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Innovations in the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
 
Keith Whitfield1  
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS2004) is the fifth in a 
series of nationally representative surveys of workplace industrial/employee/ 
employment relations that date back to 1980.  WERS2004 has been developed by four 
sponsors – Economic and Social Research Council, the Department of Trade and 
Industry, the Arbitration and Conc iliation Advisory Service and the Policy Studies 
Institute.   
 
The WERS series is regarded as world-leading in its field and has underpinned a 
substantial volume of high-quality research by British and overseas authors (Forth et 
al., 2004).  The latest survey contains many innovations relative to its predecessors.  
A number of these result from the work of the specialist teams set up by the survey’s 
Steering Group, funded by ESRC and DTI.  
 
The aim of the Innovations project reported in this volume is to highlight the work of 
these specialist teams and to disseminate the key findings that stem from their unique 
contribution.  It contains contributions from team members that summarise their 
innovations, explain why they introduced them and indicate what the preliminary 
findings suggest. In so doing, their contributions emphasise that the latest in the 
WERS series is as innovative as its predecessors, and will thereby further enhance the 
esteem in which the WERS series is held. 
 
 
2. The WIRS/WERS Series 
 
The WIRS/WERS series spans twenty-four years of data-collection and is now in its 
fifth survey.  It is used by researchers throughout the world and its analysis often 
allows the addressing of questions that cannot be tackled by researchers using data 
pertaining to their own countries.  Many of the papers which use WERS98 data are by 
North American researchers and are published in North American journals. 
 
Each successive survey has a distinctive focus, reflecting the key issues presenting 
themselves at the time of its conception.  The current survey has been especially 
directed towards the recent attempts to develop union-management partnership 
agreements at the workplace and the imminence of the European Information and 
Consultation Directive.  The lower size threshold has also been extended downwards 
to establishments with just five employees (following the successful reduction from 
25 to 10 employees in WERS98).  A financial performance questionnaire has been 
trialled and a wide range of new questions on employee well-being, governance and 
dispute resolution have been introduced.  
 
 
                                                                 
1  Cardiff Business School, Cardiff University 
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3. WERS5 Design and Development 
 
At an early stage in the WERS2004 planning cycle, it was decided that continuity 
with the previous survey (WERS98) would be the hallmark of the fifth WERS rather 
than change.  The rationales for this were that:  
 
1) WERS98 represented a major change from its predecessor (and that further 
large-scale change could potentially destroy WERS’s distinctive identity);  
 
2) large-scale change could inhibit the development of a 24 year data-set 
covering two distinct phases of ER development in Britain and;  
 
3) the broad WERS community was happy with WERS98. 
 
The academic consultation exercise raised some doubts about the desirability of too 
much continuity and, in particular, indicated that there were areas in WERS98 that 
were deemed to be short of the standards achieved in equivalent surveys in the UK 
and elsewhere.  In general, it became clear that the academic community wished for 
more attention to be paid to improving WERS as a stand-alone survey as opposed to 
one which can map change over time.  Indeed, the feeling was that the former did not 
fundamentally compromise the latter. 
 
Those undertaking the fifth WERS survey had a strong reputation to maintain.  The 
first four surveys in the WERS series had widely acknowledged as leaders in their 
field, and had been the basis of a high volume of insightful research.  A strong and 
experienced research team was established led by Barbara Kersley of the Department 
of Trade and Industry, composed of Helen Bewley (Policy Studies Institute), Alex 
Bryson (Policy Studies Institute), Gill Dix (ACAS), John Forth (National Institute of 
Economic and Social Research, on secondment to DTI), Carmen Alpin (DTI), and 
Sarah Oxenbridge (ACAS).   
 
The WERS2004 Steering Group decided to set up six specialist teams to examine key 
areas of concern raised in the academic consultation exercise and, to a lesser extent, in 
the other consultation exercises.  These focused on: the inclusion of small 
establishments in the survey; partnership arrangements; the worker representative 
questionnaire; job satisfaction, stress and skills; organisational performance and 
technology; governance and issues beyond the workplace.  The full Steering Group 
was involved in the selection of the members of these teams and in setting their terms 
of reference.  The membership of each team is outlined in the appendix to this 
chapter. Each team was led by ESRC’s Senior Academic Consultant to the fifth 
WERS project, Keith Whitfield. 
 
Each team reported to a deadline set by the Steering Group.  It should be noted that 
these deadlines were very tight.  Many of the teams’ recommendations were adopted 
by the research team. 
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4. Key Innovations in WERS2004 
 
The key innovations introduced into the 2004 survey are as follows: 
 
1) Extension of the lower-size threshold for inclusion in the survey from ten- 
employee to five-employee establishments. 
 
2) Introduction of a range of questions concerning the development of union-
management partnership arrangements in Britain. 
 
3) Development of a financial performance questionnaire to be distributed after 
the main management questionnaire, to be completed by a manager 
responsible for financial matters. These relate to more “objective” aspects of 
performance than those in previous surveys. 
 
4) Development of new measures of technology. 
 
5) Inclusion of questions on aspects of the establishment’s governance structures 
and the influence of the wider organisation in multi-establishment 
organisations. 
 
6) Refinement of the questions on employee share-ownership schemes to more 
closely reflect the underlying legislation. 
 
7) Complete redesign of the worker representative questionnaire, both to try and 
obtain more responses from non-union representatives and to anticipate the 
introduction of the European Information and Consultation Directive. 
 
8) Re-design of the self-completion employee questionnaire in relation to 
questions on job stress, worker satisfaction, skills and earnings.   
 
 
5. This Collection of Papers  
 
The key aim of this collection of papers is to highlight the main changes introduced 
into the WERS2004 survey by the specialist teams.  It thereby indicates key areas in 
which innovative WERS-based research work can take place.  Additionally, by 
outlining the rationales behind each of the innovations it gives an indication of what 
was motivating the changes proposed and therefore the literature that the innovation 
builds on.  This will allow all of those researching in this area to better locate the 
work that they are doing.  Possibly most importantly of all, the collection indicates 
what can be achieved in terms of survey design and development when an 
experienced and skilled research team works in harmony with teams of specialist 
advisers who have a keen interest in the quality of the final product.  Hopefully, 
herein will be lessons not just for any future WERS surveys, but also for all such 
activities taking place at the interface of academic, policy and practice-based research. 
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Appendix:  WERS2004 Specialist Advisory Teams  
 
Small Establishments Team 
Robert Blackburn (Kingston Business School); Rob Rutherford (Small Business 
Service, DTI); David Storey (University of Warwick). 
 
Governance/Beyond the Workplace Team 
Simon Deakin (Cambridge University); Paul Edwards (University of Warwick); Paul 
Marginson (University of Warwick); Andrew Pendleton (Manchester Metropolitan 
University). 
 
Worker Representative Questionnaire Team 
Andy Charlwood (formerlyUniversity of Kent, Canterbury; now Leeds University); 
Riccardo Peccei (Kings College London); Mike Terry (University of Warwick). 
 
Skill/Satisfaction/Stress Team 
Francis Green (University of Kent); Mike Rose (Bath University); Stephen Wood 
(University of Sheffield) 
 
Performance/Technology Team 
Richard Harris (formerly University of Durham; now University of Newcastle); 
Stephen Machin (University College, London); Robert McNabb (Cardiff University).  
 
Partnership Specialist Team 
William Brown (University of Cambridge); David Guest (Kings College London); 
Sarah Oxenbridge (formerly University of Cambridge; now ACAS) 
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Ownership, Governance, and Employment Relationships: the 
contribution and potential of WERS 
 
Andrew Pendleton1 and Simon Deakin2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been a huge growth of academic and policy interest in corporate governance in 
recent years.   This has been reflected in the emergence of an interest in the impact of 
ownership structure and corporate governance practices on labour and the employment 
relationship (eg Blair and Roe 1999).  This emphasis complements the emphasis on the 
potential role of product markets as determinants of industrial relations practices that 
emerged in the 1980s.   Although there has been a rich vein of scholarship on the nature of 
these relationships, there has been relatively little empirical work so far.   Much of the work 
has been on national, ‘systems’ level, and there is a need to investigate the hypothesised 
relationships at firm and workplace level within national economies. 
 
This paper explores the contribution and potential of the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey in this area of interest.3  It first reviews work generated from the series noting that, 
aside from early work on the IR practices of multinationals and a stream of work on 
employee share ownership, WERS has been under-used for analysis of ownership and 
governance.  It then looks at recent changes in the legal and regulatory framework affecting 
the relationship between employment relations and corporate governance and considers 
their relevance for analysis of WERS.  After that it outlines the changes made in WERS 
2004, and suggests that this enhances the potential of WERS in this area.  The paper then 
provides a couple of examples of how WERS can be used.  The first is a brief empirical 
review of findings relevant to the impact of stock market listing on workplace employment 
practices.  The second considers the impact of ownership structure on managerial 
remuneration.  Both are intended as illustrative examples of what WERS can do rather than 
definitive analyses of these topics.  Finally, the paper highlights the inevitable limitations of 
a workplace survey for analysis of corporate- level phenomena but nevertheless puts 
forward some recommendations for improvement in the next WERS survey.         
 
 
                                                               
1 The York Management School, University of York 
2 Centre for Business research, University of Cambridge 
3 The series has changed its name twice in its twenty six year history.  It started as the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS) but changed to the Workplace Employee Relations Survey in 1998 (WERS).  In 
2004 it changed again to the Workplace Employment Relations Survey.  For ease of presentation we will refer 
to the series as WERS throughout.   
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2. Research on the impact of ownership and corporate governance on employment 
relations 
 
The influence of ownership and corporate governance has been a long-standing, though 
often muted and implicit, area of interest in industrial relations research and scholarship.  
Recently, however, there has been a significant growth in activity, and a variety of strands 
of work can be discerned.  The stakeholder literature, primarily interested in how political 
economy and business organisation intersect, has shown how ownership and governance 
affect what firms do.  It has been argued that the structure of ownership and patterns of 
governance in countries such as the UK and US affect HRM in a number of ways, primarily 
because a need to prioritise shareholder and financier interests means that firms have a 
lower capacity to commit to their employees (Porter 1997; Hutton 1995).   In a not 
dissimilar vein, the emergence of the ‘varieties’ literature from comparative political 
economy has emphasised systemic complementarities between institutions, and has 
highlighted the interaction of ownership, governance, and labour relations (see Hall and 
Soskice 2001).  This has spawned a number of national- level studies exploring the 
relationship between ownership, governance, and employment systems (eg. The studies in 
Gospel and Pendleton 2005).  There has also been a great deal of interest within this strand 
in the extent and potential for convergence of national systems, especia lly of ‘coordinated 
market economies’, such as Germany and Japan, towards Anglo -American systems (Lane 
2003).   
 
At the same time, comparative quantitative studies have emerged, exploring the 
relationship between ownership structures and legal systems (La Porta et al 1998, 2000), 
including labour law systems (Ahlering and Deakin 2005), and between equity markets, job 
tenure, and payment systems (Hall and Gingerich 2001; Black et al 2006).  Firm- level 
studies, either in the form of case studies or quantitative investigations of large number of 
firms, have been less in evidence.   There have been just a few case studies of the impact of 
corporate governance on employment relations in the UK (Deakin et al 2002) and 
elsewhere (eg. Hopner and Jackson 2001; Vitols 2002).  Quantitative studies have been 
mainly found in US labour economics, and have tended to focus on the role of finance in 
influencing employment levels and pay-setting (Hanka 1998; Sharpe 1994).  In the US 
there has also been a body of work over a lo nger period on the labour effects of mergers 
and takeovers (Lichtenberg and Siegel 1990; Rosett 1990).   Finally, there has been a 
resurgence of interest in the role of multinationals and how far the practice of employment 
relations in subsidiaries of multinationals is governed by the practices of the country of 
ownership and control (Almond et al 2005; McDonald et al 2003).   
 
These literatures tend to share a number of common preoccupations though there are 
differences in focus (national systems vs. firm level).  The key ownership dimensions of 
interest include the structure of ownership (dispersed vs. concentrated) and the identity of 
owners (family, institutions, small investors, employees etc) whilst key instruments of 
governance include board structure s and composition, executive remuneration systems, and 
(in Anglo-American systems) mergers and acquisitions.   
 
  13 
What has the WERS series contributed to scholarship in this area, and what potential does it 
have to make a greater contribution?  Before answering this question, it is important to 
register a ‘health warning’.  WERS is a workplace survey, whilst ownership and corporate 
governance are primarily company level phenomena.  It is difficult to do justice to any of 
these phenomena in a workplace-level study.  However, the key contribution that WERS 
can make is to illustrate how these corporate-level phenomenon influence practices at 
workplace level.  Throughout the WERS series, there have been a number of questions (in 
Section A of the management questio nnaire) that deal with ownership.  These have asked 
about the country of ownership, the legal form of the company owning the workplace, the 
national location of Head Office, and the presence of concentrated ownership.  Later in the 
paper we will show how some of these questions, including innovations in WERS2004, 
might be used to address issues arising from ownership and governance.  Before that we 
review the history of WERS-based research into ownership and governance, and then 
outline the content of the new questions introduced in 2004.   
 
Despite the potential in WERS, the level of activity in this area has been fairly low.  
Analysis of the WERS bibliography (National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
2006) shows that WERS-based output tends to reflect the broader and primary 
preoccupations of the discipline at any given time.  So, in the early 1990s there was a great 
deal published on unions, their impact (eg. Denny and Nickell 1992), and their decline 
(Disney et al 1995).  In the 2000s, papers on high performance workplaces, employee 
participation, and performance are perhaps the dominant strands of WERS-based work (eg. 
Bryson et al 2005; Bewley et al 2005; Addison and Belfield 2001), though evaluation of the 
impact of unions (eg. Boheim and Booth 2004) and influences on union effectiveness 
(Charlwood 2004) continue to loom large.   
 
Nevertheless, two governance-related themes can be discerned in WERS-based output over 
the duration of the series.  Periodically, WERS has been used to explore the IR/HR 
practices of foreign-owned workplaces.  Indeed, some of the earliest work using WERS 
compared the industrial relations practices and comparative pay levels of domestically-
owned and foreign-owned firms (Buckley and Enderwick 1983; Enderwick and Buckley 
1983a; Enderwick and Buckley 1983b; Blanchflower 1984; Enderwick 1985).  The impact 
of foreign ownership has surfaced intermittently since with papers by Milner and James 
(1994) and Driffield (1995).  Recently, there has been a modest resurgence of work in this 
area with papers published on employees’ experience of working for overseas 
multinationals (Sutherland 2003), the impact of foreign ownership on the use of micro-
electronic technology and skills (Ta Velde 2003), and the relationship between foreign 
ownership and wages (Ta Velde 2002). 
 
The WERS sourcebooks have also commented briefly on this issue: the report on the 2004 
survey shows that in the private sector collective bargaining incidence is higher in foreign-
owned workplaces (17 per cent compared with 13 per cent), and that total employee 
coverage is 32 per cent compared with 23 per cent (foreign-owned workplaces are on 
average larger than domestically-owned workplaces) (Kersley et al 2006: 181-2).  There is 
also some initial evidence that foreign ownership has a favourable impact on value added 
and sales per work (Kersley et al 2006: 300).     
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More consistently through the series, there has been a stream of work on employee share 
ownership.  The main topics of interest have been the correlates and determinants of share 
plans (Beaumont and Harris 1994; Pendleton 1997), their impact on performance (Fernie 
and Metcalfe 1995; McNabb and Whitfield 1998; Addison and Belfield 2000), and their 
relationship to other forms of employee participation (Gregg and Machin 1988; McNabb 
and Whitfield 1999).  Recently, research in this has highlighted the role of employee stock 
ownership as a form of governance (Robinson and Zhang 2005; Pendleton 2005).  The 
WERS sourcebooks have also consistently presented informatio n on the diffusion and 
correlates of share ownership plans.  Share plans increased in incidence during the 1980s 
but then declined somewhat in the period up to WERS1998.  The WERS2004 analysis 
observes that incidence in 2004 is similar to 1998, and also shows how incidence rises with 
organisational size (Kersley et al 2006: 191-2).   
 
Other ownership and governance issues that have occasionally been investigated using 
WERS include the impact of takeovers and the HR effects of family ownership.  Hall and 
Pickering (1991) investigated the impact of takeovers on the performance of acquired 
plants, finding that takeovers lead (at least initially) to relatively poor financial performance 
but rising sales.  Unfortunately, the paper did not assess the impact on ind ustrial relations 
and HR practices.  More recently, Harris et al (2004a, 2004b) have examined employee 
involvement and consultation practices in family-owned businesses. 
  
Finally, work has emerged recently which has explicitly focused on the relationships 
between ownership, governance, and HR practices.  Konzelmann et al. (2006) construct a 
theoretical model of HR and corporate governance, building on the suggestion that 
‘organizations which have a dominant external stakeholder, such as PLCs and public sector 
organizations, may be constrained in their ability to implement and maintain commitment-
based HRM systems’, because ‘the meeting of remote stakeholders’ demands may prevent 
managers from making credible commitments to employees which in turn inhibits their 
ability to secure the full cooperation from their workforce that is required for effective 
HRM’.  They then test various hypotheses using WERS98, dividing the sample into four 
categories: public sector, PLC, owner-managed firms, and private-sector other.  The 
findings are complex but suggestive of a significant role for ownership and governance.  
Analysis of the management survey finds that PLCs have a stronger managerial 
commitment to HRM practices than the other forms, and also exhibit a higher level of 
employee consultation.  Corporate governance form is a less powerful predictor of HRM 
practices and outcomes when the employee questionnaire is analysed.  The most significant 
finding here is that the public sector reports a higher degree of commitment by employees 
to the values of the organisation, but also high levels of work pressure, low levels of job 
satisfaction and poor job quality.  
 
Thus work on ownership and governance has only recently begun to address the question of 
the impact on employment relations in a systematic way.  The growing interest in this field 
reflects the increased importance attached to it by policy makers.  We will briefly examine 
some recent developments in the legal and regulatory framework before reviewing the 
changes made in the 2004 WERS and going on to show how WERS can be used to address 
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the question of the impact of corporate governance structures on employment relations and 
outcomes. 
 
3. Issues arising from some recent changes to the legal and regulatory framework 
 
The UK is often characterised as a system which closely adheres to the principles of 
shareholder value, along with the US, in contrast to the stakeholder orientation of mainland 
Europe and East Asian countries.  In fact, legal and institutional aspects of UK corporate 
governance are arguably less sharply focused on a norm of shareholder primacy, to the 
exclusion of employee interests, than this description implies (see Armour et al., 2003).  
The influence of European Union law is pulling UK practice closer towards forms of 
employee participation which are found in continental systems.  Laws mandating 
information and consultation with employee representatives over redundancies and 
business transfers were significantly strengthened in the mid-1990s, when they were no 
longer confined to workplaces with trade union recognition, and legal sanctions for their 
breach were tightened up.  Case studies carried out by Armour and Deakin (2003) 
suggested that these laws could have a substantial impact on corporate restructurings, 
empowering employees in such a way as to qualify the rights of shareholders and creditors, 
and could also affect the outcome of reorganisations.  Thanks to the recent implementation 
in UK law of three European Directives – on European Works Councils, Information and 
Consultation of Employees and employee representation in the Societas Europaea or 
European Public Limited-Liability Company – there is now legal provision in a range of 
contexts for information and consultation of employees and employee representatives on a 
continuing basis, and not just in one-off situations such as large scale redundancies (see 
Deakin and Morris, 2005: ch. 9).  In the context of takeover bids, new legal requirements 
have been introduced for the provision of information to employee representatives 
concerning the effects of mergers and takeovers on employment conditions, under the terms 
of the Thirteenth Company Law Directive.  These provisions fall a very long way short of 
mandating codetermination along German lines – there is no prospect of mandatory 
employee representation on boards coming out of the EU any time soon – but they do 
illustrate the increasing juridification, through labour law, of managerial decision-making 
on matters of corporate structure, which not long ago were entirely within the commercial 
sphere.  They also suggest a growing gap between UK and US practice on the issue of 
stakeholder relations. 
 
A second force for change in the UK system is the Company Law Review which was 
initiated by the current government almost a decade ago, and which has finally borne fruit 
in the Companies Bill 2006.  This is the most significant reform to company law for several 
decades, not simply in terms of its considerable scale and complexity, but also by virtue of 
its incursion into the core areas of directors’ duties and the definition of the company 
interest.  The Company Law Review Steering Group recommended the introduction into 
company law of a  concept of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ to express the idea that the 
board’s task was to strike a balance between the competing interests of the different 
stakeholders, in order to benefit the shareholders in the long run (Company Law Review 
Steering Group, 1999: 37).  It accordingly proposed a restatement of directors’ duties in 
which there would be ‘[a]n obligation on directors to achieve the success of the company 
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for the benefit of the shareholders by taking proper account of all the relevant 
considerations for that purpose’ including ‘a proper balanced view of the short and long 
term, the need to sustain effective ongoing relationships with employees, customers, 
suppliers and others; and the need to maintain the company’s reputation and to consider the 
impact of its operations on the community and the environment’ (Company Law Review 
Steering Group, 2000: 12; see also Company Law Review Steering Group, 2001: 41).   
 
Clause 173 of the Companies Bill 2006 was accordingly drafted to provide that: 
 
(1) A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be most 
likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole… 
 
(2) In fulfilling the duty imposed by this section a director must (so far as reasonably 
practicable) have regard to – 
 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, 
customers and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the 
environment 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high 
standards of business conduct ,and  
(f) the need to act fairly as between the members of the company. 
 
The new provision replaces section 309 of the Companies Act 1985, which previously 
provided that directors, in exercising their duties, were required to consider the interests of 
employees as well as shareholders.  This is now subsumed into the reference to employees’ 
interests in paragraph (b).  The repeal of section 309 could be regarded as signalling a 
weakening of the employee interest, which is now simply one of a number of 
considerations which directors must take into account; but since section 309 was regarded 
as having no discernible impact on managerial decision making (see Deakin et al. 2002a), 
its demise probably does not matter much.  Of greater significance is the introduction of 
new legal remedies for the enforcement of directors’ duties: the Bill eases restraints 
previously imposed on legal actions by shareholders against directors.  In the context of 
listed companies whose shares are sold to the public at large, employees who are also 
shareholders could challenge board decisions which impact negatively on labour interests; 
it has been the subject of criticism from employer organisations on precisely these grounds.  
Because a court can halt shareholder-driven litigation in a case where it can be shown that a 
person acting with regard to the company’s interests would not pursue it, it is unclear 
whether this is a real possibility; but it seems highly likely that board-level deliberations 
will in future be more focused on the impact of managerial decision for employees.   
 
The Steering Group also argued for a new statutory requirement for listed companies (and 
certain other ‘very large companies with real economic power’) to publish an operating and 
financial review (OFR) as part of their annual reports.  The OFR was meant to ‘cover all 
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that is material in the directors’ view for users to achieve a proper assessment of the 
performance and future plans and prospects of the business’ including ‘where relevant its 
relationships with employees and others and its impact on the community and environment’ 
(Company Law Review Steering Group, 2000: 13).   Legislation making the OFR 
mandatory was duly enacted but before it could come into effect the government 
announced in December 2005 that it was withdrawing the measure, following lobbying 
from the CBI (among others), on the grounds that it added to ‘red tape’.  Then in February 
2006 the government announced that it was reconsidering its position in the light of 
litigation initiated by the NGO, Friends of the Earth, claiming that there had been a failure 
to consult relevant parties on the repeal of the law.  A new version of the OFR has now 
been introduced into the Companies Bill 2006.  Although this version does not contain the 
same requirement for companies to carry out a forward-looking review as before, and 
possibilities for litigation against boards in the context of the OFR are to be strictly limited, 
it still has the potential to shift board- level practice in the direction of a more explicit 
consideration of employee and other ‘stakeholder’ interests.   
 
A third area of importance for the legal and policy framework of corporate governance 
concerns the growing level of engagement by pension funds and other institutional 
shareholders on issues of corporate social responsibility (CSR), including employee 
relations.  An impetus towards shareholder activism was provided by the publication of 
policy papers on CSR by the European Commission and DTI in the early 2000s 
(Commission, 2001; DTI, 2001).  A change to regulations governing pension funds, made 
in  1999 and coming into effect in 2001, encouraged greater disclosure of the extent to 
which funds took ‘social, environmental and ethical’ considerations into account in 
investment decisions; the Association of British Insurers has commented that this provision 
has had a ‘significant and wide-ranging impact on the investment community…[and has] 
added significantly to the growing Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) movement’ 
(ABI, 2001: 13).  There are problems with the idea that shareholders should or will take 
action to require listed companies to act in a ‘socially responsible’ way: these include the 
high costs of direct engagement and the danger of free riding (see Armour et al., 2003).  In 
addition, the institutional framework is not necessarily compatible with shareholder playing 
this role.  In particular, British trade unions do not appear to have the degree of influence 
on boards of pension fund trustees that labour interests have in certain cases in America, as 
in the case of the CalPERS pension scheme which represents public-sector workers in 
California.  UK pensions  legislation has been slow to mandate employee representation on 
the boards of trustees of defined-benefit pension funds (a requirement for 50% employee 
representation came into effect only recently).  It has also been thought, following the legal 
decision in the Cowan v. Scargill case in the 1980s, that social considerations cannot be 
taken into account by trustees when making decisions on investments, although legal 
opinion on this issue seems now to be shifting and greater leeway for trustees is being 
recognised (UNEP, 2006).  Most employer-based pension schemes are moving away from a 
defined-benefit structure to one based on defined contributions; this displaces the risk of 
stock market fluctuations on to employees, making it possible that pension scheme member 
will become more risk averse and more narrowly focused on financial returns.  However, 
employers have less influence in defined contribution schemes, so their growth may open 
up new opportunities for unions to press the case for SRI.  Several unions have already 
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done this in the case of pension funds set up for their own employees and officers.  This is 
an area in which we can expect to a growing role for unions engaging employers on 
corporate governance issues (see generally Deakin and Hobbs, 2007).  The proposal of the 
Turner Commission to introduce what would be, in effect, a government-run defined 
contribution pension scheme to replace the existing second state pension, adds a further 
dimension to the pensions debate. 
 
Each of the policy developments set out above has implications for the empirical research 
agenda arising from WERS.  If WERS can be used to shed light on the relationship 
between management practice, corporate governance structure and employment outcomes, 
significant progress could be made on elucidating policy options in an area which is 
increasingly gaining the attention of government and the social partners, as well as the 
financial community.  With this in mind, we now turn to a closer examination of WERS 
2004. 
 
4. Innovations in WERS 2004 
 
The limited number of studies on the relationship between ownership, governance, and 
HRM/ER reflects the pattern of interests within the discipline, and the ‘mis-match’ between 
the workplace focus of WERS and the company-level phenomenon.  However, as WERS 
2004 was undergoing design it was recognised that improvements could be made to WERS 
to enhance its suitability for research into ownership and governance.  A project team was 
established to develop questions in this area.4  The main innovations in WERS 2004 arising 
from this group’s work were as follows.   
 
A question was added on whether the workplace belonged to a company that was listed on 
a stock exchange.  Stock market listing is of key interest to corporate governance scholars 
from all disciplines for a variety of reasons.  A key argument of the stakeholder perspective 
has been that active and well-developed stock markets, with highly dispersed ownership by 
institutional investors (as in the UK) encourage ‘short-termism’ by companies, as 
exemplified apparently by rela tively shorter job tenures, lower employee commitment, and 
lower levels of firm-provided training.    The weakness of direct control by owners is said 
to encourage the use of alignment devices in the area of executive remuneration, such as 
stock options, and also reliance on the market for corporate control as a form of 
management discipline (though its efficacy here is questioned – Franks and Mayer 1996; 
Deakin and Slinger 1997; Deakin et al., 2002a).  Until WERS 2004 the PLC legal form had 
to be used as a proxy for firm exposure to equity markets.  However, it is a noisy measure 
as by no means all PLCs are listed.  Twenty per cent of the 565 workplaces belonging to a 
PLC in WERS2004 do not belong to a stock market- listed firm.  
 
A related change in WERS2004 compared with WERS98 is a significant development of 
the question on formal status of the company.  In WERS98 this question had just three 
categories – PLC, private sector  -  other, and public sector.  This question did not do 
                                                               
4 Its members were Keith Whitfield (coordinator), Simon Deakin, Paul Edwards, Mahmoud Ezzamel, Paul 
Marginson, and Andrew Pendleton.  The latter was primarily concerned with the development of questions on 
employee share ownership plans (Section F of the Management Questionnaire). 
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justice to the variety of legal forms for either private sector or public sector organisations.  
In the case of the private sector, the 1998 ‘other’ category now embraces companies limited 
by guarantee, partnerships (including the relatively new but popular limited liability 
partnership), trusts and charities, bodies established by Royal Charter, co-operatives, 
mutuals, and friendly societies.  
  
Meanwhile for the public sector, the public sector category has been divided into trading 
companies (eg the Post Office), agencies, other non-trading public corporations (examples 
from National Accounts), Quasi Automonous National Government Organisations 
(QUANGO), and local and central government authorities (eg NHS and local education).   
 
As a result of this expansion, it is now possible to explore the distribution of HR/ER 
practices in a wide variety of organisational types.  For instance, those interested in HR in 
charitable organisations will be able to use WERS for the first time, and the distinctive 
governance properties of mutuals can also be studied (see Cook et al., 2002).  Similarly, it 
will be possible to examine HR in ‘spin-offs’ from major public sector organisations, such 
as agencies.  The latter especially are of growing importance and interest because of public 
policy developments over the last fifteen years or so.  WERS98 arguably embodied a rather 
old-fashioned and monolithic conception of public and private sectors which did not 
adequately capture the growing complexity of organisational forms. 
 
Table 1  
Distribution of organisational types by workplace 1998 and 2004 
 2004 
 
2004 
 
2004 
(weighted) 
1998 
(unweighted) 
1998 
(weighted) 
Organisational type Number of 
workplaces 
Percentage of workplaces 
PLC 576 25.1 20.54 37.8 29.1 
Private limited company 794 34.6 46.95   
Private sector – other 
(1998 measure) 
N/a N/a N/a 31 46 
Company limited by 
guarantee 
55 2.4 2.35   
Partnership 132 5.75 11.52   
Trust/charity 92 4.01 3.76   
Body established by 
Royal Charter 
33 1.44 0.33   
Co-
operative/mutual/friendly 
society 
24 1.05 1.53   
All public sector 
organisations 
589 25.66 13.02 31 24.9 
 
The other main change has concerned the employee share ownership questions.  
WERS2004 reintroduces a question on the specific types of employee share ownership plan 
in use: Share Incentive Plan, Save As You Earn, Enterprise Management Incentives, 
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Company Share Option Plan, and ‘other’.  This is a return to WIRS1990 practice: WERS98 
had asked a single share ownership plan question without differentiating plan types.  The 
greater precision in the 2004 question enables an evaluation of recent policy initiatives 
(both SIP and EMI were introduced in 2000) and also facilitates (to some extent) 
exploration of how different plans are associated with other HR practices and workplace 
characteristics.  For instance, SAYE is an option-based plan, whereas SIP can distribute 
free shares to employees: it may be anticipated that these plans may be used for different 
purposes (see Pendleton 2006). 
 
A further innovation which is not concerned with ownership and governa nce per se but is 
nevertheless relevant to it, is the addition of a question in Section K on whether workplace 
targets are set at higher levels of the organisation.  In general, this permits an evaluation of 
workplace autonomy and the distribution of powers between workplaces and higher levels 
of multi-site organisations (where the workplace observed is not head office).  More 
specifically, it enables an evaluation of the argument that controls on workplaces are tighter 
in those organisations with specific ownership/governance characteristics. 
 
Finally, in the Management Questionnaire, several additional categories were added to the 
question on changes to the establishment in the previous two years.  These include a change 
of name and location, and change in activity, and whether the establishment has merged or 
split from another workplace in the organisation.  Thus, WERS2004 is better able to 
capture restructuring within existing organisations as well as changes in formal ownership 
such as mergers, buy-outs, and privatisation. 
 
Thus the innovations in the ownership and governance questions, although limited in 
number and scope, enable much more precise analysis of the relationship between 
ownership, governance, and HR/ER than WERS98.  This is welcome given the growing 
interest in these relationships.  It is possible to use the new questions in conjunction with 
existing Section A questions to investigate a range of events and phenomenon such as what 
happens in listed firms that have undergone mergers and takeovers, are limited liability 
partnerships mainly found in larger (professional) organisations, and do HR practices differ 
between large and small partnerships?. 
 
5. Opportunities offered by WERS2004 to test predictions found in the literature  
 
In the remainder of the paper we use the ownership and governance questions to shed light 
on some important issues arising in the recent corporate governance literature.  It should be 
emphasized that these examples are not intended to provide definitive answers to the 
questions posed.  Instead, they provide illustrative and perhaps suggestive examples of how 
WERS can be used to explore the impact of ownership and governance.     
 
The impact of stock market listing on workplace management of employees 
 
One of the central contentions found in the new literature on ownership, governance, and 
HR/IR is that firms exposed to stock market pressures in Anglo-American companies will 
be impelled to take a short-termist approach to employee management (Gospel and 
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Pendleton 2003).  At root of this is supposed short-term behaviour on the part of dispersed, 
institutional investors: it is argued that these investors will prioritise short-term financial 
returns, often because their owners or clients (eg pension fund managers) closely monitor 
short-term performance.   Further, the dispersion of ownership in countries like the UK is 
said to encourage impersonal market-based forms of intervention rather than more direct, 
relationship-based contact as in countries such as Germany.  These interventions may take 
the form of buying or selling stock, leading to the possibility of takeovers, and replacement 
of the incumbent management (Manne 1965).  A sensible management keeps the stock-
market sweet.   
 
This is said to give rise to a two-stage process.  At the first, it is alleged that firms exposed 
to these stock market pressures will prioritise short-run financial returns over longer-term 
metrics such as quality and market share.  This operates both directly and indirectly.  At the 
direct level, stock market expectations will generate pressures to maintain a tight control of 
costs and close attention to profitability (via conventions such as quarterly and half-yearly 
financial statements).  Indirectly, these kinds of pressures are said to encourage business 
strategies which favour short-term results rather than construction of longer-term 
capabilities and market share (Porter 1997).  At the second stage, it is argued that these 
pressures lead to a pattern of employment relationships and HRM which are short-termist 
and ‘uncommitted’ (Hutton 1996).  Examples of this are a lower commitment to training by 
management, a greater willingness to lay-off workers when times are hard etc.   
 
These arguments have been developed in comparative analysis of national systems.  
However, they may also be drawn-upon to analyse within-system differences by comparing 
listed firms (potentially directly exposed to the influences outlined above) and non-listed 
firms.  WERS2004 can be used to do this.  Bearing in mind the content of WERS, several 
research questions can be formulated. 
 
1. Do workplaces belonging to listed firms emphasize financial returns more 
than otherwise similar non- listed workplaces, and are financial returns 
more important than other objectives such as quality of service? 
2. Do workplace managers in listed firms have different orientations to their 
employees than their counterparts in non-listed workplaces?  
3. Do workplaces belonging to listed firms do less training than non-listed 
workplaces? 
 
Unfortunately, there are no questions in WERS which permit a well- founded evaluation of 
business strategy.   
 
To address the first question, we compare the use of targets in listed and non-listed firms.  
WERS asks about targets across a range of areas but for brevity’s sake we use just two 
here: targets for profits/return on investment, and for quality of service.  The first is 
especially relevant because comparative studies have emphasised that such targets are a 
  22 
particularly pronounced feature of economies with large listed sectors (Carr and Tomkins 
1998).5 
 
Table 2  
Incidence of targets in listed and non-listed workplaces 
Percentage of private sector workplaces 
Type of workplace Profit targets Quality of service targets 
Listed sector 76 75 
Non-listed sector 68 67 
Non-listed sector – private 
limited companies only 
75 69 
N 995 995 
  
Table 2 provides comparative figures for use of profit and quality of service targets for 
listed and non-listed workplaces.  The analysis is restricted to workplaces belonging to 
organisations with more than 250 employees as there are very workplaces belonging to 
listed firms with less then 250 employees in WERS.  Also, the use of formal targets is 
likely to be influenced by organisational size so it is important to control for size in some 
way.  Initially, use of profit targets does seem to be more widespread in the listed sector but 
when charities, co-operatives etc are removed from the non- listed private sector category 
(as WERS2004 now enables us to do) the differences between listed and non- listed firms 
disappears.  Small differences (significant at 95 per cent) remain for quality of service 
targets, with listed workplaces more likely to have these targets.  Another notable result is 
that the quality of service targets are as widespread as profit targets in the listed sector, 
suggesting that the argument that listed firms prioritise financial returns over all other 
considerations is overly simplistic6.   
 
Next, we examine whether management orientations to employees differ between listed and 
non-listed workplaces, using long-standing questions in Section A about management 
views on employment issues.  The two most relevant questions for our purposes are those 
concerning whether employees are led to expect long-term employment and whether the 
workplace has a consultative approach to employment relations.  A lower score indicates a 
more ‘committed’ management approach.  Results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Overall the results do not provide consistent evidence of differences between listed and 
non-listed workplaces.  Listed workplaces are less likely to lead employees to expect long-
term employment (significant at 90 per cent) than all private sector workplaces but when 
the non- listed sector is restricted to private companies (i.e. charities, co-operatives etc are 
excluded) the difference narrows slightly and becomes insignificant.  There is little 
difference between listed workplaces and either group of non- listed firms in terms of 
consultative style. 
 
                                                               
5 Though latest research indicates that large listed German firms now approximate to the Anglo-American 
model: Carr 2005. 
6 90 per cent of NHS and local government workplaces have quality of service targets. 
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Table 3   
Comparison of views on employment relations between listed and non-listed 
workplaces 
Mean scores Mean scores  
Listed 
firms 
Non-
listed 
firms 
T 
Significance 
Non-listed – 
private limited 
companies 
T 
Significance 
Employees are led to 
expect long-term 
employment in this 
organisation 
2.126 2.019 1.7697 0.0771 2.02 
1.045 
0.300 
We do not introduce  
any changes here 
without first discussing 
the implications with 
employees 
2.245 2.261 
0.2555 
0.7984 
2.227 
 
0.174 
0.862 
N 995 995 995 691 691 
 
Finally, we assess the role of listing in the provision of training by workplaces.  To do this 
we mount ordered probit regressions where the dependent variables are the proportion of 
the largest occupational group receiving training in the last year and the number of days of 
training received by experienced members of the largest occupational groups in the last 
year (both are ordered category variables in WERS).  We do not present full models of the 
determinants of training7: our concern is simply to assess the role of stock market listing, 
whilst controlling for size and sector.  Results are presented in Table 4. 
 
Table 4 
 The role of stock market listing in determining training 
 in private sector workplaces  
Ordered probit (weighted) 
 Proportion of largest 
occupational group receiving 
training in the last year 
 
How many days of training 
did the experienced members 
of largest occupational group 
undertake in the last year 
Stock market listed 
(Coefficient/Z ) 
0.21 
1.49 
-0.017 
-0.11 
Sector dummies Yes Yes 
Size dummies Yes Yes 
Pseudo R2 0.0543 0.0277 
 
The results presented in Table 4 do not support the argument that stock market listed 
workplaces are less likely to provide training than other private sector workplaces.  Listed 
workplaces are more likely to train a larger proportion of workers though the difference is 
                                                               
7 For analyses using WERS see Whitfield (2000). 
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not significant.  Equally, the amount of training is slightly lower but this difference is very 
small. 
 
Overall, this set of initial results from WERS is not very supportive of the arguments that 
listed firms will make more use of financial targets, will take a more ‘hard-nosed’ approach 
to their employees, and will do less training.  This suggests that some of the common 
preconceptions of what exposure to equity markets does to firms should be revised.  Of 
course, this analysis only scrapes the surface of the issue.  More and deeper analysis can be 
conducted using WERS.  However, there will nearly always be limitations of secondary 
analysis in that the data available is unlikely to be ideal to address the chosen questions.  In 
this instance, we are not able to assess the severity of the targets or the quality of the 
training provided, though there is information in WERS to permit some further scrutiny 
(e.g. the type of training). 
 
Case studies have suggested that short-termism may be a problem not of the listed company 
segment of the economy as such, but of particular structures of ownership within that 
segment and particular regulatory environments.  Deakin et al. (2002b) found evidence that 
in regulated industries such as the utilities, shareholders could be persuaded of the benefits 
of taking a long-term approach to their investments, thereby making it possible for 
managers to make credible commitments of job stability to employees; they also found 
evidence of listed companies in which ownership by continental European pension funds, 
which explicitly based their investment policy on a long-term time horizon, encouraged the 
development of partnership agreements between management and labour.  If this is correct, 
it may not be surprising that our initia l analysis of WERS 2004 does not reveal a clear 
pattern of short-termism in the listed company sector.  A large-scale survey such as WERS 
cannot be fine-grained enough to bring out the historical and contextual circumstances 
under which partnership-style arrangements emerge in particular firms but fail in others.  
However, there may well be potential for further analysis of WERS 2004 to reveal 
divergences in HRM practices and outcomes between different corporate governance 
forms, building on the approach of Konzelmann et al. (2006). 
 
6. The influence of ownership concentration on managerial compensation 
 
In this section, we turn to management compensation and provide some illustrative results 
from WERS2004.  A central strand of the governance literature has been about how 
dispersed owners in Anglo-American economies exercise control of corporations and their 
managers (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  The dominant paradigm has been one derived from 
agency theory, where the interests of self- interested agents (managers) are seen to diverge 
from those of principals.  The issue for those in the agency tradition is how owners can stop 
managers spending free cash- flow (shareholders’ cash) on executive jets?8  The answers 
provided in the literature include the managerial labour market (Fama 1980), the market for 
corporate control (Manne 1965), and executive remuneration.  Focusing on the latter, if 
executive remuneration can be tied to shareholders’ interests, managers seem more likely to 
                                                               
8 There is an ideological aspect to this in some strands of the US literature.  There has been a concern to 
demonstrate that the separation of ownership and control is efficient despite the apparent capacity for 
opportunist and clearly sub-optimal behaviour by firm-level agents.  See Fama  and Jensen, 1983. 
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pursue policies that benefit shareholders.  Hence, the use of annual bonuses, long-term 
incentive plans (LTIPs), restricted stock, and stock options. 
 
There is evidence that the character of executive remuneration differs across economies, 
with greater use of contingent pay where there are relatively more listed firms (Black et al 
2006) and where ownership is more dispersed.  Within an economy it might be predicted 
that there will be greater use of contingent remuneration where ownership is dispersed.  An 
alternative view is that ownership dispersal, by giving greater power to managers, will 
enable managers to choose remuneration systems that are less dependent on performance 
(Werner et al 2005).  WERS can help us on this, and it is perhaps surprising that it has not 
been used in the past to  explore managerial remuneration.  There is a long-standing 
question in WERS asking whether a single individual or family owns at least 50 per cent of 
the organisation to which the workplace belongs.  We use this here to explore ownership 
influences on executive pay.  The particular hypothesis we assess is that various forms of 
contingent pay will be more likely found where ownership is not concentrated. 
         
The procedure for assessing this hypothesis is to use logistic regression where the presence 
of specific pay practices are the dependent variables.  These are the presence of a Company 
Share Options Plan (CSOP), performance-related pay for managers, and profit-related 
payments for managers.  CSOP is a discretionary share options plan that is most commonly 
used for managers and other senior executives only (WERS2004 indicates that CSOP is 
used for managers only in about 60% of workplaces).  Although the tax breaks were 
withdrawn from the formal Profit-Related Pay scheme in the late 1990s, WERS2004 shows 
that profit-related payments are still widespread: 42 per cent of private sector 
establishments reported using them for at least some of their staff.   The independent 
variables are measures of ownership concentration, of stock market listing, and of the size 
of establishment and the firm.  Controls are entered for industrial sector.   
 
The results in Table 5 are consistent with predictions from the corporate governance 
literature.  Workplaces with dispersed ownership have positive odds (significant at 10 per 
cent or better) of having performance pay and profit-related payments for managers.  The 
odds for CSOPs are also positive (larger in fact than other the other forms of contingent 
pay) though the result is not statistically significant.  It is noticeable that stock market 
listing is a strong determinant of CSOP presence, as it is of other forms of stock ownership 
plan (see Pendleton 2006): if the stock market variable is removed, the ownership 
dispersion variable becomes significant at 10 per cent and the odds increase to 3.45 
(reflecting the fairly high correlation between stock market listing and ownership 
dispersion (r = 0.257)).   As a variant on the results shown above, a measure for direct 
involvement in management by a majority owner was inserted in place of ownership 
dispersion.   As would be expected, the odds of this associating with the use of contingent 
pay were less then one, with the result significant at 5 per cent in the case of profit bonuses. 
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Table 5  
Determinants of contingent pay for managers  
Logistic regressions (weighted) 
 Company Share 
Option Plan 
 
Odds 
Z 
Performance pay for 
managers 
 
Odds 
Z 
Profit-related payments 
for managers 
 
Odds 
Z 
Ownership 
dispersal 
2.10 
1.04 
1.54 
1.84* 
1.95 
2.62*** 
Stock market 
listing 
5.28 
3.79*** 
1.00 
0.00 
0.93 
-0.22 
Size of 
establishment 
1.19 
1.46 
1.38 
3.44*** 
1.30 
2.93*** 
Medium firm 1.81 
0.96 
1.06 
0.17 
1.78 
1.57 
 
Large firm 
(1000+) 
4.70 
2.17** 
2.78 
3.70*** 
1.77 
1.91* 
Very large firm 
(5000+) 
4.18 
1.87* 
1.70 
1.47 
1.54 
1.15 
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes 
N 1374 1374 1374 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.13 0.07 
Notes: * = significant at 90 per cent; ** significant at 95 per cent; * significant at 99 per cent. 
Base: private sector workplaces excluding partnerships, trusts, bodies established by Royal Charter, co-
operatives, mutual, and friendly societies 
 
Overall, these results are supportive of the argument in the corporate governance literature 
that instruments such as contingent pay will tend to be used to overcome agency problems 
where ownership is dispersed.  The y contrast with the recent results of Weller et al (2005) 
who argue that contingent pay will be less widespread in organisations where ownership is 
dispersed because managers will be better able to resist it.      
 
The analysis presented here could no doub t be pursued further with the aid of the 
ownership and governance data collected in Section A of the WERS Management 
Questionnaire.  For instance, it is possible to investigate whether the relationship between 
ownership dispersion and use of contingent pay for managers varies between UK and 
overseas workplaces.  Preliminary analysis indicates that the odds that ownership 
dispersion predicts profit-related payments and performance pay for managers are both 
higher and more significant in foreign-owned workplaces9. The odds of ownership dispersal 
predicting the use of CSOPS are lower, however, in foreign-owned workplaces: this is to be 
expected given that domestic ownership is always a very strong influence on use of equity-
based rewards (for liquidity reasons).  
                                                               
9 This is done by splitting the sample between workplaces that are UK owned or part-UK owned and foreign-
owned (ACONTROL) 
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Using WERS to analyse the determinants of executive remuneration can add significantly 
to the literature because there is a much wider range of variables than is available in the 
typical study in this area (which typically uses information from annual accounts for 
directors).  For instance, the presence of performance pay is significantly negatively related 
to union density, when the latter is inserted in the regressions outlined above (though this 
effect is not observed for CSOP or profit payments).  It would be possible to extend the 
analysis to investigate the influence of liquidity constraints and growth opportunities (the 
latter is said to raise agency costs where ownership is dispersed because the opportunities 
for managers to make a ‘wrong’ decision are enhanced) (Smith and Watts 1992; Core and 
Guay 2001).  That said, WERS clearly cannot engage with some aspects of the executive 
remuneration debate.  For instance, neither the salaries nor levels of bonus awards for 
individual managers are available in WERS, thereby precluding analysis of pay-
performance sensitivity (seen as the acid test of agency views of executive remuneration).  
A further consideration is that the workplace focus of WERS means that the managers 
under investigation here are not necessarily the most senior managers in the organisation.  
Intriguingly, CSOPs, profit-related payments, and performance pay are significantly less 
common (at 0.1 per cent in each instance) in Head Offices than other workplaces in multi-
site organisations.  This is not inconsistent with an agency-based governance explanation: 
contingent pay is used for managers who are further from scrutiny by owners and for whom 
monitoring can be more costly. 
 
7. Limitations and further development of WERS 
 
From an ownership and governance point of view, WERS2004 is a substantial 
improvement on its forerunners in the series.  For the first time it is possible to explore the 
HRM and IR characteristics of a variety of types of ownership, such as co-operatives, 
partnerships, and charities.  It is also possible to investigate the relationship between stock 
market listing and employment relationships.  As a result, it is now possible to use WERS 
to a greater degree than previously to engage with key issues in the corporate governance 
literature concerning ownership type and governance mechanisms.  But it is also the case 
that WERS already presented opportunities in this area, though they had perhaps not been 
fully grasped by researchers.  The two sets of analysis presented in this paper use the 2004 
innovations and the long-standing questions respectively.  It will of course be possible to 
make even greater use of the new questions through linking the Employee Questionnaire 
and Financial Performance with the Management Questionnaire data.   
 
However, WERS inevitably has limitations for those interested in ownership and corporate 
governance.  As mentioned earlier, as major strand of study in corporate governance has 
been investigation of the structure and identity of ownership since both seem likely to 
influence firm behaviour.  On the whole the governance literature has not paid much 
attention to governance outcomes, other than performance (where the results are seen as 
rather indeterminate: see the review of the literature in Armour et al., 2003).  WERS might 
help to close this gap somewhat but a limitation of WERS is that information on ownership 
structure and identity is limited to the concentration measure used here, the country of 
ownership and control, and by implication whether majority owners are individuals or 
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owners.  Ideally, WERS might have a question on the nature of the dominant owners 
(investment institutions, families etc), and also one on the extent of ownership by the 
largest owner or group of owners.  Such a question exists in the French RÉPONSE survey 
which is the equivalent to WERS.  This would however add to the burden of those 
responding to the WERS surveys.  One way of mitigating this might be to produce a 
‘Company Data Sheet’ along the lines of the ‘Workforce Data Sheet’ which might be 
completed by someone other than the management respondent such as the Company 
Secretary.  
 
There are further improvements which might be made to enhance information on corporate 
governance mechanisms such as boards of directors and contingent pay, given that a central 
plank of corporate governance scholarship, especially in the agency tradition, has focused 
on these.  For instance, it could be useful to know the proportion of ownership accounted 
for by managers and whether other forms of incentive pay, such as LTIPs and restricted 
stock arrangements are available at the workplace.  Of course, the problem here is that 
many of these are corporate level issues, and that most WERS workplaces will not be at 
this level.  Such data might be directly relevant to only a minority of workplaces whilst the 
costs of collecting it might be substantial.  One way of dealing with some aspects of this 
might be to enhance further the Employee Questionnaire by including questions on bonus 
levels and eligibility/participation for a variety of forms of contingent pay. 
 
Finally, there are some less obvious ways that WERS might be modified to take account of 
recent areas of debate in corporate governance.  One strand of literature in the US has been 
concerned with union and employee involvement in pension funds.  Since, as we have seen, 
pensions arrangements are emerging as a major area of debate within the UK, WERS could 
be enhanced to contribute to this.  For instance, the Management Questionnaire might 
include a question on the form of pensions arrangement available, if any, in the workplace.  
The newly- introduced questions on non-union representation, as well as those on union 
representation, might be amended to secure specific information on worker involvement in 
pensions committees, share plan committees etc.  Currently, it is not possible to discern 
whether these types of committees have an impact from WERS data, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that such institutions could be important in some workplaces.   
Unfortunately we do not reliably know how many or how important.   By enhancing data 
on these topics, WERS could make significant improvements to our knowledge of 
employee involvement in governance. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
We have seen that the interface between corporate governance and employment relations is 
the subject of a growing body of research and is increasingly gaining the attention of policy 
makers.  The amendments to WERS 2004, which open up new possibilities for analysis of 
the role played by corporate  governance forms in shaping employment practices and 
outcomes, therefore come at an opportune moment.  In particular, it is possible to identify 
the listed company sector as a distinct category, and to say more about alternative forms of 
governance such as mutuals and not-for-profit companies.  At the same time, we should not 
necessarily expect to find a point-for-point correspondence between structures of corporate 
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ownership and control, on the one hand, and workplace employment relations, on the other.  
We know from case study research that the factors influencing labour-management 
relations and HRM practice are often dependent on the trajectory of individual firms and 
organisations.  WERS will not be able to capture this.  However, it should be possible to 
use the new corporate governance categories in WERS 2004, when coupled with the rich 
and very detailed information on aspects of workplace relations, to deepen our knowledge 
in this field.   
 
Future WERS surveys could consider further innovation in the corporate governance field, 
by, for example, including questions on ownership structure similar to those in the 
RÉPONSE survey, thereby opening up the listed company category to further subdivisions.  
However, constraints on further improvements in WERS are threefold: the cost of securing 
additional, complex information, the need to maintain WERS as a predominantly 
workplace survey to maintain the integrity of survey structure, and the desire of key 
stakeholders in WERS to maintain continuity between versio ns of the survey.  The first step 
is to explore the potential of WERS in its existing form. 
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The Study of Trust and Workplace Partnership 
 
David Guest1, William Brown2, Riccardo Peccei1, Katy Huxley3  
 
1. The problem with ‘partnership’ 
 
Political controversy makes for elusive survey topics. The long-term vitality of the 
WIRS/WERS surveys has always owed much to their engagement with current policy 
issues, monitoring the impact of recent legislation and exploring the terrain of possible 
future interventions. The closed shop, industrial action and union governance are examples 
of policy issues that, in their time, were subject to WIRS/WERS scrutiny that subsequently 
informed legislative intervention. But, by their nature, controversial topics acquire a 
changing overlay of meanings, associations and prejudices, which may make them all but 
impenetrable to dispassionate survey response. 
 
Workplace partnership has been a clear example of this. Few policy issues were more 
obvious subjects of attention for the 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(hereafter WERS2004). The first Blair government placed the promotion of workplace 
partnership at the heart of the strategy it set out in the 1998 white paper ‘Fairness at Work’ 
which anticipated the 1999 Employment Relations Act. The Act reflected this by setting up 
the Partnership at Work Fund to develop and disseminate good partnership practice. At the 
same time the Trades Union Congress was placing workplace partnership at the heart of its 
union renewal strategy. Its policy document, ‘Partners for Progress: New Unionism at the 
Workplace’, advocated industrial partnership at the level of the individual enterprise. This 
was launched in 1999 at a conference at which both the Director General of the CBI and the 
Prime Minister spoke, the latter saying that he saw trade unions to be: ‘…part of the 
solution to achieving business success and not an obstacle to it’ (Brown, 2000: 305). The 
TUC followed this by setting up its TUC Partnership Institute in 2001 (later spinning it off 
into independence in 2004) to provide practical advice to those considering partnership 
deals. In short, if ever there were a workplace employment relations policy initiative 
between the 1998 and 2004 surveys that deserved assessment, it was this encouragement of 
workplace partnership. 
 
Two difficulties were created by this substantial publicity devoted to propagating 
partnership. The first arose from the political associations that began to adhere to and 
confuse the issue. The second is the unavoidable loss of definition of something espoused 
as, in many ways, a panacea by very divergent interest groups. The first of these, the 
politicising of the notion of partnership, has been evident from the start. Trade union 
activists in many cases came to portray official endorsement of ‘partnership’ as akin to 
servile collaboration with management. It became, for example, a point of issue in the 
surprise election of Derek Simpson as the General Secretary of the union AMICUS in 
2002, decrying his incumbent opponent’s excessive espousal of partnership, which he 
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described as a ‘euphemism for exploitation’ (Financial Times, 9/9/02). A similar debate 
developed in early academic discussion of the topic, with some arguing that partnership 
‘provides an opportunity for British unions to return from political and economic exile’ 
(Ackers and Payne, 1998: 546), while others argued that it would result in debilitating 
concession-bargaining and weaken the union movement (e.g. Kelly, 1998). Within a few 
years it was evident that some trade union organisations that were engaged in, by any 
standard, sophisticated co-operative working with management, were anxious to avoid 
applying the ‘p-word’ to it, lest it undermine their credentials of independence (Oxenbridge 
and Brown, 2005: 191). 
 
The second difficulty arising from the adoption of ‘partnership’, as a desired descriptor by 
groups with different frames of reference, was simply that it quickly came to be applied to 
very diverse phenomena. For example, some employers used it to describe agreements 
which granted recognition to trade unions on such narrow terms that it appeared primarily 
to be a device to constrain their activities by, for example, explicitly denying negotiating 
and organising rights.  Other employers, by contrast, used the term partnership for 
arrangements that genuinely facilitated trade union activity and encouraged recruitment and 
widened participation (Oxenbridge and Brown, 2002).  
 
There is a revealing analogy with another, in many ways directly comparable, publicly 
encouraged initiative to reform workplace industrial relations, forty years earlier. Back in 
the 1960s, the first signs of formal, ‘integrative’ workplace bargaining in Britain took the 
form of ‘productivity agreements’. The term was coined by an agreement at Esso’s Fawley 
refinery, which was analysed by Allan Flanders, and led to widening interest in the 
potential for ‘positive-sum’ bargaining as a means of easing the inflexibilities associated 
with powerful workplace trade union organisation (Flanders, 1964). Direct negotiations at 
enterprise level were identified as a way of achieving productive changes in working 
practices that were beyond the reach of the industrial agreements that at that time formed 
the basis of British colle ctive bargaining. This imaginative approach to reform was later 
encouraged both by the National Board for Prices and Incomes, and by the Donovan Royal 
Commission on Trades Unions and Employers’ Associations. Productivity agreements were 
allowed to be the main grounds for exceptional treatment under the statutory incomes 
policies of 1966, 1967 and 1968 (National Board for Prices and Incomes, 1967; McKersie 
and Hunter, 1973). All manner of meretricious arrangements were squeezed through this 
loophole. A notion already battered by increasingly varied interpretation became so 
corrupted that Edward Heath’s 1973 incomes policy spurned the phrase ‘productivity 
agreement’ altogether.  
 
Forty years later, workplace partnership can be seen in part as a continuation of the same 
process: the involvement of enterprise- level trade unionism in co-operative rather than 
confrontational bargaining as a means of facilitating productivity improvement. But, in 
direct contrast with its progenitor of productivity agreements, workplace partnership has 
been seen, not as a means of taming powerful workplace unionism but, on the contrary, as 
means of union survival in a far harsher economic environment. The harness has become a 
lifeline. And as with its predecessor, by 2004 the ‘p-word’ of partnership had become so 
frayed by political and other exploitation as to lack any useful precision. 
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In a frank review of progress with partnership, Willy Coupar (2005), director general of the 
Involvement and Participation Association, the body that has had perhaps the leading role 
in promoting partnership, suggests that partnership was most heavily promoted in the late 
1990s, in the early years of the Labour government, and that interest reached a peak around 
2002 with the introduction of the legislation on information and consultation.  Thereafter, 
notably in the private sector and at government level, interest in partnership has waned.  By 
implication, a survey conducted in 2004 may have missed the high tide mark of the 
partnership wave.    
 
2. Exploring partnership behaviour 
 
The problem of definitions became evident as questions were formulated to investigate how 
far the policy-makers’ early enthusiasm for workplace partnership had shaped behaviour 
and institutions since 1998. A small team of academics who had recently engaged in 
empirical research on partnership was invited to suggest both new questions and those that 
might be continued from WERS19984. They suggested questions based upon four broad 
areas of enquiry to be of interest: the incidence and nature of partnership arrangements; 
associated employment relations; commitment by the parties to principles of partnership; 
and the level of trust associated with them. Pilot cognitive testing, however, found 
insurmountable problems of interpretatio n of the notion of ‘partnership’. All formulations 
were felt to be so open to ambiguity or inconsistent interpretation that they would be of no 
value. The result was that the ‘p-word’ does not appear in the survey at all.  
 
There was, however, more scope for reliable questions on ‘partnership -type practices’. 
These were identified as: experience of joint problem solving; evidence that management 
consulted with workers relatively early in decision-making; that informal approaches were 
used in resolving problems; and that pay negotiations were to some extent open to union 
influence, in that they did not start with a management fait accompli. The most important 
innovation that was felt to be sufficiently robust was a cluster of questions investigating 
aspects of trust between different parties at the place of work.  
 
We thus find ourselves in the paradoxical position that the policy objective of which the 
impact was to be evaluated – the encouragement of workplace partnership – has, in effect, 
turned into a will-o’-the-wisp, if it was not one already. It is too elusive and incoherent to 
bear survey scrutiny and may be a topic more suited to investigation through qualitative 
research techniques. But that does not mean that there might not be partnership practices as 
discussed by Guest and Peccei (2001) who identified eight clusters of ‘partnership’ 
practices based on information provided by managers and workers’ representatives in 
organizations that claimed to engage in, or be in the process of making progress towards, 
partnership at work. The focus of interest then becomes partnership, or co-operative, 
practices.  These are addressed in WERS2004 in varying degrees of detail. 
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3. Partnership and Trust 
 
The key relevant innovation in WERS2004 is the introduction of measures of trust. 
The rationale for emphasising trust in the context of workplace partnership is the 
assumption that it is a requirement for the success of cooperative processes of the sort 
defined by Walton and McKersie (1967) as ‘integrative bargaining’. While 
recognising that there are likely to be conflicting as well as mutual interests, 
integrative bargaining reflects an acceptance of the need for the key parties to work 
together and one indicator of the effectiveness of this process is the level of mutual 
trust.   
 
The positioning of trust in the context of partnership and employment relations more 
generally is potentially ambiguous.  Trust might reasonably be viewed as a 
requirement for cooperative activity; or it may be a consequence of such activity.  It is 
possible to conceive of a positive cycle reinforcing the development of trust and 
partnership; but this still leaves unanswered the question of what triggers trust in the 
first place.  As a cross-sectional survey, WERS2004 is not well-placed to explore the 
dynamics of trust relations.  However it can explore the extent to which the core 
assumption holds true, namely that there will be an association between the presence 
of partnership practices and the levels of trust between the main parties to partnership.    
 
A cursory inspection of the extensive literature on trust (see, for example, 
Wrightsman, 1991) reveals many challenges in arriving at a sound basis for its 
measurement.  Dietz (2004), in an analysis of trust and partnership, distinguishes four 
types of potentially relevant trust.  These range from calculus-based trust, utilising a 
cost-benefit analysis and therefore not implying any positive regard for the other 
party, through knowledge-based and relational-based to identification-based trust.  
Partnership is most likely to be associated with knowledge-based and relational-based 
trust; the former is based on information, the latter on a more emotional bond, perhaps 
built up though extensive contact.  Identification-based trust suggests a shared identity 
of interests that may go beyond conventional partnership that typically recognises the 
co-existence of shared and conflicting interests.    
 
There are a number of established measures of trust but none was considered to be 
wholly appropriate for measuring trust within the employment relationship.  We 
therefore had to develop items.  A useful analysis has been provided by Whitener, 
Brodt, Korsgaard and Werner (1998), in an analysis of the ways in which managers 
can build trust.  They identify five kinds of potentially relevant behaviour.  These 
appear to be equally relevant to all the parties involved in partnership activities; 
indeed, Dietz, in his case studies, uses these behaviours to inform his analysis.   They 
consist of: 
 
· Behavioural integrity – telling the truth and keeping promises 
· Behavioural consistency – predictability 
· Demonstration of concern for the interests and needs of the other party 
· Extensive open communication and information sharing 
· Shared input to decision-making 
 
Ideally, we would have included items to measure all of these behaviours.  However 
the construction of the WERS surveys consists of a series of compromises as different 
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interest groups seek to ensure that their items are included.  In the event, three items 
were retained and addressed to management and worker representatives in those 
workplaces where both were present.  These asked for responses on a five-point scale, 
ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”, to the following statements: 
 
· Management/worker representatives can be relied upon to live up to the 
commitments they have made 
 
· Management/worker representatives are sincere in their attempts to understand 
the other party’s point of view 
 
· Management/worker representatives can be trusted to act with honesty and 
integrity 
 
These three items cover the first three dimensions identified by Whitener et al.  The 
two remaining behaviours are more typically regarded as partnership practices and 
while it would have been possible and indeed desirable to gain an assessment of their 
operation in practice, in WERS2004 they served as inputs to, or correlates of trust.  As 
already noted, the distinction between what constitutes an input and an outcome of the 
relationship between partnership and trust is blurred, further highlighting the 
operational problems in developing acceptable measures.   
 
In parallel with the development of questions about trust among managers and 
workers’ representatives, WERS2004 introduced an expanded set of questions for the 
employee questionnaire intended to be completed by a representative sample of the 
staff at each workplace.   These included three questions concerned with employee 
trust in management.   As noted above, trust can be viewed as a potentially important 
mediating variable in the employment relationship and this applies equally to trust 
among employees.   It raises the question of whether the employees share with their 
representatives a similar perception of the partnership practices that are associated 
with trust in management.  By introducing these new items, WERS2004 provides an 
opportunity to explore this issue.  The employee questionnaire also includes items 
addressing information sharing and consultation, providing some basis beyond the 
trust measures for evaluating the impact of the last two behaviours identified by 
Whitener et al.  The three items relating to trust in the employee questionnaire are: 
 
“Managers here: 
 
· Can be relied upon to keep their promises 
· Are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views 
· Deal with employees honestly” 
 
The responses were once again provided on a five-point scale ranging from “strongly 
agree” to “strongly disagree”. 
 
4. The Measurement of Partnership in WERS2004 
 
Although it was impossible to agree about questions that specifically addressed 
partnership using the ‘p-word’, there is in WERS2004, as in previous WERS surveys, 
a wide range of often very detailed questions about workplace practices.  Many of 
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these might be described as partnership practices.  However in determining which 
practices to include, we are inevitably thrown back on the need to adopt an 
operational definition of partnership.  The definitions offered by organisations such as 
the TUC (1999) and the IPA (1997) do not meet our requirements, mainly because 
they tend to conflate principles, practices and outcomes.  Acknowledging the 
conceptual problems in arriving at a widely acceptable definition, an alternative is to 
adopt a more empirically-based approach. 
 
In their study of organizations that espoused an interest in applying partnership, Guest 
and Peccei (2001) found eight sets of practices that were widely associated with 
partnership activity by both management and employee representatives.  While this 
list is not without its problems, in the absence of any clear definition of partnership, 
these practices provide a useable operational checklist of partnership-type activities.  
The eight areas they identified are: 
 
1. Direct participation by employees in decisions about their work 
2. Direct participation by employees in decisions about personal employment 
issues 
3. Participation by employee representatives in decisions about employment 
issues 
4. Participation by employee representatives in decisions about broader 
organizational policy issues 
5. Flexible job design and a focus on quality 
6. Performance management 
7. Employee share ownership 
8. Communication, harmonization and employment security 
 
Some of these eight areas of activity received more enthusiastic endorsement from 
one side or the other.  For example, managers were more enthusiastic about 
performance management and employee representatives about participation in broader 
policy issues.   
 
WERS2004 covers some but not all of the practices identified by Guest and Peccei so 
while a number are explored in considerable detail, there is nothing about direct 
participation by employees in decisions about personal employment issues.  It also 
proved impractical to separate direct participation in decisions about work from 
flexible job design.  As a result, although specific practices can be considered 
independently for the purpose of analysis, based on the content of the WERS2004 
survey of employers, the Guest and Peccei list can be merged into the following five 
broad categories: 
 
1. Direct, task-based participation, including direct contributions through quality 
improvement teams;  
2. Representative participation in a range of issues;  
3. Performance management, including performance appraisal and incentive 
payment systems;  
4. Employee share ownership programmes;   
5. Communication and information sharing.  
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These categories are not entirely satisfactory.  Some may question why performance 
management is included as a partnership practice and there will undoubtedly be cases 
where, taken in isolation it will be inappropriate to view it as such.  The final category 
excludes harmonization and job security which were on the original list.  There is one 
item on job security in the survey but this does not sit well with the much larger 
number of items on communication and information sharing.  The four broad areas of 
partnership practice identified by the team of researchers are largely covered within 
the representative participation category. 
 
5. Partnership and Trust: The Evidence from WERS2004 
 
In the following section we present some core findings from WERS2004.  We 
restricted our analysis to those workplaces employing ten or more workers. Our aims 
are to identify the extent to which partnership is practised and to identify the levels of 
trust as a basis for assessing the extent to which the innovations in WERS advance 
our understanding of these issues.  We will refer to a separate analysis of the key 
consequences of partnership which is presented elsewhere.  The final section will 
offer some general conclusions, consider how successful the innovations have been in 
advancing our understanding of workplace partnership and offer some tentative 
suggestions about how any future WERS and other related research might make 
further progress. 
 
Direct Participation 
 
Direct participation by workers in decisions that affect their day-to-day work 
addresses the issues of delegation and shared control that form a key component of 
partnership.  Direct participation is also likely to have more salience for many 
employees than representative participation, partly because it more closely affects 
their daily working lives (Emery and Thorsrud, 1976) but also because in most 
workplaces there is no form of representative participation.  The core items covering 
direct participation are shown in Table 1.  The results reveal that managers believe 
they provide their workers with a moderate level of task-based autonomy – the 
predominant response is “some” – but the results also imply that the level of 
autonomy is constrained.  There has been some concern that levels of autonomy have 
been declining and that this might affect workers satisfaction (Green, 2006).  A 
comparison with the results from WERS1998 suggests that any decline in autonomy 
has been halted in the intervening years. 
 
Workers’ involvement is severely constrained when changes are considered. Although 
half the managers say workers were consulted, very few accept that change is an issue 
for local negotiation and 31 per cent of managers say they simply inform workers 
while a further 10 per cent do not even do this.  Job flexibility, which may serve the 
interests of the organisation but can also broaden workers’ competence, is widely 
used although few organizations use it extensively for the majority of workers.  
Problem-solving groups and related activities such as quality circles, which have been 
advocated as a means of tapping in to employee expertise, only operate in one in five 
workplaces although they appear to have become slightly more popular since 1998.  
In short, levels of direct participation, one of the key dimensions of partnership 
activity from a worker’s perspective, remains limited and any advance in this form of 
partnership practice between 1998 and 2004 has been modest at best. 
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Table 1 
Direct Participation in WERS2004 
(Percentages) 
Task-based participation:   none a little some a lot 
Employees have:      
Variety in their work       2 14 40 44 
Discretion over how they do their work 8 26 44 23 
Control over the pace at which they work  9 29 42 20 
Involvement over decisions about how work  7 22 47 24 
  
Mean score across the four items:  2.92 
Involvement:      
Worker involvement in introducing and 
implementing any changes:  
    
 They decided    4 
 They negotiated    6 
 They were 
consulted    50 
 They were informed    31 
 No involvement    10 
      
Job flexibility:       
Proportion of workplaces where employees in main 
group do jobs other then their own at least once a 
week 
   65 
Proportion with more than 60% doing so     16 
Quality Improvement 
Programmes:  
     
Proportion of workers involved in problem-solving 
groups or quality circles in the past 12 months:    21 
Of which:   permanent    49 
 temporary       32 
 a mixture    19 
 
Representative Participation 
 
The opportunity for representative participation depends upon the presence of 
representatives.  As WERS2004 reports, the overall level of representation has 
continued to decline between 1998 and 2004, with the proportion of workplaces 
recognising a trade union down from 33 per cent to 27 per cent.  This can be largely 
attributed to the changing profile of workplaces, with new workplaces less likely to 
have any representatives, rather than any marked reduction in representation in 
existing workplaces.  Therefore, only 656 of the 2200 workplaces included in 
WERS2004 have union representatives while non-union representatives are present in 
238 workplaces.  In some cases, both are present.  While there are extensive questions 
about aspects of pay bargaining, the most relevant questions from a partnership 
perspective concern the extent to which representatives are involved in a range of 
decisions that might affect the workforce.  Allied to this, the presence of some form of 
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consultative committee or works council is an increasingly relevant issue, given the 
recent legislation.  The results for these issues are presented in Table 2.        
            
Table 2         
Representative Participation in WERS2004 
Content of negotiation/consultation/information provision with union (non-union) 
representatives at workplace (Percentages) 
 Nothing Inform Consult Negotiate 
Pay 16 (28) 10 (42) 13 (18) 61 (13) 
Hours 18 (22) 10 (28) 20 (31) 53 (10) 
Holidays 19 (23) 17 (54) 13 (21) 52  (6) 
Pensions 22 (26) 25 (58) 16 (14) 36  (2) 
Staff selection 42 (38) 26 (37) 23 (24) 9   (2) 
Training 36 (22) 24 (35) 31 (41) 9   (2) 
Grievance procedure 15 (19) 20 (45) 36 (31) 28  (5) 
Disciplinary procedure 15 (20) 21 (46) 35 (30) 29  (4) 
Staffing plans   33 (25) 26 (41) 34 (32) 7  (3) 
Equal opportunities 22 (23) 23 (45) 40 (30) 15  (2) 
Health and safety 17 (13) 19 (39) 49 (44) 15  (4) 
Performance appraisal 33 (25) 20 (39) 33 (32) 14  (4) 
    
Per cent of workplaces with a joint consultative committee or works 
council 
14% 
Nb.  These results apply only to workplaces with workers’ representatives. 
 
The results in Table 2 confirm that at the local workplace management and union 
representatives continue to negotiate over the core terms and conditions of 
employment covering pay, hours of work and holidays.  As we might expect, they are 
likely to consult or sometimes negotiate over health and safety, equal opportunities 
and discipline. On a number of core human resource issues such as staffing plans, 
selection processes, training and performance appraisal, in a majority of cases 
managers say they are likely at best to inform union representatives, although in many 
cases they do not even do that.  Non-union representatives are much less likely to be 
involved in any negotiations.  In contrast, management seems more willing to involve 
non-union representatives in some way, mainly through consultation or provision of 
information, in staffing plans and training compared to union representatives.   
 
The other issue covered in Table 2 concerns the presence of a joint consultative 
committee or works council which could be considered to be a key indicator of 
partnership-oriented arrangements. They are reported in only 14 per cent of 
workplaces, down from 20 per cent in 1998. This decline has occurred despite the 
imminent application of the Information and Consultation legislation. Most of the 
results in Table 2 are not directly comparable with data from the WERS1998.  In so 
far as some comparisons are possible, the results reveal that in the context of 
consultative committees there has been an increase in the proportion that discuss pay 
and employment issues but a decline in the proportion discussing health and safety 
(Kersley et al, 2006, p.129).  The significance of these changes must be seen in the 
context of the small proportion of workplaces with a consultative committee and set 
alongside a drop in the proportion of workplace engaged in any bargaining over pay 
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from 30 per cent to 22 per cent.  Taken as a whole, these findings do not suggest a 
vibrant partnership environment within British workplaces. 
 
Performance Management 
 
Performance management justifies its inclusion because of its role in the process of 
mutuality and exchange that management tends to emphasise as a feature of 
partnership.  Two core practices commonly associated with performance management 
are considered.  These are performance appraisal and incentive payments.  The results 
are shown in Table 3.  These reveal that performance appraisal for non-managerial 
workers is now very widespread.  Indeed its use has increased since the previous 
survey in 1998.  Incentive payments are now used in forty per cent of workplaces, a 
substantial growth since 1998.  The growth of practices in which management has a 
particular interest may be a reflection of a shift in power and a further confirmation 
that the balance of advantage in many partnership-related activities now lies even 
more firmly with management than Guest and Peccei (2001) suggested.  
 
Table 3 
Performance Management 
Performance appraisal Percentage 
 Per cent of workplaces conducting regular performance appraisal for 
most (60%+) non-manageria l workers  64 
PBR/Merit Pay  
 Workplaces with an incentive payment scheme 40 
Of which:  
 PBR scheme alone 23 
 Merit pay alone  9 
 Both 7 
In the 40% of workplaces with an incentive payment scheme:   
 Per cent making payments to both managerial and non-managerial 
staff 56 
 Per cent making payments to managerial employees only  10 
 Per cent making payments to non-managerial staff only   34 
 
 
Employee Share Ownership 
 
Sharing the profits of an organization among employees has been advocated over the 
years by those on both the left and the right of the political spectrum and has attracted 
some support from successive governments.  In WERS2004, this topic was covered 
by two sets of questions addressing employee share ownership and profit sharing.  
One of the inevitable problems that arise is that financial partnership is virtually 
impossible in the public sector, greatly limiting the number of workplaces, and more 
particularly unionised workplaces, in which it can be applied.   
 
The relevant data from WERS2004 is presented in Table 4.  This reveals that 21 per 
cent of private sector workplaces have a scheme for employee share ownership in 
place.  In 85 per cent of these, non managerial staff are eligible to participate and in 
just over three-quarters of these allowed all workers to participate.   In the event, it 
appears that where it is available, there is quite an extensive take up of share 
  48 
ownership.  In 44 per cent of those cases where it was possible, every worker 
participated in the scheme and in 67 per cent of cases, at least forty per cent of non-
manual workers participated. 
 
The second aspect of financial reward concerns profit-related pay.  The questioning 
extended to cover bonuses, making the public sector eligible.  In the event, 30 per cent 
of workplaces have either profit-related pay or bonuses, rising to 37 per cent in the 
private sector but also including 15 per cent of the public sector workplaces.  As 
Table 4 reveals, non-manual workers were included in less than two-thirds of the 
schemes; however in 49 per cent of these, all non-manual workers had received some 
form of profit-related pay in the previous year while in 84 per cent, some workers had 
done so.  Analysis of the WERS panel data reported in the source book indicates no 
growth in financial participation between 1998 and 2004. 
 
Table 4 
Employee Share Ownership and Profit Sharing 
Employee Share Ownership Programmes   Percentage 
  Per cent of private sector workplaces with at least one 
scheme 21 
 Per cent of these where non-manageria l employees 
eligible to participate    85 
 Per cent of these where all non-managerial staff eligible
  
76 
 Per cent of these where all workers participated 44 
 Per cent of these where at least 40% participated 
  67 
Profit-related pay  
 Per cent of workplaces with profit-related pay or bonuses 30 
 Per cent in the private sector 37 
 Per cent in the public sector  15 
 Per cent including non-managerial staff in the scheme 63 
 
  
Per cent of these where all non-managerial employees  
had received profit-related pay in the last 12 months 
49 
 Per cent of these where some non-managerial employees  
had received profit-related pay in the past 12 months 
84 
 
Communication and Information Sharing 
 
Communication and information sharing lie at the heart of partnership.  In Table 2 we 
reported the results of questions about communication with worker representatives.  
However we also noted that in a majority of workplace, there were no representatives.  
Any pretence of partnership therefore requires some form of communication with the 
workforce as a whole.  This was explored in WERS2004 through questions about 
face-to-face meetings and other forms of communication and consultation.  The 
results in Table 5 reveal a perhaps surprisingly high proportion of workplaces where 
there are meetings between senior management and the whole workforce.  Indeed, 
contrary to expectations, such meetings are reported to be more frequent than 
meetings between senior managers or supervisors and the workers for whom they are 
directly responsible.  Much is likely to depend on the frequency, process and content 
of these meetings.  WERS2004 explored some of these issues.  For example, one 
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question asked about the content of communication and specifically whether certain 
strategic issues were covered.  The results in Table 5 suggest that financial plans, 
internal investment and staffing plans were covered in a majority of workplaces.  
However only 36 per cent covered all of these while in 15 per cent of workplaces, 
none of them was communicated. 
 
Table 5 
Communication and Information Sharing 
Face-to-face meetings Percentage 
 Any meetings between senior management and  
the whole workforce  79 
 Any meetings between senior managers or supervisors  
and the workers for whom they are responsible 
71 
Attitude surveys   
 Conducted formal survey in past two years  42 
Other forms of communication   
Management communicates or consults with employees by:  
 noticeboards 74 
 systematic use of management chain 64 
 suggestion schemes 30 
 newsletters 45 
 email 38 
 intranet 34 
Content of communication (count from 0 – 3) % yes 
 Internal investment   51 
 Financial position of establishment 68 
 Staffing plans   66 
 Mean score                                             1.84    0 = 15%     1 = 21%    2 = 28%    3 = 36% 
 
The survey explored other forms of communication and information sharing.  As 
Table 5 suggests, the most popular of threes are notice boards and the management 
chain.  However quite a wide variety of methods are used with over a third of 
workplaces now using email and the intranet.  Communication within partnership 
should be viewed as a two-way process and in workplaces where there is no 
representation, this may become problematic.  In smaller workplaces, informal 
systems may operate and there is some indication that the management meetings 
allow for two-way exchanges.  Another method of seeking employee views that 
potentially involves all employees is the use of attitude surveys.  WERS2004 reported 
that an attitude survey had been conducted in 42 per cent of workplaces within the 
two previous years.  Despite this quite high level of use of surveys, any growth 
between 1998 and 2004 appears to be in downward communication, notably through 
greater use of the management chain, use of which has increased from 52 per cent to 
64 per cent of workplaces, rather than in the kind of two-way flow of information that 
would reflect a partnership approach. 
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6. Trust Between Manager and Worker Representatives 
 
Trust between management and union representatives does not depend on partnership.  
However trust may be a consequence of partnership activities and it may be a 
condition for effective partnership.  As indicated earlier, three new questions on trust 
were included in WERS2004 in the interview schedules with both management and 
worker representatives.  Responses were provided on a five-point scale from strongly 
agree to strongly disagree. The percentage of representatives providing responses and 
therefore indicating a degree of trust is shown in Table 6.  The table also shows the 
proportion of cases in which there is mutual trust between management and worker 
representatives.   
 
Table 6 
Levels of Trust Between Management and Worker Representatives 
 Managers 
trust in 
union reps    
Union 
reps 
trust in 
mgers 
Mutual 
trust   
Mgers  
trust in 
non-
union 
reps  
Non-
union 
reps 
trust in 
mgers     
Mutual 
trust                          
 Percentage agree 
Managers/union 
reps can be  
relied upon to live 
up to the  
commitments they 
have made       
75 61 50 87 91 80 
Managers/union 
reps are sincere  
in their attempts to 
understand  
the respondents 
point of view 
75 62 49 85 91 78 
Management/union 
reps can be  
trusted to act with 
honesty  
and integrity  
83 62 53 90 88 80 
Overall: trust 
indicated in  
response to all three 
items 
64 44 31 76 81 64 
 
The responses across the items appear to be consistent.  For example, union 
representative trust in management representatives ranges only between 61 and 62 per 
cent.  However this hides some variation which is reflected in the figure of only 44 
per cent who indicated trust in management on all three items.  There are some 
straightforward observations that can be made about these descriptive statistics.  
Managers display a higher level of trust in union representatives than union 
representatives show in management. As a result, levels of mutual trust are quite low, 
most notably when the items are combined.  Indeed, there is consistent mutual trust in 
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only 31 per cent of cases.  When we turn to non-union representatives, the picture is 
rather different.  Levels of trust are generally higher and the worker representatives 
tend to report slightly higher levels of trust than their management counterparts.  As a 
result, there is mutual trust across the three items in 64 per cent of cases. 
 
There are various ways in which the trust items might be used for the analysis of 
employment relations.  A factor analysis confirms that they can be treated as a single 
scale for multivariate analysis.  With this in mind, Guest, Brown, Peccei and Huxley 
(2007) explored the extent to which greater application of the partnership practices is 
associated with higher trust.  The only partnership practices associated with higher 
management trust in union representatives are greater task-based participation and use 
of quality improvement programmes, both forms of what we termed direct 
participation; and use of performance appraisal, part of the performance management 
cluster.  None of the measures of representative participation are associated with 
higher trust. Among the union representatives, higher trust in management is 
associated with employee involvement in changes affecting them, the presence of 
quality improvement programmes, employee share ownership and use of attitude 
surveys.  Once again, no forms of representative participation are featured.  Finally, 
mutual trust between management and union representatives is associated with task-
based participation, quality improvement programmes, attitude surveys, employee 
share ownership programmes and extensive use of performance appraisal.  In contrast, 
use of profit-related pay and greater use of the miscellaneous forms of communication 
are associated with lower mutual trust.  Taken as a whole, these results highlight the 
importance of direct forms of participation and the lack of any role for representative 
participation.  It should be noted that the results indicate an association rather than 
causality. It might be plausible to suggest that high trust results in a greater 
willingness on the part of management to adopt task-based participation.  The sample 
of non-union representatives for which there is sufficient information is reduced to 
128 and the regression analysis is less reliable.  There are fewer significant 
associations and no clear pattern in them. 
 
7. Trust in Management Among the Workforce 
 
Three items are used to measure trust in management among employees. As noted 
earlier, the three items ask whether managers at their workplace “can be relied on to 
keep their promises”, “are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views” and 
“deal with employees honestly” A factor analysis confirms that these can be treated as 
a single scale.  This scale has a Cronbach alpha of  0.93. The responses were provided 
on a five-point (reversed) scale from “strongly agree” (5) to “strongly disagree” (1). 
The mean score on the resultant five–point scale is 3.60 (SD 0.59) indicating a 
slightly positive but not generally enthusiastic average level of trust in management.  
Guest et al (2007) report an analysis of the association between partnership practices 
and workforce trust.  There are a number of significant associations but only two are 
positive; trust is higher where there is task-based participation and where there are 
guarantees of job security.  In contrast, workforce trust in management is lower where 
management use attitude surveys and more extensive and varied forms of 
communication: and where there are consultative committees and a wider range of 
issues covered in any formal interaction between management and union 
representatives.  It is also lower where the dialogue with union representatives covers 
a wider range of issues.  Data on workforce trust in management were collected in all 
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workplaces where a workforce survey was conducted, irrespective of whether any 
representatives were present. Union recognition and union membership density were 
included as control variables.  There is no significant association between these items 
and workforce trust in management although the signs indicate a tendency towards a 
negative association. 
 
8. Reflections on Future Studies 
 
As we noted at the outset, partnership has proved to be difficult to define, to 
operationalise and to study.  This chapter has therefore been a presentation of proxies 
for partnership.  We have had to assume from the literature that certain practices can 
be marshalled under the banner of partnership.  However these practices all pre-date 
the contemporary advocacy of partnership and can claim an independent status.  
Perhaps the defining characteristic of partnership is the concept of mutuality, reflected 
in the recognition of the coexistence of both shared and different interests among the 
main parties to the employment relationship and the potential benefits of applying 
mechanisms to ensure that collaboration with respect to the shared interests results in 
mutual gain.  Effective collaboration may prove difficult or indeed impossible if there 
is no basis for representation; yet an absence of any representative system is now the 
norm in British workplaces and has become more prevalent in the years since the 
1998 WERS despite the Industrial Relations Act and the intervening period of 
enthusiasm for partnership.  It is also notable that mutual trust is no higher where 
there is any form of representative participation or other practices associated with 
partnership such as information sharing, consultation or negotiation.  A general 
finding might therefore be that on the basis of WERS2004, if we accept our proxies 
for partnership, then partnership, and what we might categorise as the short-lived 
partnership movement, is a failure.  There is no evidence that it is associated with 
higher trust and with mutual gains. 
 
This rather harsh conclusion is a little premature.  There is consistent evidence that 
direct, task-based participation is associated with higher trust.  It is also associated 
with other positive outcomes with respect to workers’ attitudes and workplace 
performance (Guest et al, 2007; Guest and Conway, 2007).  However the causal 
association with trust needs to be more fully unpicked and it is plausible to argue that 
task-based participation is a pale and limited version of partnership.  The earlier work 
on partnership by Guest and Peccei (2001) indicated that partnership works best when 
it is based on a package of practices.  This requires some analysis of bundles of 
practices.  In the context of the analysis of HRM, attitudes and performance in 
WERS2004, there is some indication that this may prove more useful than 
considering individual practices (Guest and Conway, 2007).  More broadly, it is worth 
asking whether the survey approach represented by the WERS series is the most 
appropriate way of exploring partnership activity.  It can provide a useful indicator of 
the extent to which certain practices and processes are in place.  It cannot provide firm 
information about the effectiveness of these practices.  In this respect, the kind of case 
studies reported by Oxenbridge and Brown (2002) may provide greater insights into 
the process of partnership and the way in which practices are combined and applied.   
 
The key innovation in WERS2004 in the territory of partnership is the introduction of 
measures of trust.  Two sets of three items, one set for representatives of workers and 
management and one for the workforce samples have been demonstrated to be robust 
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measures that meet the necessary psychometric criteria.   The measurement of trust is 
important in itself.  Its relation to partnership remains somewhat ambiguous.  It is 
plausible that successful partnership should be associated with high trust.  However it 
remains unclear whether trust is a cause, a consequence or a correlate of effective 
partnership.  If we wished to argue that it is a proxy for effective partnership, then the 
evidence from WERS2004 suggests that partnership in Britain is in serious difficulty.  
Perhaps for union representatives in particular, it has proved to be a poisoned chalice 
(Oxenbridge and Brown, 2005). One conclusion from this analysis is that the 
relationship between trust and  partnership needs further theoretical analysis.  
Intuitively, trust is important and its measurement can be justified in the context of 
WERS2004.  But in the context of the diminishing debates on partnership, we are left 
with the question – important for what? 
 
We have suggested that interest in partnership reached a peak in the years between the 
WERS surveys.  In so far as it is possible to consider the intervening changes, there 
appear to have been virtually no advances in partnership practices between 1998 and 
2004.  Representative systems have been on the retreat, notably in the private sector.  
Management hegemony has been extended, reflected in the growth of practices allied 
to performance management and downward communication.  The measurement of 
trends in workplace employment relations practices and the role of trust will continue 
to be important issues to monitor.  Perhaps in the future this can be done without 
allusion to the ‘p-word’.  
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The Study of Employee Share Ownership Using WERS: An 
Evaluation and Analysis of the 2004 Survey 
 
Andrew Pendleton1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been a rich vein of research into employee share ownership using WERS2 
in recent years.  Analysis of the determinants, correlates, and effects of share 
ownership plans took-off after the 1990 survey.  In part this reflects the general 
growth in the use of WERS for industrial relations research.  Partly it reflects the 
heightening of interest in forms of employee involvement, high performance work 
practices, and the impact of human resource management practices on performance.  
The main streams of analysis using WERS have focused on the determinants of share 
ownership plans (Beaumont and Harris 1994; Pendleton 1997; Robinson and Zhang 
2005), the relationship between share ownership plans and other forms of 
involvement (Gregg and Machin 1988), and the relationship between share plans and 
workplace performance (Fernie and Metcalfe 1995; Addison and Belfield 2000; 
McNabb and Whitfield 1998; Conyon and Freeman 2004; SenGupta et al 2006).  
There has also been investigation of the relationship between share plans and other 
HR practices, such as training (Robinson and Zhang 2006; Pendleton 2006a) and 
workplace targets (Pendleton 2006b). 
 
The questions on share ownership plans in WERS have evolved over the years.  The 
most notable change in 2004 was the reinstatement of questions about specific share 
ownership plans that had been dropped in 1998 (in favour of a general question about 
share ownership plans).  This has several significant benefits for those interested in 
share plans, given that they are by no means homogeneous in their characteristics and 
usage.  It enables more precise analysis of the incidence, determinants, and effects of 
specific share plans.  It is also possible to trace the development of specific plans over 
time by comparing 2004 results with those from 1990.  The use of multiple share 
plans and particular combinations of share plans can also be investigated.  Within 
certain limits, employee eligibility and participation can be analysed with greater 
precision than was possible in 1998.  Finally, the identification of specific share plans 
in 2004 enables us to compare specific share plans with a generic measure of share 
plans (as used in 1998) in terms of their relationships with other phenomena captured 
in WERS.  One of the intriguing findings in WERS98 was that share plans seemed to 
have a weaker relationship with other forms of participation and performance than 
was observed in 1990 (Addison and Belfield 2000).  Whether this was due to real 
changes in the population or methodological issues is obviously a pertinent question.  
The exploratory analysis pursued in this chapter implies that some of the 1998 effects 
could have been due to changes in question content. 
 
The chapter outlines the nature of the questions on share ownership in WERS2004, 
highlighting changes from earlier surveys.  It then considers the incidence of each 
type of share plan in 2004, and discusses methodological issues that arise in relation 
                                                                 
1 The York Management School, University of York 
2 For ease of presentation we will refer to the series as WERS.  However, individual surveys will be 
referred to by their original title. 
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to these.  Eligibility and participation are then considered.  The chapter then compares 
specific share plans against a generic share plan measure, using the relationships with 
various forms of employee participation as an illustration.  It is found that in most 
instances the generic measure has weaker effects than the main all-employee share 
plans but there are some instances where results are rather different.  Finally, the 
limitations of question content in WERS2004 are discussed, and there are some 
recommendations for revisions and additions in future WERS surveys.  
 
2. Questions on share ownership plans in WERS 
 
Like its predecessors, WERS2004 contains questions on employee share ownership 
plans.  These are found mainly in the Management Questionnaire, and are concerned 
with the presence and coverage of these plans in the workplace.  Four questions are 
asked.  The first asks about the presence of 4 specified plans which are HM Revenue 
and Customs (formerly Inland Revenue) approved (with a fifth category of ‘other’).  
The second enquires about the eligibility of the plans by occupational category. The 
third asks about the overall eligibility rate for non-management employees in the 
share ownership plans in the workplace, whilst the fourth asks about the participation 
rate amongst these employees.  There are also two questions in the Panel Survey.  
One asks about the presence of share ownership schemes and the other whether the 
share ownership scheme is limited to management or open to other employees.  
Neither the Employee Survey nor Workplace Representative Survey have questions 
on share ownership.   
 
The questions have changed somewhat in each version of the WERS series.  The main 
innovation in the 2004 survey is the reference to specific, named share ownership 
plans.  This reverts to the practice in the 1990 survey (which was an advance on 
earlier WIRS’, where generic questions were asked).  In the 1998 survey, the lead- in 
question was concerned with a variety of forms of contingent pay: profit-related 
payments or bonuses, deferred profit sharing schemes, employee share ownership 
schemes, individual and group performance-related schemes, and other cash bonuses.  
The occupational category question has been changed slightly from 1998 so that there 
is now an all-employee category.  This simplifies use of the occupational eligibility 
question so that it is no longer necessary to go through all occupational categories to 
establish all-employee eligibility.  The other eligibility and participation rate 
questions are broadly the same but there are additional questions inviting numerical 
responses where percentages are unknown.   The Panel questions, however, change 
from the 1990 to 1998 version because the Panel Survey is addressed to a subset of 
those responding to the Management Questionnaire in 1998.   
 
The question on specific share plans in 2004 is a significant improvement over the 
1998 practice for several reasons.  Most obviously, it is more precise.  Most share 
ownership plans open to non-managerial employees take an HMRC-form approved, 
and hence it makes sense to collect data on these.  This enables us to identify 
variations in the incidence of plans between workplaces and over time (by comparing 
with 1990).  In addition, the rather generalised wording used in the 1998 survey may 
pose some problems of reliability and validity.  The main reference in 1998 was to 
‘payments received from share ownership schemes’ but the main UK all-employee 
share plan – Save As You Earn – is not technically a share ownership plan.  Instead it 
is a savings contract linked to share options.  In principle, all participating employees 
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in a workplace could exercise and sell their shares instantaneously (‘cashless 
exercise’) so it would be quite legitimate for a respondent to interpret this as 
something other than a share ownership plan.  This question might therefore 
understate the incidence of share plans.   
 
A further problem in 1998 concerned deferred profit sharing.  In 1990 the wording 
explicitly related this to the Approved Profit Sharing (APS) plan.  This scheme (now 
withdrawn) enabled companies to distribute shares to their employees financed out of 
profits.  In 1998 this explication disappeared so that it was not at all clear whether 
APS was being referred to.  We cannot know whether respondents identified ‘deferred 
profit sharing’ as APS.  It seems highly likely that this would lead to understating of 
APS plans because some respondents would not have realised that their APS plans 
were a form of deferred profit sharing.  Equally, some respondents may have classed 
their APS plans as ‘share ownership plans’: this is terminologically correct but, since 
many workplaces operate more than one plan, does not resolve the under-reporting 
problem.    
 
These issues are not just technical niceties.  It is distinctly possible that WERS 1998 
under-reported employee share plans by several percentage points.  Analyses of 
WERS have highlighted a fall in the incidence of share ownership plans between 
1990 and 1998 (Millward et al 2000:216) and broadly similar incidence between 1998 
and 2004 (Kersley et al 2006: 192).  However, the phrasing of the share ownership 
question and the exclusion of the deferred profit sharing question in 1998 may over-
state the decline.  Table 1 shows how.   
  
Table 1 
 The incidence of employee share plans 1990-2004 
Percentage of private sector workplaces 
 1990 1998 
(excluding 
deferred profit 
sharing) 
1998  
(including 
deferred profit 
sharing) 
20043 
SAYE 24 N/a N/a 17 
CSOP 17 N/a N/a 9 
APS or 
deferred profit 
sharing 
9 6 6 N/a 
Share 
Incentive Plan N/a N/a N/a 10 
‘Other’ 7 N/a N/a 4.5 
Any share plan 32 24 26.5 30 
 
Base: Private Sector Workplaces with 25 or more employees (weighted) 
 
Table 1 suggests that the decline in share plan incidence between 1990 and 1998 is 
less marked if deferred profit sharing is included in the share plan category.  
Furthermore, if the phrase ‘share ownership plan’ leads to some under-reporting of 
                                                                 
3 EMI is not included here but as only 5/1148  workplaces are involved there is not a noticeable impact 
on the results  
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SAYE plans then the decline in the population may be even less.  When we are more 
able to compare like with like – 1990 and 2004 – the overall incidence of share 
ownership workplaces is similar between the two years.  However, there is substantial 
decline in the incidence of SAYE and CSOP plans.  It is not possible to discern from 
WERS why this fall has taken place: the open-ended questions on share plan 
termination found in the 1990-1998 Panel are not present in the 1998-2004 Panel.   
Nevertheless, compositional arguments can probably be ruled-out: the types of 
workplace which are more likely to operate a SAYE plan (eg financial services, 
wholesale and retail etc) have increased as a proportion of workplaces over the period 
(check with mq98).  The fall in CSOP might be attributed to changes in the plan in 
1996/7.  Following a political furore over ‘fat cat’ executive pay, the limits on 
Discretionary Share Options (as CSOP was than called) were reduced from £100,000 
to £30,000, making the plan less attractive in executive remuneration packages.  
These points notwithstanding, what appears to have happened between 1990 and 2004 
is a decline in the incidence of some types of plan but little change in the proportion 
of workplaces with share ownership arrangements.  In other words, there seems to 
have been a decline in the proportion of workplaces operating more than one share 
plan rather than a fall in the proportion of workplaces with at least one share plan. 
 
So, using specific questions that are more tailored to the types of share plans allows 
more precise and more reliable analysis of the presence of share ownership plans 
generally, as well as facilitating cross-temporal investigations of particular plans.  Use 
of rather generalised questions, as in the 1998 Management Questionnaire, may bias 
downwards estimates of share plan presence.  This interpretation is supported by 
examination of the 2004 Panel Survey where the percentage of workplaces with a 
share ownership plan (1998 wording) is just 18 per cent, considerably lower than the 
proportion in the Management Questionnaire using 2004 wording.  The magnitude of 
the different (around 12 percentage points) suggests that there is more than sampling 
error at work here.   
 
It is pertinent to ask why the questions on share plans have changed over time.  In 
part, technical issues have driven changes.  But the wording also seems to reflect 
policy concerns at the time of design.  Thus, the first WIRS in 1980 asked about the 
timing of the introduction of share ownership plans because a new plan – Approved 
Profit Sharing – had been introduced two years earlier.  It was found that around half 
of plans had been introduced in the previous three years (Daniel and Millward 1983: 
211-212).  By 1990, after a decade of innovation in share plan and contingent pay, the 
share ownership question referred to specific plans: Discretionary Share Option plans 
(now Company Share Option Plans) had been introduced in 1982, Save As You Earn 
(or ‘Sharesave’) was introduced in 1984, and Profit-Related Pay (not a share plan) 
was introduced in 1987.  In the 1990s there was very little legislative activity (though 
a great deal of company activity in employee buy-outs – See Pendleton 2001), apart 
from some tinkering with the terms of the CSOP in response to ‘fat cat’ executive pay 
issues.  As a result, it is not surprising that the 1998 WERS dropped reference to 
specific schemes (though with the confusing possible reference to APS mentioned 
above).  However, by the time of 2004 survey there had been two new plans 
introduced in the 2000 Finance Act, and there was both academic and policy interest 
in assessing the take-up of the new plans.  This is possible with varying degrees of 
success (see later).   
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3. The Incidence of Share Ownership Plans in 2004 
 
The refinement of the share ownership question means that we can present 
information on the incidence of the various types of HMRC share plan in 2004.  Table 
2 presents information for each type of share plan.  Note that this differs from the 
information presented in Kersley et al (2006) because they limit analysis to 
workplaces with 10 or more employees so as to achieve comparability with WERS98.  
 
Table 2 
 The incidence of share plans in 2004 
Percentage of workplaces (except where shown) 
 % of private 
sector 
workplaces 
% of private 
sector 
workplaces 
with specified 
plan and no 
other plans 
% of private 
sector 
employees in 
workplaces 
with plan 
Number of 
companies 
with live plans 
HM Revenue 
and Customs 
2004 
Share 
Incentive 
Plan 
7.22 1.91 11.29 760 
Save As You 
Earn 12.20 5.93 20.98 
920 
 
CSOP 6.10 2.55 11.03 2950  
EMI 0.2 0.18 0.44 2,380  
Other 3.07 1.81 5.82 N/a 
Any share 
plan 19.68  31.89 N/a 
1 share plans 12.41  17.92 N/a 
2 share plans 5.39  10.48 N/a 
Base: Private sector workplaces with 5 or more employees (weighted as appropriate) 
 
It is worth commenting on the results for each share plan as this raises some 
methodological issues about the relationship between company and workplace 
practices.  Both SIP and SAYE are all-employee plans, whereas eligibility in CSOP 
and EMI is discretionary.  SIP and SAYE tend to be found in larger, multi-site 
companies, so any given plan is potentially observable in a large number of 
workplaces.  WERS shows that the average number of workplaces per company for 
each workplace observed to have a SIP or a SAYE plan is over 400, compared with 
around 100 for non-share plan workplaces.   The incidence of discretionary plans is 
rather different.  The workplace incidence of CSOPs is slightly lower than SIP even 
though HM Revenue and Customs company- level statistics show that there are four 
times as many live CSOP plans.  As CSOP is typically a discretionary plan used for 
executive remuneration, it is possible that a CSOP would not be present in a given 
workplace of an organisation even though it is used for top management remuneration 
because there are no top executives at the particular workplace.  By the same logic, 
the presence of CSOP at a workplace means that it is probably a plan that is used 
more widely than for executive remuneration, given that only a small proportion of 
workplaces in WERS are head offices (18 per cent of private sector multi-site 
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workplaces are head offices)4.   The average number of employees to whom options 
were granted under CSOP arrangements in 2004-5 was 44 per company (HM 
Revenue and Customs 2006).  However, WERS2004 shows that in 56 per cent of 
CSOP workplaces, the plan was an all-employee plan.  The proportion of all-
employee plans is exaggerated by the factors outlined above, and it is important to 
bear this in mind when interpreting WERS findings.            
 
The case of Enterprise Management Incentives (EMI), aimed at smaller, high-
potential companies, is slightly different from CSOPs.  The number of EMIs observed 
in WERS2004 is just eight: this is rather disappointing as it makes statistical analysis 
of this plan rather difficult.  It contrasts with the large number of plans in the 
economy – 2,380 companies granted options in 2004-5, several times as many 
companies operating SAYE and SIP plans.  However, as a small company plan, EMI 
coverage across workplaces is likely to be far smaller.  Three of the eight workplaces 
with EMI are single establishment workplaces.  In absolute terms, EMI is more 
selective than CSOP: the average number of beneficiaries of option awards in 2004-5 
was 11 per company (HM Revenue and Customs 2006).  Thus, the chance that a 
workplace in an EMI multi-site company is covered by the plan is rather small, and 
certainly smaller than CSOP.  There is a further potential problem with EMI in that, in 
contrast to the other share ownership schemes, it is not a plan as such.  Participating 
companies do not need to submit a plan for approval to HM Revenue and Customs.  
Instead, eligible companies can award options to employees under EMI arrangements.  
The upshot of this is that a clearly-defined EMI plan may not be readily discernible in 
a workplace that uses EMI, and that the management respondent may not know that 
options have been awarded under EMI rules.      
 
Finally, the ‘other’ category poses something of a problem as it is quite large: there 
are 98 private sector workplaces (around 5 per cent) with an ‘other’ share plan.  The 
issue is to what ‘other’ refers to.   Some could be SIP or SAYE plans that are not 
recognised as such by the management respondent, possibly because they have 
different ‘brand’ names within the company.  Some could be the remnants of 
Approved Profit Sharing plans: although tax breaks were withdrawn on new 
distributions from 2002, there are many plans where shares continue to be held in 
trust on employees’ behalf5.  Most (78 per cent) of these ‘other’ plans are open to 80 
per cent and above of the non-managerial workforce.  Most are in workplaces 
belonging to multi-site companies.  Since the vast majority of all-employee share 
plans are tax-approved, it is highly likely that most of the ‘other category are one of 
the three plans mentioned above.  The remainder of the ‘other’ plans that are not open 
to non-managerial employees could either be CSOPs or EMI that are not recognised 
by the respondent or could be other, unapproved forms of management share plan, 
such as LTIPs or ‘restricted stock’.  Ideally, the questions might be modified slightly 
in the next WERS to pin-down the ‘other’ category a little more precisely.  How this 
might be done effectively and efficiently is not immediately obvious.   
 
Table 2, above, shows that just under 20 per cent of workplaces with 5 or more 
employees have a share plan(s).  An improvement on 1998 permitted by the 
identification of specific plans is that ‘serial’ share plan workplaces can be identified.  
                                                                 
4 3 per cent of CSOP workplaces are head offices compared with under 1 for both SIP and SAYE 
5 460,000 employees were awarded shares under APS arrangements in 2002-3.  These are required to 
be held in trust for three years for tax benefits to be obtained by employees.  See HMRC 2006 
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As Table 2 shows, just over 5 per cent of workplaces have two share plans, and a 
further 1.85 per cent have three plans.  In other words, around one-third of share plan 
workplaces have more than one plan.  It may be hypothesised that these multi-plan 
workplaces are more participative or more committed to high performance work 
practices than other workplaces.  The current design of WERS enables this to be 
tested whereas the 1998 design does not. 
 
4. Eligibility and participation in share ownership plans 
 
A further benefit of disaggregating types of share plans is that we can investigate 
participation rates in each plan.  By contrast, WERS1998 could only ask about share 
ownership plans overall.  However, in WERS2004 we can only reliably ask about 
participation rates where there is just one plan present.  Table 3 presents information 
on eligibility and participation in the share plans identified in the survey. 
 
Table 3 
 Eligibility and participation rates in share ownership plans  
Percentage of workplaces (except median scores for 1990) 
Participation rates of non-management 
employees 
 Open to 
m
anagers only 
80 –
100 
per 
cent 
40 –79 
per 
cent 
20 -39 
per 
cent 
0 - 19 
per cent 
Don’t  
know/ 
refusal 
M
edian 
eligibility  
1990 
M
edian 
participation 
1990 
SAYE 
n = 152 
8.55 21.05 15.15 14.47 17.10 23.68 80 20 
CSOP 
n= 49 30.61 12.24 6.12 8.16 32.66 10.20 9 8 
SIP 
n = 44 5.91 31.91 13.64 11.36 22.73 4.55 N/a N/a 
EMI 
n = 4 100 0 0 0 0 0 N/a N/a 
Other  
n = 47 
36.17 31.92 8.51 2.13 8.51 12.77 80 15 
All share 
ownership 
plans 
2004 
14.18 29.45 17.45 10.36 14.55 14.00 N/a N/a 
 Base: Private sector workplaces 
 
Table 3 shows eligibility for the various share plans alongside details of participation 
rates.  All of the types of share plan apart from EMI are open to non-managerial 
employees in a majority of cases.  Although 1990 and 2004 figures are not directly 
comparable, the figures suggest that eligibility for CSOP has widened over the period.  
Participation rates appear not to have changed too much: the distribution of 
participation rates for SAYE is comparable with the median participation rate of 20 
per cent in 1990.  The participation rate for CSOP looks like it might have increased 
over the period (HMRC statistics support this).  Further circumstantial evidence that 
the ‘other’ category may include substantial numbers of unrecognised SIPs and 
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SAYEs is the large proportion of cases with participation rates of 80 per cent plus6 
(whereas the lower participation rate in 1990s suggests may have been picking up 
BOGOF).  Other points of note are the large proportion of ‘don’t knows’ for the 
SAYE category (see later).  Finally, the pronounced U-shaped distribution of 
participation in SIP indicates that two separate dimensions of the SIP scheme are 
being picked-up.  The cases where participation rates are very high (80 per cent plus) 
are probably where Free Shares are offered: in most cases these are offerings of shares 
made available to all employees7.  Participation rates in the subscription-based 
element of SIP – Partnership Shares – are typically lower than SAYE (SIP 
subscriptions are more risky than SAYE), and average participation rates are around 
25 per cent (Proshare 2004).  On this basis, it can be concluded moderately safely that 
the workplaces where participation is 39 per cent or less are operating Partnership 
Shares on their own.      
 
The second main reason for disaggregating the questions on employee share 
ownership by plan type in WERS is that the heterogeneity of plan features will 
potentially have differential effects or different relationships with other workplace 
characteristics.  This implies that a single employee share ownership measure, as used 
in 1998, could provide misleading or at least imprecise results.  To illustrate this we 
examine the relationship between various share plans and several forms of employee 
participation.  There is a long strand of literature which emphasises the synergy 
between financial participation and employee participation (Levine and Tyson 1990; 
Ben-Ner and Jones 1995).  However, it  is possible that any relationships might not be 
generic but instead linked to specific types of share plan, and that differences in plan 
features may help to explain these differences. 
 
To illustrate this possibility we present the results of a series of logistic regressions 
where various forms of employee participation are the dependent variables.  On the 
right hand side, we include controls for company size and establishment size (natural 
log) along with dummy variables for various share plans.  The objective is to compare 
the results where individual share plans are included with those where a single share 
ownership variable is used.  The regressions make no pretence to be comprehensive or 
definitive estimations of the determinants of participation.  Instead they are simply a 
way of exploring the relationship between participation and share plans, whilst 
controlling for the obvious influences of company and workplace size.  Since it is 
possible that more participative share plans will be more closely rela ted to other 
employee participation, and because there are variations in participation rates between 
share plans, we limit the share plans to where participation rates are above 40 per 
cent.   
 
Each cell of table 4 represents the odds ratio in a regression where the column head is 
the dependent variable, and where the particular share plan and size controls are 
independent variables.  There are several notable results in the table which illustrate 
the point that a generic share ownership variable may not adequately portray the 
                                                                 
6 The lower participation rate for ‘other’ in 1990 could be due to this question picking up cases of 
BuyOneGetOneFree (BOGOF), a set of share purchase arrangements linked to Approved Profit 
Sharing   
7 SIP allows free shares to be linked to performance, including individual performance, but the extant 
evidence suggests that they are typically distributed to all, though distribution may vary according to 
tenure and job grade – check Capita 
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effects of particular types of share plan.  For instance, whilst share ownership plans, 
SAYE, and SIP all predict (to varying degrees) the presence of union recognition, a 
broad-based CSOP does not.  The same is true of briefing groups.  It is important to 
note that the effect of generic share ownership is smaller (sometimes considerably so) 
than those of SIP and SAYE, and could thus understate the potential effect of some 
types of share plans when used in isolation (as in 1998).   
 
Table 4  
Relationships between share plans and other forms of participation 
Summary of logistic regression results 
 Union 
recognition 
Joint 
committee 
Briefing 
group 
Quality 
circles 
Workplace 
financial 
information 
Company 
financial 
information 
SAYE 4.74*** 1.23 2.60* 1.51 1.39 4.98*** 
SIP 5.49*** 1.25 2.96* 2.80** 2.73* 5.29*** 
CSOP 1.80 0.90 2.02 1.42 11.04*** 5.57*** 
Share 
ownership 
plan 
3.22*** 1.40 2.19* 1.64 2.78*** 3.70*** 
Typical 
pseudo 
R2 
0.23-0.24 0.24-0.25 0.11 0.05-0.06 0.11 0.09-0.11 
 
 
A rather different result concerns quality circles where the size and significance of 
effects are similar between the generic share ownership variable, SAYE, and CSOP, 
but not SIP.  SIP is significantly associated with the odds of quality circles being 
present.  The difference between SIP and the other share plans is that most of the SIPs 
captured here will have the Free Shares component (ie quasi-profit sharing) whilst the 
others are stock purchase plans.  Free shares could be a reward for participating in 
quality improvement projects.    A more perplexing result is that for disclosure of 
workplace financial information.  The share ownership variable is significantly 
associated with disclosure, and this appears to be driven by the high odds of 
disclosure associated with the use of CSOPs.  The other share plans are associated 
with considerably smaller odds of disclosure.  Why CSOPs should be associated with 
greater odds of disclosure of workplace financial information is not clear but the 
important point here is that the main all-employee share plan – SAYE – is not 
significantly related to disclosure whilst the generic share ownership variable is.  In 
this case, reliance on a generic share ownership would give a misleading picture of 
the relationships between disclosure and the main all-employee share plans.     
 
5. Limitations of WERS2004 
 
The questions on share ownership plans in WERS2004 are an improvement on those 
in WERS98 for the reasons outlined above.  As mentioned, WERS2004 returns to the 
practice found in WIRS1990 of stipulating named Revenue-approved share plans.  
Even with these improvements there are, however, limitations in WERS2004.  Some 
of these relate to the specification of questions, other to the absence of questions. 
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The most obvious limitation of the current questions concerns those dealing with 
eligibility and participation.  In WERS2004 the first eligibility question asks which 
occupational groups are eligible to participate.  This is based on the 1998 model but 
with the improvement that an ‘all employee category’ is now included.  This provides 
a lead- in to questions about the rates of eligibility and participation for non-
management employees.  The aim of this structure is to highlight non-managerial 
involvement in share plans, given that discussions of WIRS1984 and 1990 were keen 
to differentiate broad-based from managerial share ownership plans.  However, in 
practice it is cumbersome structure, and one that is not as informative as it might be in 
some respects whilst providing unnecessary information in others.  The main function 
of the lead- in question establishes whether non-managerial workers are eligible for 
the share ownership plans.  The detailed information on occupational categories can 
only be fully utilised if it is cross-checked against the occupational composition of the 
workplace (as found in the Workforce Data Sheet).  This is a cumbersome process, 
and one that has not been used in full by any researchers who have analysed WERS.  
It also tends to be unnecessary in that SAYE and SIP are necessarily all-employee 
plans, and will thus in principle be open to all employee groups in the workplace.  The 
main influences on eligibility are likely to be the length of service required for 
eligibility and the distribution of job tenure.       
 
A further limitation of this set of questions is that the eligibility and participation rate 
questions are limited to non-management staff.  This is fine in that it gives a measure 
of how open and broad-based plans are.  However, it means that eligibility and 
participation rates amongst managers are obscured, and that a partial picture of the 
workplace is obtained.  Picture a workplace where 80 per cent of the staff are 
managers: we would obtain participation rates based on only 20 per cent of the 
workplace.  If participation rates were very high amongst non-managers but low 
amongst managers, a potentially misleading picture of overall participation would be 
obtained.  Similarly, we may want to know participation rates in a management-only 
plan if our interest is management remuneration.   
 
There is a simpler and possibly more accurate way to pose these questions.  The 
questions on eligibility and participation rates could revert to the pre-1998 practice of 
asking about the workplace as a whole, rather than just non-managers.  In so far as 
workplace respondents are supplied with information about share plan eligibility and 
participation from Head Office, the information is typically likely to be for the 
workplace as a whole rather than just the non-management component of the 
workforce.  Thus, this could be a more reliable measure than the one currently in use.  
However, the use of categories for eligibility and participation (with the 2004 
innovation of asking for actual numbers as a fallback) should be retained as seeking 
more precise information is likely to increase missing or inaccurate responses (as was 
found in the analysis of WIRS1990 (Millward et al 1992).  At the same time the lead-
in question (FOCCGR*^) could be removed, and replaced with a categorical question 
for the discretionary plans only (CSOP, EMI, and ‘other’) to establish whether a plan 
is for managers only, for other selected staff, or for all or most employees.  As there 
has never been a comparative investigation of involvement in share plans by 
occupation using the WERS series, replacement of this question would not in practice 
limit cross-temporal comparisons.       
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A further issue concerns the use of single measures for eligibility and participation.  
This means that we cannot know which plan has higher participation where there are 
two or more plans.  Comparison of plan participation rates in WERS2004 has 
therefore to be restricted to those cases where there is just one plan present.  The 
problem here is that the numbers of individual plans can be relatively small: around 
40 each in the case of SIP, CSOP, and ‘other’.  Ideally, separate 
eligibility/participation rates would be sought for each plan in the workplace.  This 
might generate more accurate information and fewer ‘don’t knows’ (12 per cent of 
non-managerial share plan workplaces) than at present.  This is because workplace 
respondents may be supplied with participation information for each plan in the 
workplace (this information is readily obtainable) but are unlikely to receive 
information on the combined participation rate in the plans (it is not held in this form 
on share plan databases).  Thus, managerial responses where there is more than one 
plan are probably ‘inspired guesswork’ in many instances. Millward et al found in 
1990 that those workplaces with a single scheme were much more likely to give an 
estimate of participation than those workplaces with multiple schemes (1990: 274).        
 
Finally, on the issue of participation, there is problem with SIP because SIP is a multi-
module plan.  Companies can offer Free Shares or opportunity to participate in 
Partnership Shares (potentially coupled with Matching Shares), or both.  These SIP 
variants are not recognised in WERS so interpretation of participation rates is a little 
tricky.  In general, high participation rates are likely to indicate that Free Shares are 
offered (average take-up rates are 67 per cent: Proshare 2004).  Lower participation 
rates are likely to indicate that Partnership Shares are offered without Free Shares.  
The problem is that it is difficult to know where to draw the line.  Drawing such a line 
is important because a Free Shares plan is very different from a Partnership Shares 
plan: one is a form of profit sharing, the other a medium-risk share subscription plan.  
As noted earlier, the average participation rate in Partnership Shares is around 25 per 
cent.  Ideally, in the next WERS the question on share plan types will differentiate 
between the sub-forms of SIP.      
 
6. Future opportunities 
 
It is tempting to recommend a whole raft of additional questions on employee share 
ownership to enhance the capabilities of WERS in this area.  However, employee 
share ownership is just one small area of the WERS enterprise so any major 
expansion would need to be compensated by economies elsewhere.  Since the 
potential to re-balance in this way will clearly be very limited, any recommendations 
for extra questions have to be parsimonious with new questions having to deliver a 
‘big bang for the bucks’ 
 
One recurrent critic ism of the WERS and other survey approaches has been that data 
on the presence of HR practices does not provide any indication on the ‘quality’ and 
importance of those practices (McCarthy 1994; Wall and Wood 2004).  In the case of 
employee share ownership, an obvious limitation is that WERS does not observe the 
extent of employee share ownership.  This might be seen as unfortunate as there is a 
large raft of research that indicates the level of ownership can be important, though 
not necessarily in a linear fashion (see Conte and Svejnar 1990).  On the face of it, the 
more employees own of a firm the more likely employee interests and concerns are 
likely to be reflected in company policies and practices (Pendleton 2001), though 
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whether this has beneficial effects on performance is questionable.  This could be a 
great opportunity for WERS: the potential to investigate the impact of the extent of 
employee ownership on performance, participation practices, and employee attitudes 
using a large, nationally representative sample.  Typically, previous research 
assessing the role of ownership extent has used fairly small samples and the potential 
for selection bias has been considerable.   
 
There is a case therefore for asking how much of the company to which the workplace 
belongs is owned by employees, with the expectation being that larger ownership is 
associated with bigger effects.  In principle a simple question could be posed: ‘how 
much of the company is owned by employees?’  However, this may not be entirely 
straightforward.  Each individual employee shareholder is an owner in their own right 
as far as the Shareholder Register and legal requirements are concerned, and this 
information needs to be aggregated.  There is also potentially shares held in trust on 
employees’ behalf (certainly where a SIP is in use) and shares under option in SAYE, 
EMI, and CSOP plans (some of which may not be exercised).  Despite these 
complications, listed companies (67 per cent of share plan workplaces belong to listed 
companies) will typically monitor their total employee ownership at any given time 
because of the requirements in the Association of British Insurers’ Code of Practice to 
limit the extent of employee ownership (including shares under option) to 10 per cent 
check details).  Thus, information on the level of employee ownership should be 
readily available within the firm.  To deal with a possible lack of precision at any 
given point, it might be appropriate to use a categorical variable.  One possibility, to 
overcome the possibility that information on company level influences on the 
workplace, may not be held at the workplace, is to introduce a short Company Data 
Sheet in WERS to accompany the Workforce Data Sheet.  This could be especially 
concerned with ownership and governance features at corporate level, and might be 
completed by the Company Secretary (see Deakin and Pendleton 2006).       
 
A second possible innovation relates to the employee questionnaire.  There is 
considerable interest currently in the potential for linking employer-employee data-
sets (Dti publication).  The employee questionnaire in WERS2004 is a considerable 
improvement on the 1998 version primarily because of the addition of better questions 
on employee attitudes and views on their job and their employer. This raises the 
possibility that the management questionnaire and the employee questionnaire can be 
linked to investigate the relationship between presence of share plans and employee 
attitudes.  This has been an important area of research into employee share ownership, 
and the possibility of using WERS to add to this will enrich it greatly.  However, there 
is one major stumbling block with the current employee questionnaire: we do not 
know whether the observed employee participates in the share plan or owns shares in 
the company.  Without this information any investigation of attitudinal ‘outcomes’ is 
going to be fundamentally deficient, and has to rest on an assumption about the 
probability of participation (given our knowledge from the management questionnaire 
of non-managerial participation rates) and/or the idea that the availability of the 
benefit is as powerful as actual participation in the benefit.  This is the idea that the 
presence of share ownership plans will create a pervasive culture of participation.  
However, as participation cultures are not observed directly by WERS it remains a 
questionable assumption.          
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There is a case, then, for adding a question to the employee questionnaire asking 
whether a) the respondent participates in any current share plan, and b) whether the 
respondent owns any shares in the company (directly or beneficially).  In the case of 
the Share Incentive Plan, involvement in Partnership Shares would mean a yes to both 
questions.  In the case of SAYE, it is possible that a respondent may participate in 
SAYE but does not yet own any shares in the company.  This might be coupled with 
questions on pension plan participation, given that is becoming an ever more 
important public policy issue.  
 
Questions on employee involvement in share plans would also enable research into 
the influences on employee participation in share plans.  This is a ‘hot’ topic, 
especially in the US, in the wake of the Enron and other corporate scandals because 
employees clearly invested too much of their pension savings in company stock.  So 
far most of the research in this area has used a single data source (employees, 
administrator records etc) with the result that one set of influences (employee 
characteristics, firm characteristics, plan characteristics) are investigated but not their 
combined effect.  Adding a participation question to the employee questionnaire 
would enable analysis of share plan, workplace, and company influences, in addition 
to employee characteristics, on the individual participation decision.  Currently, we 
can investigate workplace and company influences on the participation rate of non-
managerial employees at the workplace but can only imperfectly link in personal 
characteristics from the employee questionnaire.    
 
Finally, it would be helpful to know a little more about the role of employee 
representation in the design, introduction, and operation of employee share plans.  It 
has long been argued that employee involvement in other ways needs to complement 
participation in ownership for the  full benefits to be achieved.  In principle, employee 
involvement in the operation of the share plan itself may be a highly beneficial form 
of participation since it may demonstrate the commitment of the share plan to ‘real’ 
employee involvement.  As yet, there has been very little research into this issue, 
other than in the case of employee buy-outs (Pendleton 2001 etc).  The only survey 
data on this topic can be found in Kalmi et al (2005, 2006).  The results suggest very 
limited impact of this form of participation on performance but this investigation is 
embryonic and with limited data (in scope and volume).   However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that in ‘best practice’ share ownership firms there is very extensive 
employee involvement and representation in plan introduction, and that this seems to 
impact on participation rates and possibly plan effects.   In some cases this 
representation seems more advanced and extensive than in other aspects of 
employment relationships.  This raises the possibility of whether some questions on 
union and union-union representation in the Management Questionnaire and Worker 
Representative Questionnaire can be amended slightly to refer explicitly to share plan 
committees and representation.   
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Innovations to the Employee Representative Questionnaire 
 
Andy Charlwood1, Riccardo Peccei2 and Mike Terry1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The employee representative questionnaire is a long established feature of the WERS 
survey series. It was introduced in the first WIRS survey, and was initially addressed 
to union representatives only, with the representatives of manual unions the most 
likely to be interviewed. It is now a survey of the senior (defined by length of service 
as a representative) representatives. Where more than one union is present at the 
workplace, the representative questioned is the senior representative of the largest 
trade union. In 1998, the sampling frame was widened to encompass non-union 
representatives, but only if no union representative was present, and if the non-union 
representative sat on a consultative committee which dealt with a range of issues. The 
evaluation of WERS98 and the preliminary consultation prior to the design and 
commissioning of WERS2004 revealed a strong feeling among members of the 
WERS user community that while the employee representative questionnaire was an 
integral and important part of the WERS survey, not least because it sheds important 
light on one of the key actors in the regulation of the employment relationship and 
provides an interesting counterpoint to the views of managers, a significant overhaul 
was needed to make it fit for purpose. Three areas of concern stood out. First, given 
the decline of unions and union representation over the last twenty five years, and the 
potential for an increase in non-union forms of representation as a result of the 
transposition of the European Union’s Information and Consultation Directive into 
UK law, it was felt that WERS needed to provide a better picture of non-union 
representation. Second, systematic comparison of responses to similar questions from 
managers and representatives from the same workplace revealed discrepancies in 
answers, but it wasn’t always clear whether discrepancies were the result of 
differences in opinion and/or information, perhaps as a result of workplace conflict or 
artefacts of differences in the way that the questions were asked (Peccei and Benkhoff 
2001) To try to clarify this, the group decided to drop questions where discrepancies 
seemed likely to be the result of representatives having poorer quality information 
than management and to ensure that the wording of questions was harmonised across 
both the management and employee representative questionnaires. A small number of 
new questions were also developed to probe issues like trust between employee 
representatives and management in more detail. Third, the employee representative 
questionnaire had been little used in secondary analysis, and where it had been used 
(e.g. Charlwood 2004) there were some problems with the wording of some of the 
questions which made it difficult to interpret what some of the results meant. When 
considering this third point, the specialist group developed the position that the 
objective of the survey should be to reveal who representatives are (in terms of age, 
gender, occupation etc). What they do in their role as representatives and what are the 
resources that they do it with? All questions were evaluated against this position. 
Questions which did not provide answers, or which provided ambiguous answers 
were re-drafted or removed.  
                                                                 
1 Warwick Business School, University of Warwick 
2 King’s College London 
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For these reasons, it was felt by the sponsors that the employee representative 
questionnaire was due a thorough review. Consequently a review group was set up 
comprising the authors and representatives of the sponsors. Over a number of 
meetings, the review group hammered out agreement on changes to the sampling 
frame and to the content of the questionnaire. The remainder of this chapter highlights 
the key changes, the rationale for them, and the opportunities that they open up for 
new research. We deliberately omit any reporting of results from the innovations to 
the survey, because the sheer volume of innovations introduced make it impractical 
do to do in the space available to us. The remainder of the chapter is organised as 
follows. Section two considers changes made to provide a fuller account of the 
structure of employee representation, including non-union representatives in addition 
to the traditional focus on union representatives. Section three outlines changes made 
to facilitate understanding of employment relations in workplaces with non-union and 
dual channel representation. Section four outlines changes made to provide a better fit 
between questions asked to management and employee representatives. Section five 
considers changes made to enhance understanding of the representatives’ role and 
resources. Section six outlines changes made to enhance understanding of union 
organisation. 
 
2. Mapping managerial strategy towards employee representation 
 
As we noted above, the employee representative questionnaire in previous WERS 
surveys concentrated on union representatives. In WERS98, non-union 
representatives were also interviewed if the following two conditions were met. 1) 
There was no union representative present. 2) The non-union representative sat on a 
consultative committee which discussed a range of issues. These selection rules meant 
that the small number of non-union reps interviewed in 1998 could not be considered 
as representative of the wider body of non-union employee representatives, because 
non-union employee representatives in ‘dual channel’ workplaces, where there were 
also union representatives present were excluded, as were non-union representatives 
who did not sit on multi- issue consultative committees.  
 
Given the decline of union representation and the potential for future expansion of 
non-union representation as a result of the Information and Consultation Directive, it 
was felt that it was important that WERS should provide a fuller account of the 
activities of non-union representatives. We also wanted to ensure that new types of 
union representative, for example union learning reps were accounted for in the 
survey. Two questions needed to be addressed. How exactly would an employee 
representative be defined? How would non-union employee representatives be 
selected?  
 
In answer to the first question, it was decided that to be eligible for participation in the 
employee representative questionnaire, a representative had to deal with a range of 
issues. Therefore, representatives whose purpose was to represent employees on a 
single issue, for example health and safety or statutory consultation over 
redundancies, would not be eligible to participate. However, union learning reps 
would be eligible to participate in the survey, because in many cases, union learning 
reps also fulfil other representative roles in addition to their role in promoting 
learning. The second question was trickier. The 1998 survey had given primacy to 
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union representatives and only interviewed non-union representatives if there was no 
union representative present. This resulted in an unrepresentative sample of non-union 
representatives. Yet to reverse this decision and give primacy to non-union 
representatives would introduce selection bias to the sample on union representatives. 
To interview both a union and a non-union representative in workplaces where both 
were present would risk adding significant costs to the survey. Various compromise 
solutions were considered, including randomly choosing either a union representative 
or a non-union representative to be interviewed in workplaces where both were 
present. However, none of the compromise solutions were particularly satisfactory, so 
the group made a strong recommendation, subsequently adopted by the sponsors, that 
two employee representative interviews – one with a union representative, the other 
with a non-union representative – should take place in workplaces where both union 
and non-union representatives were present. In addition to providing a fully 
representative sample of non-union representatives, this approach has the further 
benefit of allowing the processes of representation in dual channel workplaces to be 
investigated in greater detail (see section two below).  
 
In total 1,203 eligible representatives were identified at 1,072 establishments. This 
sampling frame yielded 985 employee representative interviews (81.9 per cent of 
eligible representatives) from 896 workplaces. 736 of those interviewed were union 
representatives while 249 were non-union representatives. Response rates differed 
slightly by type of representative, with 83.5 per cent of eligible union reps being 
interviewed compared to 77.3 per cent of eligible non-union representatives (Chaplin 
et al. 2006). Interviews were conducted with union and non-union representatives in 
89 workplaces, this represents 54 per cent of workplaces where both union and non-
union reps were present. Looking in more detail at the non-union representatives, 181 
(72.7 per cent) were representatives who sat on multi- issue consultative committees, 
while 68 (27.3 per cent) were ‘stand alone’ representatives who did not have any 
formal committee role (so who would not have been interviewed in the 1998 survey). 
Overall, if the 1998 sampling frame had been used in 2004, only around 119 
interviews with non-union representatives would have been achieved in 2004 (68 
would have been excluded because the representatives did not sit on a multi- issue 
committee and a further 62 would have been excluded because a union representative 
would have been selected for interview ahead of the non-union representative). We 
believe that these results vindicate the decision of the sponsors to undertake extra 
interviews in dual-channel workplaces and to extend the sampling frame of non-union 
representatives to include those who did not sit on multi- issue consultative 
committees. This innovation opens up avenues for research into the nature and 
activities of a nationally representative sample of non-union representatives, 
something which was not possible in previous WERS. This is interesting in its own 
right, but, as the next section will make clear, this innovation is particularly important 
if we are to understand the impact of the European Union’s information and 
consultation directive on employee representation in Britain. 
 
3. Understanding employment relations in workplaces with non-union and dual-
channel representation 
 
As the preceding section explained, WERS2004 is the first survey in the series to be 
built around the clear understanding that employee representation is no longer based 
around a ‘union monopoly’ of representative structures directed principally at the 
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negotiation of terms and conditions of employment with managers.  Consequently, an 
explicit decision was taken by the expert team responsible for the ‘employee 
representative’ questionnaire (and, indirectly, for related questions to management 
representatives) to develop new and modified questions designed to probe the 
possible emergence of new modes of representation. New questions and routing were 
developed specifically for non-union representatives. This dealt with one of the key 
weaknesses of the 1998 survey: many of the questions asked of the small number of 
non-union respondents were only appropriate for union representatives. The 2004 
survey contains questions developed specifically to probe the role and activities of 
non-union representatives. Where possible these questions are analogous to equivalent  
questions addressed to union representatives so allowing comparisons between union 
and non-union representatives, but this new structure allowed the flexibility to address 
questions which were only applicable to either union or non-union representatives 
without adding dramatically to the length of the survey. These changes allow us to 
address a number of pertinent issues and questions which could not be addressed by 
the previous surveys. 
 
Over the last several years survey and case study research has confirmed the 
continuing decline of traditional forms of trade union workplace representation.  As 
union recognition has declined so too has the number of workplaces with trade union 
representative systems and the proportion of employees who enjoy the basic right to 
representation at the workplace has fallen dramatically.  But it has not just been a 
matter of numbers.  The decline in unions’ workplace bargaining strength has been 
reflected in significant changes in the processes that characterise workplace 
interactions between management and union representatives and in the subjects 
covered by them.  In particular it is claimed that negotiation (a process of bargaining 
resulting in jointly-owned compromise outcomes) has been increasingly displaced by 
consultation (seeking the views of representatives within a framework of unilateral 
managerial decision-making).  More radically still, some research indicates a growing 
managerial interest in representation through non-union channels, both direct and 
indirect.  Several of these emergent trends are given greater weight by the 
promulgation in 2005 of the Information and Consultation of Employees (ICE) 
Regulations that provide a legal framework for universal employee consultation (not 
negotiation) within the enterprise.  These Regulations, although their full impact has 
yet to be assessed, run against the established model of employee representation at the 
workplace since they establish consultation and information as the mode of collective 
interaction, and they enable universal employee representation, irrespective of union 
membership.  
 
As discussed in the previous section, WERS2004 provides, more completely than its 
predecessors, a detailed mapping of the three available forms of indirect employee 
representation: the traditional form based solely on trade union (‘shop steward’) 
representation; non-union systems; and ‘hybrid’ systems containing both union and 
non-union representatives. The last are of particular interest since it could be plausibly 
argued that they constitute the most likely form to emerge as a consequence of the 
operation of the ICE Regulations, as a result of the actors in workplaces with existing 
trade union-based systems looking to extend rights to information and consultation to 
groups of employees who do not enjoy trade union recognition to comply with legal 
requirements before the law comes into effect.  New questions explored the 
relationships between union and non-union representatives and looked at whether 
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managers treated the two types of representative differently.  These all enable a first 
investigation into the important question whether the presence of non-union 
representatives weakens or strengthens collective employee representation and 
whether, as many unions fear, managers may seek to use the presence of non-union 
representatives as a means of weakening or bypassing union-based forms. The three-
way classification noted above can also be used for testing different hypotheses about 
the impact or effectiveness of the three types, both from the point of view of 
employee interests (wages, employment security, etc.) or from that of employers 
(workplace performance measures). It will provide a snapshot of the coverage of these 
three forms of representation as a benchmark against which to chart growth or decline 
in the future. In short WERS2004 allows us to explore the growing diversity of 
indirect representation structures and to say something useful about the different 
forms.3  Alongside the identification of this increased diversity, WERS2004 sought to 
trace and investigate a second, possibly related, phenomenon: the alleged growing 
significance of systems of engagement between managers and employee 
representatives devoted solely to consultation as opposed to negotiation, the more 
traditional approach to collective relationships.  Thus if the traditional structure is 
held to be a joint committee of managers and trade union representatives negotiating 
the terms and conditions of employment, a more recent form, particularly promoted 
by the 1990s enthusiasm for ‘partnership’, was a body concerned with consultation of 
employee representatives. The difference between the two may not lie solely in the 
process and outcome (‘joint regulation’ and ‘managerial decision informed by 
consultation’).  It is also argued that the agenda of consultation is significantly 
different from that of traditional negotiation; the latter preoccupied with economistic 
issues of terms and conditions of employment and wages in particular, and the former 
broader, reflecting in part an alleged managerial enthusiasm for sharing with 
employees information about the challenges facing the company, competitive 
prospects, and corporate strategy.  Finally, reflecting the earlier discussion, we tend to 
assume that negotiation is undertaken solely by trade union representatives (evidence 
on non-union representative systems shows that they are virtually never granted rights 
of negotiation (see Terry (1999); Butler (2004)), while consultation may be handled 
by all three types of representative structure outlined above.  This last point again may 
anticipate some of the implications of the ICE Regulations which grant rights to 
consultation and information but on the presumption of universal systems of 
employee representation.  This may prefigure the emergence of a form of workplace 
dualism with negotiation rights and processes remaining the prerogative of unions 
acting on behalf of their members (where recognition exists) but consultation 
extending through different mechanisms to a larger employee constituency.  
  
WERS2004 probes to a greater extent than before the subjects of consultation, the 
structures created to enable it to take place and representative and management 
evaluations of its significance and influence.  It provides an opportunity to check in 
detail whether employers’ professed enthusiasm for consultation with employees has 
been realised and if so what its effects are proving to be. Administered only months 
before the implementation of the first phase of the ICE Regulations it provides an 
opportunity to look for evidence of managerial and employee/trade union interest in 
                                                                 
3 We did not have time to explore other signs of this growing diversity, such as the suggestion that 
there is a growth in specialist areas of representation – Health and Safety representation as in the past, 
but also the increasing importance of specialist Learning Representatives and Equality Representatives, 
strongly promoted by many trade unions in recent years. 
  77 
anticipating the effects of the legislation by drawing up agreements before the law 
comes into force.  In exploring claims for the enhanced significance of consultation it 
enables us to explore the vexed question as to whether the development of 
consultation is associated with a weakening of negotiation (as frequently argued in the 
past) or whether the two processes can co-exist, each with its own dedicated structure 
and purpose.  
 
The survey thus provides tools to examine not only the state of play of traditional 
employee representation but the emergence and significance of new forms of 
representation and new modalities of engagement between employers and employee 
representative structures.  It is sometimes suggested that recent changes (in particular 
the Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations) are introducing a form 
of ‘dual system’ into UK workplace representation systems, analogous by implication 
to those found in other EU Member States in mainland Europe.  While WERS2004 
certainly enables us to check this, it provides tools for the assessment of a far more 
likely set of outcomes than a structured dualism, namely a considerable diversification 
in both the form of indirect employee representation and the modes of engagement 
between representatives and employers. Earlier WERS started the task of identifying 
some of these trends; the most recent one will enable us to paint a much clearer 
picture of the multifarious forms likely to characterise workplace representation in the 
future.  
 
4. Triangulating responses from employee representative and management 
respondents 
 
As noted above, the third key issue considered by the specialist group was that of the 
triangulation of data from the management and employee representative 
questionnaires. Triangulation, in this context, refers to the matching or alignment of 
questions in the two questionnaires so as to enable a direct comparison of manager 
and employee representative responses to specific topics of interest. Such 
comparisons are important since they make it possible to check the information 
provided by management on these topics against that provided by employee 
representatives. In turn, this makes it possible to consider wider issues of interrater 
agreement and reliability. Such issues are central to the analysis of the WERS data 
and are made all the more important by the fact that much of the information available 
from WERS about the management and operation of individual establishments comes 
from management itself (Peccei & Benkhoff, 2001).  
 
Effective triangulation requires appropriate matching of questions across 
questionnaires so as to enable direct comparison of responses on desired items. Since 
their inception, the WERS surveys have always included a number of common 
questions asked to both management and employee representatives in individual 
establishments. In the previous survey, WERS98, for example, there were over 80 
questions that appeared in both the management and the employee representative 
questionnaires. Closer inspection shows, however, that a number of these common 
items were not fully matched in that the actual wording of the questions involved 
differed between the two questionnaires (Peccei & Benkhoff, 2001). In some cases the 
differences in wording were only minor, while in others they were more substantial, 
making systematic comparison between management and representative responses 
problematic. In addition, some of the common questions in WERS98 covered issues 
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about which employee representatives might have only limited knowledge, such as 
whether management at the establishment set a range of specific targets relating to 
sales, costs, turnover, and so on, thereby clearly limiting the value of any comparison 
with the information provided by management on these same items.  
 
In light of these and similar problems, the specialist group decided to review the set of 
common  questions asked of management and employee representatives in WERS98 
and then proposed a number of changes designed to harmonise the items involved and 
provide a more meaningful basis for comparing responses across questionnaires in the 
2004 survey. As part of the review, a number of the common questions that were 
asked in WERS98 were dropped in 2004, while others were changed to ensure direct 
relevance and comparability across questionnaires. The end result of this 
harmonisation exercise was the inclusion in the 2004 survey of a smaller, but more 
coherent, set of directly matched questions that were asked to both management and 
union and non-union employee representatives who participated in the survey. 
 
The matched questions included in WERS2004 covered both filtered and non-filtered 
items. Non-filtered questions are primary questions asked of all management and 
employee representative who participated in the survey. For example, whether there 
are formal procedures at the establishment for dealing with discipline and dismissals. 
In contrast, filtered questions are secondary, or follow-up, items that are only asked of 
respondents who answered in a particular way to a previous primary or secondary 
question.  For instance, if there are formal procedures for dealing with discipline and 
dismissals, whether employees are asked to attend a formal meeting with a manager to 
discuss the reason for taking disciplinary action and, if so: (a) whether employees are 
allowed to be accompanied by a range of possible companions at the disciplinary 
meeting, and (b) whether the companions, if admitted to the meeting, are allowed to 
ask questions on behalf of the employee. Although important, filtered questions are 
less directly useful than non-filtered questions for looking at issues of interrater 
agreement and reliability. This is because the number of va lid responses on follow-up 
questions is often much smaller than on primary questions and can also vary 
significantly from one item to the next, thereby making meaningful comparisons 
across questions extremely difficult. As part of the harmonisation exercise, therefore, 
a number of matched secondary items were retained and/or introduced in the 2004 
management and employee representative questionnaires. The main emphasis, 
however, was on the inclusion in the two questionnaires of appropriately matched 
primary or non-filtered questions covering a range of topics of interest.  
  
In the event, a set of 50 directly matched primary questions were included in the 
WERS2004 management and employee representative questionnaires. These 50 
matched items cover a range of topics and include both ‘factual’ questions asking 
respondents, for instance, to identify whether or not there had been any strikes at the 
establishment in the past year, as well as more ‘subjective’ questions requiring 
respondents to rate on a three-point Likert scale, for example, management’s attitude 
towards union membership at the workplace. The specific topics covered by the set of 
matched items include key aspects of the management and operation of the 
establishment about which employee representatives could reasonably be expected to 
have direct knowledge and experience. The topics cover issues related to human 
resource (HR) practices, negotiations, information sharing, industrial conflict, change 
  79 
and management attitudes towards union membership. Specifically, the matched 
questions cover the following areas: 
 
(1) The existence or otherwise of a basic set of HR practices and 
procedures at the establishment dealing with collective and 
individual grievances, and with discipline, dismissals and 
appeals. 
(2) Whether management ignores, informs, consults or 
negotiates with employee representatives over a number of 
important issues at the establishment, ranging from pay to health 
and safety. 
(3) Whether management regularly discloses information about 
various aspects of the operation of the establishment to 
employees and/or their representatives at the workplace. 
(4) Whether or not a range of forms of industrial action, such as 
strikes, go slows and work to rules, had either taken place or 
been threatened at the establishment over the past year. 
(5) Whether management had introduced a series of changes at 
the workplace in the past five years, ranging, for example, from 
changes in payment systems to changes in work techniques and 
procedures, and the role played by employees and their 
representatives in the introduction of these changes.  
(6) Management’s overall attitude towards union membership 
among employees at the establishment. 
 
Clearly, there are a number of other areas that, in principle, it would have been useful 
to collect matched information about from management and employee 
representatives, including, for example, other aspects of HR policy and practice at the 
establishment. However, given the other important additions made to the employee 
representative questionnaire outlined above, the specialist team thought it best to limit 
the number of matched items so as not to add further to the length and complexity of 
the instrument.  The matched questions included in WERS2004, however, are both 
sufficiently numerous and varied to allow for a useful comparison of the extent to 
which management and employee representatives agree about important aspects of the 
management and operation of their workplace. As such, they provide the basis for an 
in-depth analysis of interrater agreement and reliability, as well as an opportunity to 
explore key related issues about validity and systematic bias in the latest version of 
WERS.  
 
Finally, in this context, it is worth noting that in addition to the set of matched items 
discussed above, a small number of new questions designed to assess levels of trust 
between management and employee representatives at the workplace were also 
included in the WERS2004 survey.  The new trust-related items are discussed in 
detail in the contribution prepared by the specialist group dealing with innovations 
relating specifically to partnership at work in WERS2004. Here it is sufficient to note 
that in order to assess perceived trust relations between management and employee 
representatives, three parallel questions were asked of the two sets of respondents in 
each establishment. Specifically, employee representatives were asked whether 
managers at their workplace: (a) can be relied upon to live up to the commitments 
they have made to employee representatives, (b) are sincere in their attempts to 
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understand representatives’ point of view, and (c) can be trusted to act with honesty 
and integrity in their dealings with representatives. The same sets of questions were 
asked of management about both union and non-union employee representatives. 
Taken together, these parallel set of questions constitute an important innovation in 
WERS2004 allowing for a systematic analysis of mutual trust relations between 
management and employee representatives across British establishments. Importantly, 
this analysis can be further extended and enriched by looking at the questions from 
the employee questionnaire in WERS2004 designed to tap employees’ trust in 
management. In particular, the combined trust data from the three WERS 
questionnaires provide a unique opportunity to explore wider issues about the role 
played by mutual trust not only in enhancing labour-management cooperation at the 
workplace, but also in contributing more generally to employee well-being and 
performance at the establishment.  
 
5. Understanding the representative role 
 
The specialist group made a number of more minor changes and additions to the  
worker representative questionnaire to allow the questions, of who the representatives 
are, what they do and what resources do they have to do it with, to be answered more 
thoroughly. Because a lot of what representatives do may happen through informal 
contact with management rather than formal consultative or negotiating meetings, a 
new question was added on informal contact between employee representatives and 
management. The extent of consultation and information sharing were examined more 
carefully. In workplaces with both union and non-union representatives were present, 
a question was introduced to look at the relationship between union and non-union 
representatives. Questions on whether or not representatives sought help and advice 
from sources outside of the workplace and if they did, who from were developed. 
More detailed questions on how representatives were selected for their representative 
role were introduced so the extent of democratic participation in representative 
selection could be gauged. In a similar vein, more detailed questions on the 
constituency of workers that the representative spoke for were developed. 
 
6. Understanding union organisation 
 
The final area considered in detail by the specialist group were questions on union 
organisation. This is a subject of considerable interest among practitioners and 
academics. In recent years, debate has focused on the viability of ‘organising 
unionism’ as a strategy for union revitalisation (e.g. Heery et al. 2003). WERS 
represents and important opportunity to investigate the extent to which the rhetoric of 
organising unionism is being translated into action at a grassroots level and whether 
or not attempts at union organising have been successful. To allow these questions to 
be investigated, there are now more detailed questions on union organising; the scope 
that unions have to expand their membership in area where they are recognised and 
coverage in areas where they are not recognised. If there is scope for growth, has the 
union made any attempts to expand membership and coverage? If they did, what 
resources and tactics were used: specialist training, support and material from the 
unions head office or regional office? The new questionnaire also explores in more 
detail the nature and extent of contact and support provided to union representatives 
by union officials and headquarters. These new questions allow the extent of union 
organising activity to be mapped, and allow some analysis of the determinants of 
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successful and unsuccessful attempts to organise and recruit non-union workers. 
There are also new and more detailed questions on strike activity and the union role in 
grievance procedures. The questions on contact between union representatives and 
union officials also allow some assessment of the independence and self-sufficiency 
of workplace organisation to be assessed – something which may allow theories of 
union viability (Willman 2001) to be tested. 
 
7. Conclusions: new directions for research 
 
This brief chapter has highlighted the key changes to the WERS2004 employee 
representative questionnaire and explained the rationale behind the changes. It has 
deliberately omitted any discussion of the results of the survey arising from these 
changes, because the sheer volume of innovation makes this an impractical task given 
the time and space available in this book. It has identified four key sets of changes: 
First, major changes to the selection rule which has more than doubled the number of 
non-union employee representatives who participated in the survey. This change 
means that WERS2004 is the first WERS to include a fully representative sample of 
non-union representatives and the first to allow comparison of union and non-union 
representatives from the same workplace. This innovation will allow researchers to 
gain a better understanding of non-union representation while providing a benchmark 
against which the effect of the ICE Regulations can be assessed. It will also allow the 
multiplicity of representation arrangements currently present in Great Britain to be 
mapped more accurately while allowing some analysis of the processes and outcomes 
associated with different forms of representation. 
 
Second, changes to the questionnaire to reduce unhelpful duplication of questions 
with the management questionnaire in cases where it seems likely that employee 
representatives’ will not be well placed to provide accurate answers and to build a 
core of questions which allow accurate triangulation of responses between managerial 
and employee representative respondents. These questions cover the existence of HR 
practices, the extent of management consultation, negotia tion and information sharing 
with representatives on a range of issues as well as information disclosure, industrial 
action, workplace change and managerial attitudes towards union membership. This 
change will allow some assessment of interrater agreement and reliability. A further 
set of common questions on trust between management and employee representatives 
are developed, this innovation is discussed in more depth elsewhere in this volume.  
 
Third, a small number of new and more detailed questions were introduced, and 
wording was changed in some other questions in order to provide better answers to 
the question of who reps are, what they do and the resources they do it with. These 
innovations allow for better description of the representatives role and activities 
(already documented in the WERS2004 sourcebook) and if combined with some of 
the other innovations described above, will allow for a more in depth study of the 
determinants of more capable and effective forms of workplace representation. 
 
Fourth, and in a similar vein new and more detailed questions were introduced on 
union organising activity, which will allow ideas about the extent and nature of union 
organising activity and the determinants of success in union organising to be tested.  
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The Collection of Objective Data on Workplace Performance 
 
John Forth 1 and Robert McNabb2 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One of the central purposes of the Workplace Employment Relations Survey series 
has been to map patterns and trends in employment relations in Britain. However, 
another principal application of the survey data has been to analyse the relationships 
between workplace performance and various types of human resource management 
practices, employment practices and compensation systems. Much of this work arises 
from a desire to establish the impact and efficacy of different workplace practices. 
The subjects investigated have included union representation, employee consultation 
arrangements, performance-related pay, workforce training, bundles of human 
resource management practices, and work- life balance policies.  
 
A prerequisite for such analyses is the availability of information on workplace 
practices and relevant contextual variables, on the one hand, and workplace 
performance measures, on the other. In this respect, the Workplace Employment 
Relations Surveys (WERS) (previously, the Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys) 
have proved an invaluable source, as few other inquiries provide data in both areas. 
But despite the extensive use of WERS in industrial relations, labour economics and 
human resource management, some commentators have questioned its value. One 
such area of debate concerns the ability of the survey (indeed, any survey) to capture 
the complexity and diversity of human resource management practices and industrial 
relations at the workplace. We do not address this particular issue here. Instead, we 
focus on another area of contention, which concerns the validity of the measures of 
performance that have traditionally been available in WERS. The latter comprise 
subjective assessments of relative productivity and relative profitability acquired in 
each Cross-Section survey from the main management respondent (the senior person 
at the workplace with responsibility for personnel or employment relations issues). 
The nature of these measures, and the way in which they have been collected, have 
raised questions about both their reliability and their usefulness in identifying 
performance-enhancing or performance- limiting practices.  
 
In acknowledgement of these concerns, efforts were made in the 2004 WERS to 
collect objective (accounts-based) measures of workplace productivity and 
profitability, in addition to the subjective measures previously captured. These efforts 
involved the administration of a new Financial Performance Questionnaire within the 
2004 Cross-Section Survey. They also involved attempts to link both the 2004 Cross-
Section and 1998-2004 Panel data with performance data collected in the Office for 
National Statistics’ (ONS) Annual Business Inquiry.  
 
This paper describes these attempts, and also examines the nature and availability of 
the objective measures of performance that were subsequently obtained. It is 
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complemented by a separate paper (Forth and McNabb, 2007) which evaluates the 
degree of convergence between the objective and subjective measures.  
 
2. Existing measures of workplace performance  
 
Before we consider the objective performance data available in WERS 2004, it is 
useful to consider the existing measures of workplace performance available in earlier 
surveys in the series and collected again in WERS 2004 Here we focus on final 
performance indicators, that is, labour productivity and profitability, rather than 
intermediary measures such as labour turnover and absenteeism.  
 
Subjective assessments of relative financial performance have been sought from 
workplace managers in each of the five Cross-Section surveys in the WERS series. 
The subjective assessment of relative productivity was added in 1990. The question 
text used for each measure in WERS 2004 is reproduced in Appendix A, though the 
wording has remained virtually identical over the series: the principal change was the 
move from a three to a five-point scale for the measure of financial performance in 
1984. These questions have typically been directed to the main management 
respondent, though in 1990 they were directed to a financial manager in private sector 
workplaces that had someone in such a role (24 per cent of all surveyed workplaces). 
 
There are a number of criticisms that might be levelled at these subjective measures. 
The first is that performance may be measured with error since the main management 
respondent in WERS may have only limited information on either or both of the 
performance variables. In the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey, half of all 
respondents were personnel specialists. A further 47 per cent were owners or general 
managers, whilst only 4 per cent were financial managers. It seems probable that 
some personnel managers will not be well informed about the level of labour 
productivity or financial performance within their own workplace, and will be even 
less knowledgeable about the performance of their competitors; the respondent 
requires knowledge of both in order to provide the relative evaluation sought within 
the question. Such concerns are seemingly given weight by the fact that around half of 
all respondents report their establishment’s productivity or performance as being 
above average and only a small proportion report it to be below average (see 
Appendix A). There is also a significant amount of non-response.  
 
If any measurement error was random, the impact would be to reduce the apparent 
strength of any associations that could be identified. However, a second criticism is 
that the limited variance in the data (also partly a function of the limited response 
categories) provides the analyst with less information than a continuous, accounts-
based measure of productivity or profitability. This further restricts the analyst’s 
ability to identify associations between practices and performance, since the impact of 
a practice must be sufficient to move a workplace from one category to the next in 
order to be observable in the data.  
 
If any measurement error was non-random, and there were consistent positive (or 
negative) response biases across a range of variables, the impact could be more 
problematic. This may occur if a manager responsible for introducing specific 
practices, presumably with the expectation that they may improve productivity or 
profitability, then overstates any positive effect these practices may have had (or 
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downplays any negative impact), leading to a spurious positive correlation between 
responses about employment practices and responses about performance.  
 
Quite apart from any potential measurement error, another possible criticism is that 
there is some lack of clarity in the WERS subjective measures as to what is actually 
being measured. Since 1998, a precursor to the question about financial performance 
has asked the respondent to specify the measure of financial performance on which 
their evaluation is based (sales, profits, costs etc), but there is no such precursor to the 
question on productivity. Two managers may then base their productivity ratings on 
very different measures, with one taking sales as the numerator and another taking 
value-added. The denominator for the respondent's evaluation is not defined for the 
ratings of either productivity or financial performance, and so may be variously taken 
as either total employees, full-time equivalents or even hours worked. Furthermore, 
the nature of the industry comparison is not defined and respondents may clearly have 
differing views as to what constitutes “your industry”. 
 
Finally, and of no less importance in policy terms, the subjective measure may be 
criticised because the limited, ordinal nature of the response categories means that it is 
not possible to quantify the impact of any particular practice on workplace 
performance. Instead, one is limited to making general statements about the sign of 
any impact or association (whether positive or negative) and about the relative 
importance of different practices included within the same analysis.  
 
Notwithstanding these various concerns, subjective performance measures do have a 
number of significant advantages. From a pragmatic point of view, objective 
measures of profitability or productivity are not always available at the level of the 
establishment. Respondents to workplace surveys may have an accurate perception of 
how their establishment is performing, but may not have - or be willing to release - 
actual data on sales, value-added or profitability. This may be because such 
information is not collected at the level of the individual workplace or because, even 
if it is available, it is commercially sensitive. In contrast, subjective measures tend to 
have high response rates, with 85-90 per cent of respondents typically providing a 
rating in WERS. They are also less costly to construct, since one merely incurs the 
negligible marginal cost of asking (answering) one or two additional questions within 
an existing face-to-face interview that, in WERS, already lasts an average of two 
hours.  
 
Prior evaluations of the subjective performance ratings in WERS have also generally 
been positive. In their analyses of the impact of unions on financial performance, 
Machin and Stewart (1990, 1996) accepted that the subjective measure included a 
degree of ‘noise’, but their tests found no evidence of systematic reporting errors. 
They also found that workplaces which gave higher subjective ratings of financial 
performance were less likely to close down in subsequent years, a finding replicated 
by Bryson with more recent data (2001). Machin and Stewart also pointed out that 
objective valuations may be subject to measurement error and may vary because of 
differences in accounting practice across firms, and they noted the value of the 
subjective measure in implicitly controlling for unobservable industry-specific effects.   
 
Nevertheless, there have been continual calls advocating the collection of objective 
(accounts-based) performance data in WERS. This was first attempted during the 
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design phase for WIRS 1990, but abandoned after piloting suggested a low response 
rate (Airey et al, 1992: 20).  
 
A second attempt to obtain objective performance data was made in 1998. The Cross-
Section Survey included a question (MCENPRO) which sought consent from the 
management respondent to link the survey data from their workplace to any return 
that had been provided for that workplace in response to the ONS Annual Business 
Inquiry (ABI). The ABI provides information, inter alia, on gross output, intermediate 
inputs and employment that can be used to derive a measure of per capita gross value 
added (Jones, 2000). Successive years of data are made ava ilable for research use 
within an ONS repository named the Annual Respondents Database (ARD) (Oulton, 
1997; Barnes and Martin, 2002). The ABI (and hence the ARD) does not, however, 
contain much information on the sorts of contextual variables found in WERS and 
contains no data on workplace human resource practices or industrial relations. 
 
The linking of the records was possible because both surveys drew their samples from 
the ONS Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR). However, when the matching 
exercise was conducted, ABI data were available within the ARD for only 175 of the 
2,191 establishments surveyed in WERS 1998. The reasons were two-fold. First, the 
ABI covered only the production sector at the time that WERS 1998 was being 
designed and put into the field in 1997; data were first collected from the service 
sector in 1999 (albeit most typically for the calendar year January – December 1998).3 
For this reason, consent to link WERS and the ABI was only sought from workplaces 
in the production sector (n=418) and, because it was originally envisaged that the 
majority of WERS fieldwork would take place before the end of 1997, the question 
only sought consent to link WERS to the 1997 ABI. This naturally limited the 
opportunities for data linking. The second issue was that, being a sample survey 
among enterprises with fewer than 250 employees, the ABI has only partial coverage 
of the population of private sector businesses. Consequently, only 229 of the 319 
workplaces providing signed consent in WERS 1998 could be identified on the ARD 
as having provided an ABI return for 1997 (Haskel, 2005). 
 
A further issue to be confronted in any subsequent analysis of the matched data was 
that most returns to the ABI are completed at enterprise level. Thus, in cases where 
the surveyed establishment in WERS 1998 was part of a multi-site organisation, there 
was commonly a discrepancy in the unit of observation within the two surveys.4 A 
similar problem arose in matching ABI returns with another establishment-level 
survey – the Employer Skills Survey for England. Analysis of those data proceeded 
either by focusing solely on single-plant enterprises (Haskel et al, 2003; Galinda-
Rueda and Haskel, 2005), by apportioning enterprise output across plants on a per-
employee basis (thereby assuming homogeneity across plants within the same 
enterprise) (ibid), or by extrapolating from the small number of observations for 
workplaces in multi-establishment firms (Harris and Robinson, 2006). Each option 
naturally raises questions about the representativeness and reliability of the results. 
 
 
                                                                 
3 The ABI continues to exclude SIC(2003) Section J (Financial intermediation).  
4 For example, if the WERS data related to a single outlet of a national retail chain, the ABI return may 
well concern the whole company.  Haskel (2005) reports that only 69 of the 229 matched ABI returns 
had site-level data on labour productivity.  
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3. Collecting Objective Measures of Workplace Performance in WERS 2004 
 
The experience of the previous surveys led the Performance/Technology Specialist 
Team and the WERS Research Team to consider how objective performance data 
might be better collected in WERS 2004. It was clear that the size of any WERS-ABI 
linked dataset could be extended considerably by a more wide-ranging consent 
question that included service industries and which also provided for linkages to be 
made to multiple years of data in the ARD. However, questions would still remain 
about the common mis-match in units of observation. Accordingly, it was also agreed 
that, subject to successful pre-testing, WERS would again attempt to collect data at 
establishment level through the development of a questionnaire focused specifically 
on financial performance.  
 
Linking WERS 2004 to the ARD 
 
The development of a revised consent question took place via discussions with the 
Business Data Linking (BDL) team at the Office for National Statistics, headed by 
Felix Ritchie. BDL have responsibility for linking data from the various statistical 
inquiries undertaken by ONS, and have also facilitated the few links that have been 
made between these inquiries and external surveys (e.g. WERS 1998, Employer Skills 
Survey, International Benchmarking Survey). These discussions led to the adoption of 
a wide-ranging consent question previously used in DTI’s Work-Life Balance 
Employer Survey 2003. The wording of the question as it appeared in WERS 2004 is 
reproduced in Appendix B. 5 Where a positive reply is obtained from the respondent, 
the nature of the consent obtained via this question permits links to be made (by ONS 
and the WERS Research Team) between the WERS data from that workplace and 
almost any other source of data over any time period, as long as the resultant linked 
data are used for research purposes. In the event, consent was obtained from 2,166 (94 
per cent) of the 2,295 workplaces that participated in the Cross-Section Survey. 6 
 
The WERS Cross-Section data for these workplaces were subsequently linked to 
ARD2 by the Business Data Linking team at ONS (see Davies, 2006 for a detailed 
discussion of the linking process).7 Table 1 provides a summary of the linkages made 
in respect of ARD2 for 2002, 2003 and 2004. The process of linking WERS with the 
ARD2 was done by matching via each workplace’s unique IDBR identifier (called the 
IDBR Local Unit reference number), this identifier being present on both data files. 
The table indicates that it was possible to identify 1,979 of the 2,166 consenting 
WERS workplaces (91 per cent) on ARD2 in 2003. The slightly higher match rate for 
2003 when compared with 2004 is to be expected, since the sample for the WERS 
Cross-Section was drawn from the Inter-Departmental Business Register in 
September 2003 and establishment reference numbers disappear from the Register 
over time for reasons other than establishment closure (e.g. company takeover).   
 
                                                                 
5 Verbal consent was considered sufficient by ONS in 2004. The requirement for signed consent in 
WERS 1998 had reduced the numbers available for matching, as signed consent forms were not 
collected for 54 of the 373 workplaces that were recorded to have given verbal consent in the survey 
interview.  
6 The consent question was also included in the 2004 wave of the 1998-2004 Panel Survey. See section 
7.  
7 ARD2 is a revised version of the ARD, released in mid-2006, with improved consistency in variable 
names and definitions across years (see Robjohns, 2006, for further details). 
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Table 1  
Number of matches between the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey and the 
Annual Respondents Database (ARD2) 
 
 ARD 
2002 
ARD 
2002 
ARD 
2003 
ARD 
2003 
ARD 
2004 
ARD 
 2004 
 
Full sam
ple 
Trading sector 
(A
STA
TU
S1
W<
=
8) 
Full sam
ple 
Trading sector 
(A
STA
TU
S1
W<
=
8) 
Full sam
ple 
Trading sector 
(A
STA
TU
S1
W <
=
8) 
Total number  
of observations 
2,295 1,757 2,295 1,757 2,295 1,757 
Consent given  
for data linking 
(MLINKDATW=1) 
2,166 1,651 2,166 1,651 2,166 1,651 
Identified on 
ARD2 
using IDBR Local 
Unit Ref. No.  
(MATCHA=3) 
1,535 1,381 1,979 1,612 1,855 1,503 
ABI return 
provided  
(SOURCEA=1) 
855 825 932 894 882 847 
ABI return covers 
single workplace 
(LIVELUA=1) 
178 171 175 167 149 142 
Notes: 
W: Indicates a variable contained in the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey Management data file 
(XS04_MQ.*) 
A: Indicates a variable contained in ARD2 or the matched WERS-ARD data file 
 
The fact that the Annual Business Inquiry is not a census of enterprises is seen by the 
fact that only half of those workplaces identified on the ARD2 in a particular year (47 
per cent for 2003) belong to enterprises with an ABI return for that year. The 
proportion is slightly higher (55 per cent in 2003) when the attention is confined to 
WERS workplaces located in the trading sector of the economy (defined as the private 
sector, plus trading government corporations and nationalised industries), since the 
ABI purposefully does not cover the public sector.8 Within the trading sector, ABI 
returns are more likely to be available for workplaces that belong to larger enterprises 
and for those outside of the Financial Intermediation sector, reflecting the sample 
design of the ABI. One inadvertent implication is that WERS workplaces that 
recognise trade unions have an above-average probability of having an ABI return, 
since union recognition is more common among workplaces belonging to larger 
organisations.  
                                                                 
8 In WERS 2004, trading sector workplaces are those where ASTATUS1<=8. 
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The table also highlights (in the final row) the common mismatch in observational 
units between WERS and the ABI, with only one fifth of matched ABI returns (19 per 
cent in 2003) being provided for a single establishment. The remainder cover a wider 
unit, commonly the whole enterprise to which the workplace belongs.9 Further 
analysis shows that, in instances where the ABI return is not at establishment level, 
the number of workplaces covered by the return is typically very high: half of all 
multi-establishment matched returns for 2003 covered 30 or more local units, but the 
distribution was heavily skewed, with the mean standing at 332. These multi-
establishment returns clearly offer the potential for measurement error if used to 
estimate the productivity of a single workplace.10  
 
Table 2 focuses further on the nature of the matched ABI data available for 2003, 
tabulating the period covered for each of the 929 matched returns with data on this 
item (3 of the 932 matched returns have no information on the period covered). 
Around two-fifths of matched returns cover the calendar year, i.e. January – 
December 2003. A further fifth cover the financial year April 2003 – March 2004.  
 
Whilst the process of matching WERS 2004 to ARD2 yields ABI returns for only a 
partial sub-set of the full sample, one notable attribute of the ABI is the low rate of 
item non-response observed on most of the survey questions. Table 3 indicates the 
availability of a number of key data items within the subset of 932 matched ABI 
returns for 2003. The table indicates, for example, that data on turnover per employee 
(often referred to as ‘average labour productivity’) or gross value-added per employee 
are available for 868 (97 per cent) of 894 trading sector workplaces. A rudimentary 
measure of profits per employee (calculated as gross value-added minus employment 
costs and capital expenditure) is similarly available for 868 trading sector workplaces. 
Each of these measures is based on a simple headcount since, in contrast to the WERS 
Financial Performance Questionnaire (described below), the ABI does not provide 
separate numbers of full and part-time employees. It is also noteworthy that the 
employment data collected in the ABI relates to a single point- in-time (December of 
the survey year), and so some imprecision is invariably introduced when combining 
this with data on outputs.11 Finally, it is also noted that the construction of production 
functions is inhibited since the ABI does not directly provide data on capital stocks, 
though ONS provide estimates of the latter in a separate database, derived using the 
historic pattern of net capital expenditure (see Martin, 2002).  
 
                                                                 
9 This comparison is made possible by the LIVELU variable, which indicates the number of local units 
present in the ARD reporting unit. It should be noted that this does not correspond perfectly with the 
WERS data contained in ASINGLE: 278 (14 per cent) of the 1,979 WERS establishments identified on 
ARD2 in 2003 are differently classified on these two data items. This may be due to differences in the 
timing of data collection (see later text) or differences in interpretation by respondents to the two 
inquiries. 
10 As well as looking at the number of units covered by the ABI return, it is also possible to make a 
comparison on the basis of IDBR employment, thereby identifying workplaces for which employment 
in the surveyed local unit comprised at least 50 per cent of employment in the reporting unit for the 
ABI. We identify 315 WERS workplaces where IDBR-recorded employment for that establishment 
comprised at least 50 per cent of employment in the matched reporting unit for the ABI. One might 
speculate that measurement error arising from the mis -match of units could be fairly minimal in this 
circumstance, but we do not investigate this issue further here.  
11 One would ideally have data on average employment over the period of the financial return. Table 2 
shows that, for ABI 2003, the central date of most matched returns precedes December 2003.  
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Table 2  
Period covered by matched returns from ABI 2003 
 Number Per cent 
March 2002 – February 2003 * * 
April 2002 – March 2003 32 3.4% 
May 2002 – April 2003 11 1.2% 
June 2002 – May 2003 29 3.1% 
July 2002 – June 2003 79 8.5% 
August 2002 – July 2003 * * 
September 2002 – August 2003 39 4.2% 
October 2002 – September 2003 43 4.6% 
November 2002 – October 2003 10 1.1% 
December 2002 – November 2003 46 5.0% 
January 2003 – December 2003 359 38.6% 
February 2003 – January 2004 50 5.4% 
March 2003 – February 2004 54 5.8% 
April 2003 – March 2004 172 18.8% 
May 2003 – April 2004 * * 
June 2003 – May 2004 * * 
TOTAL 929 100.0% 
 
* Fewer than 10 observations; actual counts suppressed in accordance with ONS disclosure control 
rules.  
Notes:  
(i) Period data is held in variables Q801 (start date) and Q802 (end date) on ARD2.  
(ii) Around 10 per cent of returns did not cover a 12-month period. Such cases were coded in the above 
table by identifying the 12-month period around the central date of the return. 
 
Table 3 
Availability of key data items in matched returns from ABI 2003 
 Full sample Trading sector 
   
All matched returns 932 894 
   
Turnover (to) * 925 888 
Total purchases of goods and services 
(totpurch) * 
929 892 
Gross value-added (to-totpurch) * 925 888 
Employment (emp_pit) * 909 872 
Total labour costs (totlabcost) * 929 892 
Net capital expenditure (ncapex) 932 894 
Average labour productivity – derived 
(to/emp_pit) * 
904 868 
Value-added per employee – derived 
((to-totpurch)/emp_pit) * 
904 868 
Profits per employee – derived ((to-
totpurch-totlabcost-ncapex)/emp_pt) 
904 868 
Notes: ARD2 variable names are indicated in brackets 
* after excluding zero values 
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Further investigation of the periods covered by matched ABI returns shows that 700 
workplaces in the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey can be matched to an ABI return 
covering a period that includes the date of the WERS 2004 Management interview. 
Some 685 of these returns derive from ABI 2004 and a further 15 derive from ABI 
2003, the latter being some of the first WERS interviews conducted in February or 
March 2004. In 132 of these 700 cases, the ABI return covers a single establishment.  
 
In summary, the process of matching the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey to ARD2 
has been successful in yielding a matched dataset that is significantly larger than the 
equivalent matched dataset arising from WERS 1998. By including a broader consent 
question, WERS 2004 has provided an opportunity to match across to a much broader 
sample of ABI returns, including both production and service sectors.  The revised 
consent question has also permitted matching to take place across multiple years of 
ARD2. This has not only provided some flexibility in the choice of ‘match year’ in 
ARD2, it also seemingly opens up the possibilities for longitudinal analysis of 
workplace performance. Investigation shows that some 725 of the 894 trading-sector 
workplaces with a matched ABI return for 2003 also have a return for 2004, 
suggesting that it will be possible to build a reasonable sample of workplaces with 
productivity data for two, three or more years as subsequent years of ABI data 
become available in the future.  
 
Another positive attribute of ARD2 is the low degree of item non-response recorded 
in the ABI data. The implications of missing data are therefore largely limited to those 
arising from survey sampling or survey level non-response in both WERS and the 
ABI. One important question that remains, however, is the extent to which one can 
reliably employ data from the numerous ABI returns that have not been completed at 
establishment level but relate to some wider organisational unit. We return to this 
issue in Section 4.  
 
4. The WERS 2004 Financial Performance Questionnaire  
 
The development of the Financial Performance Questionnaire arose out of an 
appreciation within the WERS Research Team and Specialist Team that many 
organisations do hold data on the performance of individual establishments, though 
they may not always choose to supply such detailed information in response to the 
Annual Business Inquiry. This view has subsequently been supported by ONS’ own 
research (Mills and Ursachi, 2006). Nonetheless, there were a variety of different 
ways in which one might attempt to collect such data in a voluntary survey such as 
WERS.  
 
One option, similar to that pursued in the telephone-based National Employer Surveys 
conducted in the United States in the 1990s, was to attempt to collect quantitative 
financial data about the establishment via questions inserted into the existing face-to-
face Management interview. However, this option raised obvious concerns about 
likely rates of item non-response, and about levels of data quality, particularly in 
cases where the WERS management interview was conducted with a personnel 
specialist who may not have the answers to hand. A further option was to add 
questions to the Employee Profile Questionnaire (a two-page questionnaire that 
currently covered the composition of the workforce and which was issued to 
management respondents in advance of the face-to-face interview). But it was thought 
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that the inclusion of financial questions within this document might prompt wholesale 
survey non-response among those unable or unwilling to provide such financial 
information. The preferred option therefore was to develop a dedicated Financial 
Performance Questionnaire that could be issued at end of the face-to-face 
management interview (thus minimising interference with that instrument) and passed 
on by the main management respondent to someone with responsibility for financial 
matters, who would then post the completed paper form to the survey administrators.  
 
Most of the questions that were included in the Financial Performance Questionnaire 
were based on those used in the short-form versions of the ABI. The main alteration 
was to shorten some of the very detailed ABI instructions about what should be 
included or excluded in the totals, recognising that an overly technical questionnaire 
may provoke non-response from workplaces without specialised financial managers 
or accountants. Further departures from the ABI were to include questions on the 
numbers of full and part-time employees, the value of assets and the extent of 
research and development activity. Research economists and professional accountants 
were consulted over the range and wording of questions prior to piloting.  
 
The level of response that could be expected was uncertain. The ABI could not 
provide a reasonable benchmark as the Inquiry is mandatory under the Statistics of 
Trade Act 1947. The attempt to collect objective data in WIRS 1990 had been 
abandoned at the pilot stage after a poor response (Airey et al, 1992: 20). However, 
the return of 22 of the 38 FPQs issued during the piloting of WERS 2004 provided a 
tentative indication that a response rate of 50-60 per cent might be feasible.  
 
In the main stage of fieldwork, FPQs were distributed in 2,076 of the 2,295 
workplaces that participated in the Cross-Section Survey (Chaplin et al, 2005: 63).12 
Following a three-stage reminder process, FPQs were obtained for 1,070 of these 
workplaces, representing a response rate of 52 per cent among workplaces accepting 
placement of the questionnaire and a rate of 47 per cent among all Cross-Section 
workplaces (ibid). Establishments were more likely to complete the Financial 
Performance Questionnaire if the respondent to the management interview had 
responsibility for financial matters, if the workplace was a single independent 
establishment (i.e. not part of a larger organisation), if the organisation was not listed 
on a stock exchange, and if the workplace participated in the Survey of Employees. 
There were also variations by workplace size and industry. As those establishments 
with an FPQ did not constitute a random sample of all participating establishments, 
weights were computed to adjust for these observable biases in the sub-sample of 
establishments with FPQ returns (Chaplin et al, 2005: 95-99).13  
 
Respondents were asked to complete the questionnaire for the workplace that had 
been the subject of the main management interview, but were given the option to 
report on a more widely-defined unit if establishment- level data were not available. In 
the latter case, they were asked to indicate the total number of workplaces covered by 
                                                                 
12 Questionnaires were issued to workplaces in the private and public sectors. Public sector 
establishments were asked to report on the value of their overall budget, rather than levels of turnover.  
13 The FPQ weight is the cross-product of the Cross-Section establishment weight (ESTWTNR) and an 
adjustment factor, with the latter being computed as the inverse of the predicted odds of participation, 
derived from a logistic regression model including a range of establishment characteristics taken from 
the management interview. 
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the return and the approximate share of turnover accounted for by the surveyed 
workplace, in order to provide some means of disaggregating the totals provided in 
the questionnaire. The number of site-level FPQ returns obtained in main fieldwork 
was particularly encouraging. Some 834 of the 1,070 FPQ returns (78 per cent) 
contained site- level data, compared with around one-fifth in the matched ABI 
dataset.14 
 
One inevitable disadvantage compared to the ARD was that the data obtained in the 
FPQ referred to a single year. In order to promote some consistency in the periods 
covered by the FPQ returns, respondents were invited to provide figures for the 
calendar year 1st January -31st December 2003. If this was not possible, they were 
invited to respond about the most recent business year for which figures were 
available. In total, 406 (38 per cent) of the 1,070 FPQ returns covered the default 
period, with a further 325 (31 per cent) reporting on the financial year April 2003 – 
March 2004 (Table 4).15  
 
The data collected in the FPQ is therefore historical in nature: only 58 returns cover 
periods that include the date of the main management interview, with the remaining 
returns covering periods that ended, on average, 6 months prior to the interview date. 
The median number of days between the end of the FPQ return period and the date of 
the management interview in these cases was 154 days (mean 182 days; standard 
deviation 118 days). But this is a necessary consequence of administering the 
questionnaire alongside the management interview and, indeed, a similar charge can 
be laid against the subjective rating (which is inevitably based on some historical 
comparison), other quantitative measures collected in WERS such as absenteeism or 
disputes (which invariably refer to the past 12 months) or the quantitative 
performance data collected in other workplaces surveys (such as the US National 
Employer Survey).16  
 
Completion rates for the individual items contained within the FPQ were high, 
averaging around 90 per cent, but were inevitably somewhat below the completion 
rates in the ABI, reflecting the voluntary nature of the WERS instrument. The highest 
response rates in the FPQ were for the questions on employment levels, employment 
costs and R&D activity, with the lowest rates being observed on questions about asset 
valuations, particularly rented or leased assets (Table 5). In some circumstances, 
missing values could be inferred by comparing with data from the sample file or 
Management interview. Another approach involved inserting zeros in empty cells in 
cases where the respondent appeared to have ignored the general instruction to write 
NIL rather than leaving entries blank. The latter approach requires some rather bold 
assumptions about patterns of non-response, and so all imputed values are identified 
via flag variables to give users discretion over the use of such data in their analysis.  
                                                                 
14 These figures include 78 cases in which the scope of the return was either recoded (58 cases) or 
imputed (20 cases) after comparing FPQ and MQ employment and studying comments made at Note 2 
on the FPQ. These imputations are identified on the variable XCODE1.  
15 It was not possible to use April 2003 – March 2004 as the default period for the questionnaire, since 
fieldwork began in February 2004.  
16 In retrospect, it may have been preferable to request data from the most recent period that the 
establishment could provide, particularly in view of the eventual length of the fieldwork period. There 
is, of course, the option of repeating the FPQ at a later date for the same establishments, in order to 
obtain longitudinal data on financial performance akin to that available in the ABI.  
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Table 4  
Period covered by WERS Financial Performance Questionnaires 
 Number Per cent 
July 2001 – June 2002 1 0.1% 
October 2001 – September 2002 1 0.1% 
November 2001 – October 2002 1 0.1% 
January 2002 – December 2002 3 0.3% 
March 2002 – February 2003 2 0.2% 
April 2002 – March 2003 27 2.5% 
May 2002 – April 2003 8 0.8% 
June 2002 – May 2003 10 0.9% 
July 2002 – June 2003 11 1.0% 
August 2002 – July 2003 47 4.4% 
September 2002 – August 2003 20 1.9% 
October 2002 – September 2003 27 2.5% 
November 2002 – October 2003 15 1.4% 
December 2002 – November 2003 9 0.8% 
January 2003 – December 2003 406 38.2% 
February 2003 – January 2004 18 1.7% 
March 2003 – February 2004 44 4.1% 
April 2003 – March 2004 325 30.5% 
May 2003 – April 2004 21 2.0% 
June 2003 – May 2004 6 0.6% 
July 2003 – June 2004 10 0.9% 
August 2003 – July 2004 20 1.9% 
September 2003 – August 2004 6 0.6% 
October 2003 – September 2004 6 0.6% 
November 2003 – October 2004 2 0.2% 
January 2004 – December 2004 12 1.1% 
February 2004 – January 2005 2 0.2% 
April 2004 – March 2005 4 0.4% 
TOTAL 1,064 100.0% 
 
Notes: Period data is held in variables NPERIOD (whether default or custom reporting period), 
YRSTART (start date if NPERIOD=2) and YREND (end date if NPERIOD=2).  
Around 5 per cent of returns did not cover a 12-month period. Such cases were coded in the above 
table by identifying the 12-month period around the central date of the return. 
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Table 5  
Availability of key data items in the WERS Financial Performance Questionnaire 
data 
 Full sample Trading sector 
   
All returns 1,070 792 
   
Turnover [or budget if non-trading sector] (nturnpa)  994 763 
Employment – full- time (nempft)1 1040 778 
Employment – part-time (nemppt)2 998 742 
Value of owned buildings (nownbld)3 828 638 
Value of rented buildings (nrentbld)4 756 595 
Value of other owned assets (nownoth) 860 667 
Value of other rented assets5 (nrentoth) 695 546 
Capital acquisitions (nacqpa) 949 716 
Capital disposals (ndispa)6 861 642 
Purchases (npurpa) 974 724 
Employment costs (necpa) 1039 775 
Any R&D at the establishment (anyrdest) 1047 786 
% of total expenditure on R&D (anyrdest, rdestpc) 1008 759 
Any R&D elsewhere in the organisation (anyrdorg) 1017 772 
   
Selected derived variables:   
Gross value-added (nturnpa-npurpa) - 705 
Average labour productivity 
(nturnpa/(nempft+nemppt))7 
- 715 
Value-added per employee ((nturnpa-
npurpa)/(nempft+nemppt))8 
- 665 
Profits per employee ((nturnpa-npurpa-
nempcost+nacqpa-ndispa)/(nempft+nemppt))9 
- 569 
Notes: FPQ variable names are indicated in brackets 
1: Full sample figure includes 37 values imputed by reference to SCOPE, MQ and sample file 
(XCODE2=2,4,5) 
2: Full sample figure includes 55 values by imputed reference to SCOPE, MQ and sample file 
(XCODE2=1,2,4) 
3: Full sample figure includes 98 values recoded from missing to zero (XCODE4=1) 
4: Full sample figure includes 184 values recoded from missing to zero (XCODE4=2) 
5: Full sample figure includes 176 values recoded from missing to zero (XCODE5=1) 
6: Full sample figure includes 136 values recoded from missing to zero (XCODE6=1) 
7: Trading sector figure includes 50 imputed values on employment (XCODE2=1,2,4,5) 
8: Trading sector figure includes 47 imputed values on employment (XCODE2=1,2,4,5) 
9: Trading sector figure includes 29 imputed values on employment (XCODE2=1,2,4,5) and 81 
imputed values on capital disposals (XCODE6=1).  
 
 
Clearly, much of the analysis of the FPQ data on workplace performance will be 
restricted to establishments operating in the trading sector of the economy. Restricting 
the sample in this way yields a sample of 792 FPQ returns from a total of 1,757 
workplaces (an overall response rate of 45 per cent). Some 626 of these returns (79 
per cent) are at site- level. Table 5 shows that data on average labour productivity is 
available for 715 (41 per cent) of the 1,757 trading sector workplaces, whilst data on 
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value-added per employee is available for 665 (38 per cent). Data on ‘profits’ per 
employee is available for 569 (33 per cent). 
 
In summary, whilst one would naturally have valued higher response rates both at 
questionnaire and item level in the WERS FPQ, the rates achieved seem creditable 
given the experimental nature of the exercise and the rather limited resources 
expended in its administration. The high proportion of site- level returns would also 
appear to be a notable advantage when compared with most other sources of financial 
data, such as the ABI or company accounts databases.  
 
One important question that remains, however, concerns the quality of the data 
collected in the FPQ. An initial investigation of the construct validity of the data, 
presented in the WERS 2004 sourcebook, was encouraging (Kersley et al, 2006: 294-
303). But one might also wish to see some comparison of FPQ values with those 
obtained from another source, such as the Annual Business Inquiry. We turn to this 
issue in the next section. 
 
5. A Preliminary Analysis of the Objective Performance Data in WERS 2004 
 
Our preliminary analysis of the objective performance data in WERS 2004 has three 
strands. First, we examine the mutual availability of objective data from the FPQ and 
ABI for workplaces that participated in the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey. 
Second, we focus on workplaces that have productivity data from both the FPQ and 
ABI and assess the degree of convergence in those two objective sources. Finally, we 
assess the degree of construct validity in the objective data by looking at the 
association between measures of productivity and profitability and a small number of 
workplace characteristics. A further investigation of the degree of convergence 
between the objective and subjective measures of productivity and profitability will 
be provided in a companion paper (Forth and McNabb, 2007).   
 
Data availability 
 
A comparison of Tables 3 and 5 indicates that the number of workplaces with ABI 
and FPQ returns are available is quite similar. However, the cases do not always 
overlap and a number of workplaces have returns from only one of these sources. The 
total number of workplaces with objective performance data is therefore somewhat 
larger than indicated in Tables 3 or 5. One gets a sense of this from Table 6, which 
focuses on the sub-sample of 1,757 trading sector workplaces. Only 482 of these 
workplaces (27 per cent) do not have either a return in either the FPQ dataset or ABI 
2003. In contrast, 411 workplaces have a return in both datasets.  
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Table 6  
Co-availability of returns from the FPQ and ABI 2003 among trading sector 
workplaces 
 FPQ for workplace 
(NSCOPE=1) 
FPQ for wider unit 
(NSCOPE=2) 
No 
FPQ 
All 
ABI exact match 
(LIVELU=1) 
93 7 67 167 
ABI non-exact 
(LIVELU>1) 
228 83 416 727 
No ABI, but 
matched to ARD2 267 66 385 718 
No match 38 10 97 145 
All 626 166 965 1757 
 
Correspondence  
 
The correspondence between productivity values in the FPQ and the ABI provides an 
important indication of the quality of the data collected in the FPQ (the ABI being the 
official source of data on business performance). Since some returns are at site level 
and others are not, it can also provide an insight into the reliability of data in returns 
that cover more than one workplace. This section investigates these two separate, but 
related, issues.  
 
In making such a comparison, it is not necessarily the case that data from ABI 2003 
provides the most appropriate comparator for the data obtained in the FPQ. Instead, 
we would like to be able to take returns from any year of the ABI if they provide us 
with a closer match in the timing of the ABI and FPQ data. Broadening our sights to 
include returns from ABI 2002 and 2004, we find that 514 trading-sector workplaces 
with an FPQ have an ABI return in 2002, 2003 or 2004 (compared with 411 in Table 
6). A comparison of the periods covered by these various returns shows that, for 76 of 
these workplaces, the data provided in ABI 2004 constitutes the closest match (in 
terms of timing) to the reporting period of the FPQ. For a further 364 workplaces, the 
closest match is with a return from ABI 2003 and for the remaining 74 it is with a 
return from ABI 2002.  
 
Nevertheless, we would like to ensure that our comparison of FPQ and ABI data is 
based on returns that cover substantially over-lapping periods (and not simply two 
periods that are reasonably close together). Thus we restrict our attention to the 401 
trading-sector workplaces with FPQ and ABI returns whose periods overlap by at 
least 6 months. Of these, around 40 take their data from ABI 2004, 350 obtain it from 
ABI 2003 and around 10 take their data from ABI 2002. This sample of 401 
workplaces is our preferred basis for the comparison of productivity/profitability 
values obtained in the FPQ and ABI. The mean distance between the mid-dates of the 
ABI and FPQ returns is just 15 days in this sample. For 58 per cent of the sample the 
mid-dates coincide, for 74 per cent they are no more than one day apart and for 86 per 
cent they are no more than 31 days apart. 
 
The first panel of Table 7 shows the mutual availability of FPQ and ABI returns for 
these 401 trading sector workplaces. The table indicates that there are 92 workplaces 
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with a site- level return in both of the surveys, 229 workplaces with a site-level return 
in only one of the two surveys (usually the FPQ) and 80 workplaces with no site-level 
return in either survey. The subsequent panels of Table 7 show the mutual availability 
of data on average labour productivity (turnover per employees), value-added per 
employee and ‘profits’ per employee within the same sub-sample of 401 workplaces.  
 
Our investigation focuses first on the correspondence between the FPQ and ABI 
values of average labour productivity. At the outset, we exclude 21 cases with large, 
outlying values in either survey. The approach adopted was to exclude all values in 
either survey that exceeded the value at the 95th percentile in the FPQ distribution of 
average labour productivity within the sample of 357 workplaces. Most of the 21 
extreme values arise from the FPQ return, rather than the ABI return, and may relate 
to punching errors (e.g. instances in which the respondent ignored instructions to give 
financial values in thousands).  
 
Table 7 
Mutual availability of data from the FPQ and ABI among trading sector 
workplaces where the return periods overlap by at least 6 months  
 FPQ at site-
level 
FPQ for wider 
unit 
All 
A. Overall availability of FPQ/ABI returns:    
ABI at site- level 92 7 99 
ABI for wider unit 222 80 302 
All 314 87 401 
B. Availability of data on average labour 
productivity: 
   
ABI at site- level 82 6 88 
ABI for wider unit 200 69 269 
All 282 75 357 
C. Availability of data on value-added per 
employee: 
   
ABI at site- level 81 6 87 
ABI for wider unit 185 69 254 
All 266 75 341 
D. Availability of data on ‘profits’ per 
employee: 
   
ABI at site- level 81 6 87 
ABI for wider unit 185 69 254 
All 266 75 341 
 
 
The upper- left quadrant of Figure 1 contains a scatter-plot based on the remaining 336 
workplaces. The scatterplot presents average labour productivity from the ABI on the 
y-axis and the equivalent measure from the FPQ on the x-axis. It is clear from the 
scatterplo t that there is a divergence in the two measures for a substantial proportion 
of workplaces.  The correlation between the two measures stands at 0.74.  
 
Some of this non-correspondence may naturally be due to measurement error in either 
survey. However, it is also possible that it may arise from a mis-match in the units of 
observation; for example, if the FPQ return refers solely to the workplace surveyed in 
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WERS but the ABI return has been completed on behalf of the whole organisation, of 
which that site is just a part. The scatter-plots contained in the next two quadrants of 
Figure 1 investigate this question. First, in the upper-right quadrant, we restrict the 
plot to those 76 workplaces with a site- level observation in both the FPQ and ABI. 
The points are much more closely located on the diagonal and the correlation rises to 
0.89 (or 0.96 after further exclusion of one clearly deviant case). The contrast with the 
plot in the lower-left quadrant is clear. This third quadrant is restricted to those 
workplaces for which only one of the FPQ or ABI observations is at site level: here 
we see a more considerable spread of points and a substantially lower correlation of 
0.70. These comparisons clearly indicate a close correspondence between the FPQ 
and ABI values when both returns are completed at site level. However, when one 
return is completed for multiple sites, it does not appear to represent a robust proxy 
for site- level data. 
 
We can further examine the degree of non-correspondence between site- level and 
aggregate returns by examining how the correlation coefficient between the ABI and 
FPQ varies with the number of sites covered by the aggregate return. In fact we find 
that, where site-level returns are compared with aggregate returns covering 2-9 sites, 
the correlation coefficient is approximately the same as when both returns are at site 
level (0.91; n=74). But it falls to 0.39 when the aggregate return covers 10-99 sites 
(n=64) and stands at 0.70 when the aggregate return covers 100 or more sites 
(n=66).17  
 
The lower-right quadrant in Figure 1 is included for completeness but does show that, 
when both returns cover multiple sites, the correspondence is in fact reasonably good. 
This may be because the scope of both returns is actually equivalent (e.g. both returns 
completed about the whole enterprise) although this has not been directly 
investigated.  
 
Figure 2 repeats the analysis with the measures of value-added per employee, whilst 
Figure 3 does so with the measures of ‘profit’ per employee. In both cases, the pattern 
is broadly similar to that which has been described in the case of average labour 
productivity. For both measures, the points are reasonably scattered on the plots that 
include all values, but this scatter is found to be primarily evident among those cases 
where there is a mis-match in the unit of observation. Where both returns are at site 
level, the correspondence is generally good: we observe correlation coefficients of 
0.81 in the case of value-added per employee and 0.78 in the case of ‘profits’ per 
employee. The correspondence in either case is lower than for average labour 
productivity, but this probably reflects the fact that our measures of value-added and 
‘profits’ are compiled from greater numbers of individual data items, so that 
measurement errors in any one data item combine to generate a greater degree of 
measurement error in a composite variable.  
                                                                 
17 We should add that the cut-offs used here were chosen primarily for their convenience in dividing 
those workplaces with aggregate returns into three fairly evenly-sized groups, and were not identified 
by any more detailed investigation of break points in the relationship between the correlation 
coefficient and the number of sites. 
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Figure 1 
 Correspondence between measures of average labour productivity in the ABI 
and FPQ 
 
All matched units (r=0.74; n=336)a 
 
Both observations at site-level (r=0.89; 
n=76)b 
 
  
Only one observation at site-level 
(r=0.70; n=194) 
 
Neither observation at site-level (r=0.73; 
n=66) 
 
Notes: 
a. Sub-sample excludes observations with values in excess of the 95th percentile in the FPQ distribution 
b. The correlation rises to 0.96 after excluding the single outlying observation with a high value in the 
FPQ relative to the ABI.  
Axes are unscaled so as to comply with ONS rules which prohibit the disclosure of specific values 
from the ABI.  
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As with average labour productivity, we can examining how the correlation 
coefficients between the ABI and FPQ vary with the number of sites covered by the 
aggregate return. In the case of value-added per employee, the overall coefficient of 
0.41 arises from a correlation of 0.68 when the aggregate return covers 2-9 sites 
(n=72), 0.32 when it covers 10-99 sites (n=62) and 0.09 when it covers 100 or more 
sites (n=37). In the case of ‘profits’ per employee, where the overall coefficient is 
0.35 (n=141), the individual coefficients are 0.40 for 2-9 sites (n=64), 0.21 for 10-99 
sites (n=53) and 0.58 for 100 or more sites (n=18).  
 
Figure 2  
Correspondence between measures of value -added per employee in the ABI and 
FPQ 
 
All matched units (r=0.56; n=316)a 
 
Both observations at site-level (r=0.81; 
n=76) 
  
  
Only one observation at site-level 
(r=0.41; n=177) 
 
Neither observation at site-level (r=0.73; 
n=63) 
 
Notes: 
a. Sub-sample excludes observations with values in excess of the 95th percentile in the FPQ distribution 
Axes are unscaled so as to comply with ONS rules which prohibit the disclosure of specific values 
from the ABI.  
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Figure 3  
Correspondence between measures of ‘profit’ per employee in the ABI and 
FPQ 
 
All matched units (r=0.50; n=273)a 
 
Both observations at site-level (r=0.78; 
n=70) 
  
  
Only one observation at site-level 
(r=0.35; n=141) 
 
Neither observation at site-level (r=0.35; 
n=62) 
 
Notes: 
a. Sub-sample excludes observations with values below the 1st percentile or in excess of the 95th 
percentile in the FPQ distribution 
Axes are unscaled so as to comply with ONS rules which prohibit the disclosure of specific values 
from the ABI.  
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From these various comparisons of FPQ and ABI values, it seems reasonable to make 
the following conclusions: 
 
The FPQ data closely corresponds to that collected in the ABI in cases where the two 
returns have both been completed at site level.  
The data do not compare as well when there is a mis-match in the unit of observation, 
i.e. if one return is completed at site- level and the other at some more-aggregate level 
(e.g. enterprise).  
The degree of non-correspondence between site-level and aggregate returns is 
generally lower if the aggregate return covers only a small number of units than if it 
covers a larger number of units, although the relationship only appears to be linear in 
the case of value-added.    
 
The first of these conclusions gives us confidence in the overall quality of the data 
collected in the FPQ. However, the second and third conclusion confirm our 
expectation that productivity is not necessarily homogenous across plants within the 
same firm, which in turn indicates that aggregate returns do not necessarily provide 
good estimates of plant- level productivity. The further conclusion then, is that using 
data from wider returns in conjunction with site- level data on workplace practices 
may run the risk of biases caused by measurement error in the dependent variable. A 
more robust approach would appear to involve focusing on site- level observations. 
Nevertheless, the close correspondence in FPQ and ABI values would imply that such 
site- level observations could reasonably be taken from either dataset. We explore this 
possibility in the following section.  
 
6. Compiling a site-level dataset  
 
There are two apparent advantages of compiling a site-level dataset of objective 
performance measures that takes values from either the ABI or FPQ. The first is that 
one is likely to be able to increase the number of surveyed workplaces for which site-
level objective performance data is available, since we have already seen in Table 6 
that some workplaces have data in only one of the two datasets. The second advantage 
is that, by having a choice of which data set to call upon for workplaces where both 
ABI and FPQ data is on offer, one is likely to be able to minimise the chronological 
distance between the return period for the objective performance data and the 
interview date on which the workplace practices data were collected in the main part 
of the WERS survey. For example, the data presented in Tables 2 and 4 suggest that, 
if site-level returns were available from both ABI 2004 and the FPQ, it would be 
likely that a return from ABI 2004 would cover a period that is closer to the WERS 
interview date. In this case, it would be sensible for an analysis of the relationship 
between workplace practices and performance to utilise data from the ABI return in 
preference to that available from the FPQ.  
 
Looking for matches in the ABIs of 2002, 2003 or 2004, we find that some 1,111 of 
the 1,757 trading sector workplaces in the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey have an 
ABI return in at least one of these years. By expanding our view to encompass all 
three years, we are thus able to expand the pool of available ABI returns beyond that 
which would be available if we restricted ourselves to just one year (say 2004).18 We 
                                                                 
18 Table 1 shows that just 847 trading sector workplaces have a return in ABI 2004.  
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then compute the distance in days between the WERS interview date (NINTDATE) 
and the central date for this closest available ABI return. This serves two purposes. 
First it enables us to reliably identify which of the ABI returns is closest to the 
interview date. For 829 of the 1,111 workplaces the closest return comes from ABI 
2004, for a further 183 it comes from ABI 2003 and for the remaining 99 it comes 
from ABI 2002. Second, computing the distance enables us to compare it with the 
corresponding distance between the WERS interview data and the central date of any 
FPQ return. In cases where site- level returns are available from both sources, we are 
then able to identify whether it is the FPQ return or the ABI return that is 
chronologically closer to the WERS interview date. We undertake this last step 
separately in respect of the measures of productivity and profitability, since the 
presence of missing data for either measure means that we may prefer to choose the 
more distant source if the proximate source has missing data on the item in question.  
 
When we combine the ABI and FPQ data, we find that 653 of the 1,757 trading sector 
workplaces have a site- level measure of productivity in either the FPQ or the ABI.  In 
114 of these cases, a measure is available from both sources and so we take the one 
closest to the WERS interview date. In 82 cases it is the ABI, rather than the FPQ. We 
thus obtain a dataset containing 653 site- level observations on labour productivity, 
451 of which derive from the FPQ and 202 of which derive from the ABI.  
 
Among these 653 observations, the central date of the return period precedes the date 
of the MQ interview date by an average of 310 days. The inclusion of performance 
data that precedes the interview data by some considerable distance will impair our 
ability to identify robust associations, and so we restrict the sample to those 
workplaces with returns that end no more than one year prior to the interview date. In 
this sub-sample of 597 observations (423 from the FPQ and 174 from the ABI), the 
management interview has taken place during the financial year immediately 
following the available return, and so we can surmise that the data available to us 
covers the most recent completed financial year.19  
 
Following the same principles in respect of the site- level data on ‘profits’ per 
employee, we initially obtain a dataset containing 578 site-level observations on 
profitability, 370 of which derive from the FPQ and 208 of which derive from the 
ABI. Among these observations, the central date of the return period precedes the date 
of the MQ interview date by an average of 306 days. Restricting the sample to 
workplaces with returns that end no more than one year prior to the interview date 
brings the sample down to 526 observations (351 from the FPQ and 175 from the 
ABI).20   
 
These data manipulations have therefore produced objective site-level data on 
productivity and/or profitability for just under one-third of the trading sector 
workplaces in the WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey. There has been a clear benefit 
in being able to call upon both the FPQ and ABI within this process. The FPQ has 
contributed substantially to the number of site- level observations, which would have 
been available for little more than one tenth of the sample had we relied solely on the 
                                                                 
19 Restricting the sample to cases in which the management interview date lay within the return period 
for the objective performance data would reduce the sub-sample to only 151 observations.  
20 There are 144 cases in which the date of the management interview lays within the return period for 
the objective performance data. 
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ABI. The ABI, for its part, has contributed a further 100 or so site- level observations 
for workplaces not featuring in the FPQ dataset. It has also enabled us to maximise 
the proximity of the interview data and the performance data, reducing the distance 
between the return period for the objective data and the management survey interview 
date by around 40 days on average.  
 
Two primary questions remain. The first concerns the representativeness of the sub-
samples of workplaces with site- level performance data. The second concerns the 
behaviour of the data when used in statistical analysis.  
 
7. Preliminary investigation of site-level data 
 
As we have observations for only one-third of trading sector workplaces, there is an 
obvious concern that this sub-sample may not be representative, and that this may 
affect the robustness of any conclusions one might wish to draw from any statistical 
analysis. To investigate this issue, we have assessed the representativeness of the sub-
sample on a small selection of variables – largely those which were found to be 
associated with non-response to the FPQ (see Chaplin et al, 2005, Section 7).  
 
Following the methodology outlined in the Technical Report, we run a logistic 
regression to identify variables that are significantly associated with the likelihood of 
having a site- level observation in our two sets of performance data (productivity and 
profitability). The dependent variables are coded 1 if the performance data is present 
and 0 otherwise. Positive coefficients therefore indicate that workplaces with the 
particular characteristic were more likely to have site- level performance data than 
workplaces without the characteristic. Negative coefficients naturally indicate the 
reverse. The results are presented for both productivity and profitability in Table 8. In 
both cases, workplaces are more likely to have site- level performance data if they are: 
larger (rather than smaller); located in manufacturing (rather than services); a single-
independent establishment (rather than part of a larger organisation); foreign-owned 
(rather than domestically-owned); listed on a stock exchange (rather than not listed); 
took part in the Survey of Employees (rather than refused to participate); agreed to 
external data linking (rather than refused it); and provided a below average rating on 
the subjective performance measure (rather than an average or above-average rating).  
 
We use the predicted values from these regressions to compute a weight that can 
compensate to some degree for these match biases.21 The weights reduce the most 
severe sample biases and bring the profile of the matched sub-samples considerably 
closer to that of the full trading-sector sample. It is worth noting, however, that the 
weights do not bring the profile perfectly into line with the full sample, thus 
indicating that the weights could be improved with further work (a fact also indicated 
by the relatively low values for R2 in Table 8). However, the weights we have 
computed are considered sufficient for this preliminary analysis, which is merely 
indicative of what might be done with the data. 
 
 
                                                                 
21 The method is the same as that employed in the weighting of the FPQ (see page 95 of the WERS 
2004 Technical Report). Specifically, we multiply each establishment’s main weight (ESTWTNR) by 
the inverse of the predicted value from the logistic regression, after truncating the distribution of the 
predicted values at the 10th and 90th percentiles in order to limit the variance of the resultant weights.  
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Table 8  
Assessing match bias within sub-sample of trading sector workplaces with site-
level performance data 
 Productivity 
(1=597; 0=1,160) 
Profitability 
(1=526; 0=1,231) 
Position within organisation: 
 (ref. Head office) 
Coeff. Std. 
err. 
Sig. Coeff. Std. 
err. 
Sig. 
 Single independent site 0.837 0.174 *** 0.827 0.177 *** 
 Branch site -0.509 0.164 *** -0.571 0.169 *** 
Job title of management : 
 (ref. All other) 
      
 Financial manager/ 
company sec. 
0.125 0.137  -0.038 0.143  
Workplace took part in SEQ 0.910 0.137 *** 0.791 0.141 *** 
Management respondent agreed to 
data linking 
0.945 0.276 *** 1.001 0.295 *** 
Foreign-owned 0.304 0.151 ** 0.286 0.158 * 
Listed on a stock exchange -0.601 0.163 *** -0.701 0.173 *** 
Subjective rating:  
(ref. At least ‘average’) 
      
 Below average 0.786 0.218 *** 0.170 0.201  
 Not available 0.373 0.210 * 0.311 0.230  
Private sector 0.862 0.428 ** 0.994 0.471 ** 
Workplace size:  
(ref. 5-9 employees) 
      
10-24 -0.193 0.200  0.052 0.214  
25-49 -0.064 0.218  0.277 0.231  
50-99 0.083 0.224  0.358 0.238  
100-499 0.227 0.213  0.627 0.227 *** 
500 or more 0.558 0.245 ** 0.971 0.259 *** 
Industry sector:  
(ref. Manufacturing) 
      
Electricity, gas and water -0.903 0.438 ** -0.986 0.460 ** 
Construction -0.448 0.257 * -0.392 0.257  
Wholesale and retail -0.726 0.191 *** -0.829 0.200 *** 
Hotels and restaurants -0.559 0.262 ** -0.403 0.266  
Transport and communications -0.761 0.252 *** -0.776 0.261 *** 
Financial services -1.235 0.302 *** -1.178 0.314 *** 
Other business services -0.668 0.189 *** -0.603 0.191 *** 
Public administration -0.043 0.719  0.124 0.736  
Education -0.403 0.330  -0.324 0.333  
Health -0.656 0.229 *** -0.701 0.234 *** 
Other community services -0.057 0.251  -0.135 0.236  
       
Pseudo-R2 0.135   0.138   
Number of observations 1,757   1,757   
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We use the matched data in a preliminary analysis in which we regress the natural log 
of each of the three performance variables (average labour productivity, value-added 
per head and ‘profits’ per head) on a small number of independent variables, 
including union recognition, foreign-ownership and the use of incentive pay. We have 
prior expectations about the sign of each association, and so the analysis is intended to 
provide a basic test of the construct validity of the objective data.22 Our expectations 
are as follows: 
 
Table 9 
Association Expectations  
Independent 
variable: 
Expected 
association: 
Reason: 
Organisation size Positive Economies of scale and knowledge-sharing 
across sites 
Foreign-ownership Positive Economies of scale and knowledge-sharing 
across countries 
Union recognition Negative Restrictions on work practices and union 
influence on pay bargaining 
Training Positive Skill-enhancing 
Incentive pay Positive Impact on employee motivation and effort 
 
Investigations lead to the exclusion of around 20 observations with outlying values on 
the dependent variables prior to in each of the three analyses. This leaves 576 
observations for the analyses of average labour productivity, 570 for the analysis of 
value-added per employee and 507 for the analysis of ‘profits’ per employee. A 
summary of the  results is presented in Table 10. The associations that are observed in 
each analysis are broadly in line with prior expectations. The sole exceptions are the 
variable identifying workplaces that belong to large organisations, which is negative 
in the labour productivity regressions (although it does not reach statistical 
significance in any of the three equations), and the variable identifying extensive use 
of training, which is negatively associated with profitability (although again non-
significant in each equation).  
 
To summarise, our matched dataset of objective, site- level measures of productivity 
or profitability appears to perform reasonably well. It is clear that there are notable 
match biases among the sub-sample of workplaces with objective site- level data. 
However, we have identified a number of these biases through regression analysis and 
we have demonstrated that weights can be compiled to account for the most severe 
biases that are found to be present. Further, we have been able to conduct regression 
analysis of the objective performance measures themselves, and have identified that a 
number of key workplace characteristics are associated with these measures in ways 
that we might expect.  
                                                                 
22 A preferable specification, at least in respect of the productivity variables, might involve the 
estimation of a production function with the capital-labour ratio being added on the right-hand side. We 
have not attempted that here, due to the added complexity of brining in data on capital stocks for 
observations that derive from the ABI. However, we note that such a specification performed 
reasonably well in tests conducted with the FPQ alone as part of the primary analysis of WERS 2004 
(Kersley et al, 2006: 299).  
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Table 10 
Preliminary analysis of match site-level performance data 
 Average labour 
productivity 
Value-added per 
employee 
‘Profits’ per 
employee 
 Coeff. Std. 
error. 
Sig. Coeff. Std. 
error. 
Sig. Coeff. Std. 
error. 
Sig. 
          
Foreign-
owned 
0.576 0.155 *** 0.340 0.063 *** 0.195 0.049 *** 
Large 
organisation 
(1,000 or 
more 
employees) 
-0.061 0.163  
-
0.023 0.039  0.024 0.029  
Union 
recognition -0.444 0.197 ** 
-
0.161 0.053 *** 
-
0.139 0.047 *** 
Off-the-job 
training for 
60% or more 
of core 
employees 
0.108 0.182  0.057 0.040  
-
0.020 0.028  
Performance-
related pay 0.461 0.149 *** 0.117 0.037 *** 0.067 0.028 ** 
          
Number of 
observations 571   566   502   
R2 0.34   0.40   0.36   
Additional controls: workplace size (5 dummies); industry sector (11 dummies). 
Coefficients are weighted to account for match bias. Standard errors have been adjusted to take account 
of the complex sample design in WERS 2004 
 
 
8. Performance data in the 1998-2004 Panel Survey 
 
The 1998-2004 Panel Survey also includes a subjective measure of workplace 
performance, in this instance referring solely to financial performance. The nature of 
the subjective measure is somewhat different to that which appears in the Cross-
Section, as the intention is to collect data on the relative performance of the 
establishment over the period since 1998. Accordingly, the subjective measure 
attempts to identify the average trajectory of the industry as a whole, and then seeks to 
identify how the performance of the surveyed establishment has fared relative to that 
average trajectory. 23 The question text and resulting data are presented in Appendix C.  
 
Clearly, this longitudinal subjective rating is subject to similar disadvantages as those 
summarised above in respect of the subjective measures included in the Cross-Section 
Survey, as well as the additional possibility of recall error on the part of the 2004 
respondent. And so attempts were made to link the 1998-2004 Panel data to ARD2, as 
                                                                 
23 The alternative would be to ask the simple Cross-Section rating question at both time points. But a 
change in relative performance can then only be identified if workplaces switch categories.  
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a means of obtaining objective measures of performance over time. Panel workplaces 
were not issued with a Financial Performance Questionnaire, as no such questionnaire 
had been issued in Wave 1 (1998).  
 
In order to facilitate the link to ARD2, the 2004 Panel interview included an identical 
consent question to that inc luded in the Cross-Section Survey (see Appendix A). 
During fieldwork, consent to link the WERS Panel data to other databases was 
obtained from 896 (96 per cent) of the 938 workplaces that were re- interviewed for 
Wave 2 of the Panel. The data were subsequently linked to ARD2 by staff at ONS, 
following the same procedure as was used to match the Cross-Section data (see 
above). The extent and nature of the resultant matches are presented in Table 11.  
 
Table 11  
Number of matches between the WERS 1998-2004 Panel Survey and the Annual 
Respondents Database (ARD2) 
 ARD 1998 ARD 2004 ARD 1998 and 2004 
Total number of 
observations (full 
sample) 
938 938 938 
Consent given for data 
linking 
(MLINKDATW=1) 
896 896 896 
Identified on ARD2 
using IDBR Local Unit 
Ref. No. 
(MATCHA=3) 
421 586 396 
ABI return provided 
(SOURCEA=1) 
245 281 166 
ABI return covers 
single workplace 
(LIVELUA=1) 
72 66 27 
Notes: 
W: Indicates a variable contained in the WERS 2004 Panel Survey data file (PS9804_PQ04.*) 
A: Indicates a variable contained in ARD2 or the matched WERS-ARD data file 
 
The smaller initial sample (896 workplaces) inevitably means that the process of data 
linking would offer fewer matches than the equivalent linking of the Cross-Section 
with ARD2. But the number of matches is fur ther restricted in the Panel because the 
IDBR local unit reference numbers for all 896 Panel workplaces date back to 1997, 
when the sample for the 1998 Cross-Section was initially drawn from the Register. 
We have already mentioned that IDBR reference numbers may change over time (e.g. 
through company takeover) and this limits one’s ability to trace workplaces. In the 
event, ONS were able to match 245 of the 896 Panel workplaces to ABI returns for 
1998, whilst 281 could be matched to ABI returns for 2004. Some 166 (18 per cent of 
all 938 Panel workplaces) had ABI returns for both years. Alas, only 27 of these 
offered site- level returns for both 1998 and 2004. The opportunities for longitudinal 
analysis of ABI data via the 1998-2004 Panel Survey therefore appear to be extremely 
limited.  
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9. Summary and conclusions  
 
The Workplace Employment Relations Survey series has provided the basis for a 
wide range of empirical investigations into the relationships between workplace 
practices and performance. However, its reliance on subjective ratings of workplace 
productivity and financial performance has raised questions over its adequacy to meet 
the demands that are often placed upon it. This paper describes attempts made as part 
of WERS 2004 to augment the performance data collected in the survey with 
objective (accounts-based) measures.  
 
The developments in WERS 2004 took two forms. The first comprised attempts to 
link the Cross-Section and Panel Survey data to the Annual Respondents Database, in 
order to link the WERS data with responses to the ONS Annual Business Inquiry. The 
second comprised an attempt to collect establishment-level performance data directly 
within the WERS Cross-Section Survey, through the administration of a Financial 
Performance Questionnaire.  
 
Both exercises have been completed with some success. The link between the WERS 
Cross-Section Survey and ARD2 has produced a matched dataset containing around 
1,000 observations with very low rates of item-non-response and the prospect of 
obtaining longitudinal observations on the same workplaces for a number of years 
into the future. The disadvantage, however, is that the majority of these ABI returns 
are not completed for the workplace surveyed in WERS, but for a larger unit, 
typically the whole organisation to which it belongs. The WERS Financial 
Performance Questionnaire, for its part, has provided around 1,000 observations, with 
around 80 per cent relating to the surveyed establishment. Apart from small numbers 
of outlying values, the data appear to correspond well to figures provided within the 
ABI, for cases in which such a comparison is possible. But this dataset does not 
currently contain any longitudinal dimension.  
 
Taking account of some of the strengths and weaknesses of both datasets, we have 
compiled a site-level dataset containing objective measures of productivity and 
profitability for around one-third of the trading-sector workplaces in the WERS 2004 
Cross-Section. After weighting to account for observed match biases on a small 
selection of variables, we run some preliminary analyses, finding that a number of key 
workplace characteristics are associated with these measures in ways that we might 
expect.  
 
A companion paper (Forth and McNabb, 2007) will provide an investigation of the 
degree of correspondence between the objective measures of performance contained 
in this site- level dataset and the traditional subjective ratings of performance. 
 
10. Postscript 
 
The syntax used in the compilation of this paper is to be made available within the 
VML, along with the combined ABI-FPQ data file discussed in Sections 5 and 6. All 
syntax and data are in Stata format.  
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Appendix A: WERS 2004 Cross-Section Survey questions to obtain subjective 
evaluations of workplace productivity and financial performance  
 
KESTPER1 
Compared with other establishments in the same industry how would you assess your 
workplace's ...READ OUT.  
...financial performance :  
 
 Frequency Per cent 
A lot better than average,  240 10 
Better than average,  820 36 
About average for industry,  801 35 
Below average,  163 7 
A lot below average,  12 1 
No comparison possible,  100 4 
Relevant data not available  58 3 
Not answered 101 4 
 All workplaces 2295 100 
 
KESTPER2*  
...labour productivity :  
 
 Frequency Per cent 
A lot better than average,  136 6 
Better than average,  833 36 
About average for industry,  880 38 
Below average,  121 5 
A lot below average,  7 <1 
No comparison possible,  137 6 
Relevant data not available  61 3 
Not answered 120 5 
 All workplaces 2295 100 
 
 
Note: In both cases, the respondent was given a show-card displaying the first five 
response options.  
 
Appendix B: Consent question used in WERS 2004 
 
MLINKDAT  
It is sometimes possible to link the data we have collected from you with other 
surveys or datasets, to which we have authorised access. Would you be content for us 
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to do this, as it can provide us with the potential for further analysis? In doing this, we 
assure you that your confidentiality will be respected and the linked data will be 
anonymised and used for statistical and analytical purposes only, with only authorised 
researchers having access to the linked data.  
 
1) Yes  
2) No  
 
Appendix C: WERS 2004 Panel Survey questions to obtain subjective evaluation 
of workplace financial performance  
 
KOPTB  
Generally speaking, in establishments in your industry or field has the financial 
performance...READ OUT...":  
 
1) Improved  
2) Stayed the same,  
3) Or deteriorated since 1998?  
 
{If financial performance has improved (KOPTB=1)}  
KIMP*  
Looking at this card, would you say that, compared with the improvement in the 
average financial performance of establishments in your industry or field, your own 
establishment has...READ...  
 
1) Improved at a faster rate  
2) Improved at a similar rate  
3) Improved at a slower rate  
4) Remained static, or  
5) Actually deteriorated?  
 
 
{If financial performance stayed more or less the same (KOPTB=2)}  
KTable  
Would you say that, compared with the stability in the average financial performance 
of establishments in your industry or field, your own workplace has...READ OUT...  
 
1) Improved  
2) Remained stable like the rest of the industry  
3) Actually deteriorated?  
 
{If financial performance deteriorated (KOPTB=3)}  
Kdeti  
Would you say that, compared with the deterioration in the average performance of 
establishments in your industry or field, the financial performance of your own 
workplace has...READ OUT...  
 
1) Actually improved,  
2) Remained stable,  
3) Deteriorated at same rate as the rest of the industry, or  
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4) Deteriorated at a faster rate than the rest of the industry?  
 
Resultant data (after manipulation): 
 
Establishment performance 1998-2004: Frequency Per cent 
Above industry average 318 34 
About average for industry 446 48 
Below industry average 97 10 
 Not answered 77 8 
 All workplaces 938 100 
 
 
Appendix D: Access to performance data in WERS 2004 
 
Until April 2007, data from the Financial Performance Questionnaire is available only 
via the Virtual Micro-Data Laboratory (VML) operated by the Business Data Linking 
section at the Office for National Statistics (http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/bdl/). 
In April 2007, these data will be added to the WERS 2004 data on general release at 
the Economic and Social Data Service (http://www.esds.ac.uk).  
 
The linked WERS-ABI data is also currently available via the VML. ONS restrictions 
mean that it will not be deposited at ESDS or elsewhere.  
 
Summary of access arrangements at ONS: 
 
The ONS Virtual Micro-data Laboratory can be accessed at any of the five ONS 
offices, namely: London, Newport, Titchfield and Southport. Dumb terminals are 
provided at each of these locations to enable access to the central servers on which the 
micro data is held. ONS have plans to extend access to other government offices in 
the future, in order to reduce travelling times for researchers located some distance 
away from ONS sites, but these plans were not confirmed at the time of writing. 
 
To gain access to the VML, researchers must first complete an application form 
outlining the nature of the proposed research. Each application is approved by both 
ONS and the WERS Sponsors. Successful applicants are then required to then enter 
into a secondment arrangement with ONS, whereby their home institution formally 
seconds them to ONS for the purposes of conducting research in the lab. This is a 
purely contractual process and does not indicate any desire on the part of ONS to 
direct the research. The application process is usually completed within a few weeks.  
 
Researchers are also required to attend an introductory seminar before gaining access 
to the lab. The seminar covers, amongst other things, the form of disclosure control 
that is applied to research undertaken within the lab. It should be noted that 
researchers are not permitted to remove any data from the lab: all analyses must be 
undertaken on ONS premises. Similarly, all research output must be manually 
checked by ONS staff prior to its removal from the lab, in order to ensure that it is not 
disclosive (i.e. does not contain results that may enable the identification of a survey 
respondent). The process of disclosure checking is usually completed within 48 hours.  
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Users should also note a charge of £52 per day has traditionally been levied on those 
using the lab, in order to cover ONS administration costs. New arrangements that 
come into place in January 2007 will mean that researchers using the lab for academic 
research (i.e. not funded by government departments or private organisations) will 
have these costs paid by ESRC, even if they are not working under an ESRC grant.     
 
Further details on the operation of the VML are provided at: 
 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/about/bdl 
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The Analysis of SMEs and Some Methodological Challenges 
 
Robert Blackburn1, Paul Edwards2, David Storey2,George Saridakis2 and Sukanya 
Sen-Gupta2 
 
1. Introduction and Objectives 
 
Smaller enterprises have attracted growing interest from analysts of employment 
relations although, until the past five years or so, this has been slow to take off (see 
Marlow et al., 2005).  Numerous studies of the employment relationship have been 
conducted by researchers in the small business field but contributions from 
employment relations specialists have been especially welcomed.   Prior to WERS 
2004, smaller units3 were arguably under-represented in the series of surveys focusing 
on employment relations leading to a deficiency in our knowledge and theorising on 
the employment relationship.  The relatively slow recognition of the significance of 
small firms in industrial relations is a result of a number of factors associated with a 
focus on large organisation policies and institutions and that the field of study grew 
up in a period of dominance by large organisations and trade union representation 
(e.g. Edwards, 2003).   If WERS is to survive as having some resonance with the 
world of work it has to develop and embrace the changes in the world or work and 
work organisation.  This point is not new.   As one commentator put it when 
reflecting on the WIRS series:  
 
‘Looking back to the topics that dominated the first survey, and thus were 
carried through to subsequent iterations, we did seem to have a fixation 
with the institutions and procedures of industrial relations to the exclusion 
of other issues in personnel  management or work organisation which 
now seemed central to human resource management’  
Purcell (2000: 252) in reviewing Millward et al. (2000) 
 
Others have also suggested the need for permanent change and the need to break with 
‘continuity’ between surveys. 
 
‘To conclude, while this paper might primarily be seen as a memo to 
those responsible for the conduct of a future WIRS 4, the subtext is that 
users of the data need to be alive to issues of survey method and design.  
The WIRS series is the most comprehensive source available for 
examining industrial relations practice in the workplace …/… academic 
researchers should be actively contributing ideas on ways in which the 
series might develop’  
                                Cully and Marginson (1995: 18) 
 
Clearly innovations in WERS are needed if it is to be adequate for the purpose of 
providing benchmark data on employment relations in the economy.4   
                                                                 
1 Kingston University 
2 Warwick Business School, University of Warwick 
3 By small units we are referring to both ‘establishments’ and ‘enterprises’. 
4 This variable-centred research approach does of course have limitations for examining the 
employment relationship (see McCarthy, 1994). 
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The WERS small establishment’s team was interested in ensuring that the shift 
towards smaller-scale capital was incorporated in WERS2004.  Over time, there has 
been some recognition that studying smaller organisations is important if we are to 
understand the nature of employment relations in the economy.  To some extent, this 
growing interest in small firms by industrial relations’ specialists is reflected in the 
adaptations of the workplace employment relations surveys.  WIRS 1994 utilised a 
minimum establishment size threshold of 25 employees and WERS 1998 10 
employees.  WERS 2004 reduced this threshold further to five employees.  Such 
innovations are welcomed and it is unquestionable that this move has generated a 
significant dataset for analysis. 
 
Overall, the paper aims to explore the contribution of WERS2004 to our 
understanding of the employment relationship in SMEs.  This includes a number of 
objectives.  First, it sets out the rationale for having a lower employment size 
threshold in WERS.  Second, it discusses some of the findings to date from 
WERS2004, particularly in relation to the 5-9 size band (called here micro-firms), set 
against a context of on raising our understanding of the employment relationship in 
smaller workplaces.  Then the paper considers the particular methodological 
challenges of applying a WERS framework and style of research to SMEs.  Attention 
is especially paid to the inclusion of micro-establishments and the challenges that a 
reduction of the size threshold creates.   
 
Generally, the paper applauds the innovations in lowering the workplace 
establishment size threshold for inclusion in WERS.  The first analyses by the WERS 
Project Team (e.g. Kersley et al., 2005; Forth et al., 2006) provide important baseline 
evidence on certain aspects of the SME workplace, identifying many of the distinctive 
features related to size.  The findings also provide a strong justification for including 
smaller workplaces, and particularly the micro-establishment (5-9) since it is the 
group which appear at first sight to provide significant and distinctive size-based 
differences.  Whether or not there has been sufficient shift in the approach and content 
of the WERS methodology to adequately capture the smaller firms employment 
relations environment, and thus provide a comprehensive picture of employment 
relations, is open to debate.  Three layers of bias are discussed in the paper which 
leads to the argument that incremental rather than radical innovations have taken 
place in the small establishment area.  A step change has to be made to fully examine 
smaller firms.  The paper concludes with some suggestions for developing WERS 
surveys. 
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5  All turnover figures exclude Section J (financial intermediation) where turnover is not available on a 
comparable basis. 
6 "With no employees" comprises sole proprietorships and partnerships comprising only the self-
employed owner-manager(s), and comp anies comprising only an employee director. 
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2. The Importance of Reducing the Size Threshold 
 
The justification for the inclusion of smaller workplaces in WERS is primarily to 
reflect the size distribution of organisations and employment in the economy.  One of 
the reasons for this is the growth in the contribution of smaller vis a vis larger 
enterprises in the economy.  Data from the DTI (2006) show that that there were an 
estimated 4.4 million businesses in the UK at the start of 2005 (excluding government 
and non-profit organisations) an increase of 59,000 from 2004.  Almost all (99.3%) 
enterprises were small (0-49 employees) in contrast to 0.1% or 6,000 that were large 
(250 or more employees) (Table 1).  SMEs accounted for more than half of the 
employment (58.7%) and turnover (51.1%) and there were almost a quarter of a 
million in the 5-9 category. 7   Clearly, the pressure to reduce the size of establishment 
eligible for inclusion in WERS has gained momentum and on reflection may have 
been well overdue.  Small firms are very different in their employment practices and 
their exclusion from studies leads to a biased picture of employment relations. 
 
3. Results from Innovations in Small Establishments 
 
The innovation in the size analysis of WERS2004 includes both a reduction in the 
establishment size to those with 5 employees and in the way the principal analysis has 
been undertaken.  The surveys within micro-establishments used two of the five 
survey collection instruments:  the cross-section survey of managers MQ and the 
survey of employees EQ.  For the whole private sector, irrespective of size, 
WERS2004 includes data collected from 1693 private sector workplaces and 15260 of 
their employees (Forth et al., 2006: 3-4).  Whilst the sourcebook (Kersley et al., 2006) 
uses ‘establishment’ as the break point for any size analysis, Forth el al., (2006) 
sought to align their analysis with more common approaches to studying SMEs 
undertaken by other mainstream small business researchers and official statistics.  
Although the data collection point is at the workplace, post- interview these are then 
classified according to the size of the enterprise to which they were a part: micro (5-
9), small (10-49), medium (50-249) and large enterprises (250+).   
 
This approach led to the classification of 621 establishments and 4,682 employees 
within enterprises of less than 250 employees (i.e. SMEs).  Within this 392 enterprises 
and 2438 were in small enterprises.  Forth et al. report that the survey is representative 
of 26% of all workplaces and 76% of employees in private sector enterprises (2006: 
5).  Certainly, it does make this the largest dedicated survey on employment relations 
in small workplaces.  The approach undertaken in Forth et al., that is nesting 
establishments within the size of the enterprise to which it is a part is an improvement 
on an establishment classification although it does not mesh onto the size distribution 
of enterprises exactly. 8  A basic point here is that employment relations within small 
establishments will vary according to the size of the enterprise: those belonging to a 
large enterprise will probably have more structures and formal practices.  The 
implication is that the employment relationship in small enterprises may be different 
from those in small establishments of the same size that are part of a larger 
                                                                 
7The actual number of enterprises with employees is estimated to be around 1.2million.  See DTI 
(2006).   
8 As Forth et al (2006) report, however, two thirds (67%) of workplaces belonging to SMEs were single 
site firms and this proportion declined significantly with firm size. 
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organisation (see Storey et al., 2006).  The effects of formality on employment 
relations are under investigation elsewhere.9 
 
Innovation Highlights 
 
An overview of the results on SMEs from WERS2004 has been presented by Forth et 
al (2006) who provide what they call ‘..a descriptive mapping of employment 
relations in SMEs in some of the areas covered by WERS ’ (Forth et al., 2006: 91).  
Our analysis adds to this baseline by unpacking some of the differences between 
micro and firms and those in the other size classifications. The main approach we take 
follows that of Forth et al. in that units are classified by size of enterprise, rather than 
establishment.10  This leads us to be able to classify firms by size of enterprise.  The 
analysis covers 84 micro, 308 small, 229 medium and 1,072 large enterprises and the 
employees within these enterprises.  What the findings show is that the additional 
focus of WERS 2004 on micro enterprises is vindicated: many of the observations in 
size differences are accentuated in the micro firms and there are also big differences 
within the SMEs category. 
 
Across all the aspects covered, employee ratings of managerial responsiveness were 
higher in firms employing 5-9 people than all other size classes (Table 2).  This was 
particularly high in ‘seeking the views of employee or employee representatives’ but 
slightly less so in relation to ‘allowing employees or employee representatives to 
influence final decisions’.  Although it may be difficult to explain the patterns in the 
data definitively, the results are not surprising given both the closeness of working 
relations in micro firms and the dominance of owner-managers in the decision 
processes of smaller firms.  The results suggest elements of ‘fraternalism’ whereby 
employers work alongside and are dependent on labour often with the same of similar 
skill’s set (Goss, 1991).  Yet, the findings do not refute the existence of other 
employer strategies, including ‘paternalism’ or ‘benevolent autocracy’ (Scase and 
Goffee, 1982; Goss, 1991): clearly employer engagement with employees declines the 
closer the final decision approaches.  
                                                                 
9 Forth et al. identify 621 SME workplaces. This includes, however, those owned by overseas 
organizations, and it may be that a ‘small’ UK operation is part of a large global company. If we are 
interested in ‘pure’ SMEs it may be preferable to exclude overseas-owned workplaces, which reduces 
the number to 568. 
10 The analysis and Tables in this paper follows this approach with the exception of Tables 7-9 which 
present an establishment picture since it draws on the Technical report of WERS 2004.  Hence, the 
paper presents an analysis of enterprise (firm) size rather than establishment size of all private sector 
employers. 
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 Table 2 
Employee Rating of Managerial Responsiveness 
   Size of Firm 
 All private sector All SMEs 5-
9 
10-
49 
50-
249 
250+ 
percentages 
Seeking the views of employees or employee 
representatives: 
    
Very good 13 17 27 19 12 11 
Good 35 36 45 37 32 34 
Neither 26 25 21 22 28 27 
Poor 16 14 5 13 17 18 
Very poor 10 8 2 9 10 10 
Responding to suggestions from employees or employee 
representatives: 
    
Very good 12 15 24 17 10 10 
Good 33 37 46 40 31 31 
Neither 29 27 21 25 31 31 
Poor 17 14 8 11 18 19 
Very poor 9 8 2 7 10 10 
Allowing employees or employee representatives to 
influence final decisions:  
    
Very good 8 11 17 12 7 7 
Good 24 29 43 31 23 22 
Neither 34 33 29 32 34 34 
Poor 20 16 7 13 21 23 
Very poor 13 12 4 11 15 14 
Base: all employees in private sector workplaces with 5 or more. Establishments classified according to 
their enterprise size bands 
Figures are weighted and based on responses from the following numbers of employees (minimum): 
13,712 (all private sector), 4,150 (all SMEs), 220 (micro), 1,912 (small firms), 2,018 (medium-sized 
firms) and 9,506 (large firms). 
 
 
Research elsewhere has shown the low level of unionisation and union density in 
small firms.  A corollary of this is the almost absence of collective bargaining in small 
firms.  Table 3 shows that collective bargaining is almost non-existent in the smallest 
size band and rises to only 5.3% of firms employing 50-249.  This contrasts with 
almost three out of 10 enterprises with 250 employees or more.  Wage rates in smaller 
firms were much more likely to be set at the workplace compared with firms 
employing 250 or more.  The dominant form of wage setting in the micro firms was 
through ‘unilateral decisions by management’ (in these case most probably the owners 
of the business): 84.2 per cent of employees in enterprises of 5-9 had pay set 
determined by management compared with 29.1 per cent in enterprises of 250+.  
These results most probably reflect the relative power of the owner-manager in the 
smallest enterprises. An examination of employees’ ratings of their views on 
managers shows some stark differences by size of enterprise (Table 4).  Those in 
micro firms were much less likely to voice disaffection for managers in relation to 
them keeping promises, understanding workers’ needs, skills’ development and 
treating them fairly.  This difference tended to increase with size of enterprise.  Only 
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in relation to skills’ development did the large firm-micro firm gap narrow, 
confirming the lower ratings of opportunities for training and development by micro 
employees, but even here there was a 10 percentage point difference. 
 
Table 3 
Pay Determination Methods  
 
Sector 
Size of 
organization 
in the UK 
 
Firm size 
 All 
private 
sector 
All SMEs 5-9 emps 
10-49 
emps 
50-249 
emps 
250+ 
emps 
Collective 
bargaining 19.6 3.2 0.1 2.3 5.3 29.1 
Set by management 
at higher level, all 27.3 8.7 0.0 3.2 18.0 38.2 
Set by management 
at workplace, all 
46.2 75.4 84.2 81.2 65.5 29.1 
Set by individual 
negotiation, all 
5.4 10.1 13.0 11.2 8.0 2.7 
Some other way 0.7 1.2 0.2 1.0 1.7 0.4 
Base Weighted 
Unweighted 
84 
1662 
48 
603 
16 
81 
24 
299 
9 
223 
36 
1047 
Base: All employees in workplaces with 5 or more. Establishments classified according to their 
enterprise size bands.  Col %s 
 
These results are most probably linked to the type of management ‘order’ within the 
smaller firm.  Staff in small firms, and particularly micro firms, are often managed 
closely, if not on a face-to-face basis, by business owners with an egalitarian ethos 
and teamworking approach.   Indeed, the latter has become recognised as important in 
small business development especially where there are managerial teams 
(Vyakarnham and Handelberg, 2005) and a breaking down of conve ntional, overt 
worker-manager power relations through strategies such as ‘fraternalism’ (Goss, 
1991).  Findings from the survey of managers to some extent confirm the broad 
pattern in the data.  Forth et al. (2006: 77) report that 22% of managers in workplaces 
belonging to micro firms disagreed with the statement that employees at the 
workplace sometimes tried to take unfair advantage of management compared with 
16% in SMEs as a whole and one in 10 in larger firms.   
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Table 4 
Employees’ Trust in Workplace Managers  
 All private 
sector 
All 
SMEs 
Size of Firm 
 5-9 10-49 50-249 250+ 
Managers here … 
… can be relied upon to keep their promises: 
   Col %s 
Strongly agree / 
Agree 
50 59 75 63 49 46 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
26 24 17 23 28 28 
Strongly disagree / 
Disagree 
23 17 8 15 23 27 
… are sincere in attempting to understand 
employees’ views: 
    
Strongly agree / 
Agree 
56 63 77 67 55 52 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
24 21 17 19 25 25 
Strongly disagree / 
Disagree 
20 16 6 14 20 23 
… deal with employees honestly:     
Strongly agree / 
Agree 
58 66 82 70 56 53 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
24 21 14 18 27 26 
Strongly disagree / 
Disagree 
18 13 5 11 17 21 
… treat employees fairly     
Strongly agree / 
Agree 
58 67 80 70 59 53 
Neither agree nor 
disagree 
23 19 12 18 23 25 
Strongly disagree / 
Disagree 
19 14 8 13 18 22 
Base: all employees in private sector workplaces with 5 or more. Establishments classified according to 
their enterprise size bands 
Figures are weighted and based on responses from the following numbers of employees (minimum): 
14,724 (all private sector), 4,485 (all SMEs), 233 (micro firms), 2,103 (small firms), 2,148 (medium-
sized firms) and 10,177 (large firms). 
 
 
In general, employees in enterprises employing 5-9 people appeared to have more 
positive levels of satisfaction about their work experience when measured on seven 
factors together with an overall perception of satisfaction (Table 5).  In contrast, those 
in larger enterprises appeared to be less satisfied across the board.  The greatest 
difference in levels of satisfaction by size appeared to be in relation to the amount of 
involvement in decision making (seven per cent dissatisfied in 5-9 size band 
compared with 23 per cent in the large size band).  Within the 5-9 enterprise size band 
most dissatisfaction was recorded in relation to levels of pay and training but these 
levels were still much lower than larger firms.  The differences in levels of 
  127   
dissatisfaction within micro firms bear out findings from elsewhere in relation to pay 
rates and training opportunities.  Micro and small firms generally offer lower rates of 
pay and less opportunities for training than larger firms as shown in Forth et al (2006) 
but also elsewhere (Marlow et al., 2005).  Annual pay reviews appeared to be less 
frequent in micro-firms (e.g. 71% compared with 81% in all SMEs and 87%) in large 
firms (Forth et al., 2006: 60).  However, what is interesting is that despite these lower 
level of remuneration and training the levels of dissatisfaction in micro firms are still 
lower than those in larger firms. 
 
Table 5 
Levels of Satisfaction of Employees Job Control and Security 
   
 All 
private 
sector 
All 
SMEs 
Size of Firm 
   5-
9 
10-
49 
50-
249 
250+ 
   Col %s 
How satisfied are you with the following aspects of your 
job?: 
Proportion dissatisfied or 
very satisfied 
The sense of achievement you get 
from your work 10 7 5 6 9 12 
The scope for using your own 
initiative 10 7 5 6 9 11 
The amount of influence you have 
over your job 13 9 5 8 12 15 
The training you receive 22 19 11 17 23 24 
The amount of pay you receive 40 33 25 33 37 43 
Your job security 14 10 9 9 11 16 
The work itself 9 7 4 6 8 11 
Overall, how satisfied are you with 
the amount of involvement you have 
in decision-making at this 
workplace? 
21 16 7 14 21 23 
Base: all employees in private sector workplaces with 5 or more. Establishments classified according to 
their enterprise size bands 
Figures are weighted and based on responses from the following numbers of employees (minimum): 
14, 858 (all private sector), 4,516 (all SMEs), 230 (micro firms) 2,109 (small firms), 2,165 (medium-
sized firms) and 10, 272 (large firms). 
 
An examination of employees’ views on management operations is shown in Table 6.  
Clearly, the smallest enterprises have employees who report lowest leve ls of 
dissatisfaction.  However, there are differences in the gap between the small and 
largest enterprises.  Hence the gap is closed when financial matters, including budgets 
and profits are considered (25 per cent poorly or very poorly informed by 
management compared with 28 per cent in enterprises of 250+ employees).  This 
suggests that although employees in the smallest size bands are more likely to feel 
informed about the enterprise although on some essential matters, including finance, 
they are no different from those in large enterprises.   
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Table 6 
Satisfaction Levels of Employees on Management Operations  
   
 All 
private 
sector 
All 
SMEs 
Size of Firm 
   5-9 10-
49 
50-
249 
250+ 
 Percentages 
In general how good would you say managers at this 
workplace are at keeping employees informed about … 
Proportion saying 
‘poor’ or ‘very poor’ 
Changes to the way the organisation is 
being run 
24 22 13 20 27 25 
Changes in staffing 26 22 11 20 27 29 
Changes in the way you do your job 19 15 8 14 19 21 
Financial matters, including budgets or 
profits 29 31 25 30 34 28 
Overall, how good would you say managers at this workplace are at … 
Seeking the views of employees or 
employee representatives 
26 21 7 22 28 28 
Responding to suggestions from 
employees or employee representatives 26 21 10 19 28 29 
Allowing employees or employee 
representatives to influence final 
decisions 
34 28 11 25 36 37 
In general, how would you describe 
relations between managers and 
employees here? 
14 10 2 8 14 17 
Now thinking about the managers at this workplace, to 
what extent do you agree or disagree with the following?  
Managers here … 
Proportion 
‘disagreeing’ or 
‘strongly disagreeing’: 
Can be relied upon to keep their promises 23 17 8 15 23 27 
Are sincere in attempting to understand 
employees’ views 20 16 6 14 20 23 
Deal with employees honestly 18 13 5 11 17 21 
Understand about employees having to 
meet responsibilities outside work 19 13 6 11 16 22 
Encourage people to develop their skills 18 15 10 14 19 20 
Treat employees fairly 19 14 8 13 18 22 
Index score (from 22 items) 4.38 3.50 1.92 3.17 4.39 4.87 
Base: all employees in private sector workplaces with 5 or more. Establishments classified according to 
their enterprise size bands 
Figures are weighted and based on responses from the following numbers of employees (minimum): 
13,712 (all private sector), 4,150 (all SMEs), 220 (micro firms) 1,912 (small firms), 2,018 (medium-
sized firms) and 9,506 (large firms). 
 
As for how we explain these results, there has been much debate on employee 
satisfaction in small firms (Curran and Stanworth, 1981b).  A simple conclusion of the 
above would be that they confirm the Ingham (1970) thesis of a ‘non-economistic 
orientation to work’ in smaller firms.  But this is one thesis to which we have 
difficulty in subscribing, not least because of its overtly ‘supply side perspective’ of 
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job choice or size of enterprise choice by employees (Curran and Stanworth, 1981b) 
especially when in small firms the owner-manager has great dominance.  The reasons 
for the above differences in responses between micro and larger firms may also be 
bound up within a number of other contextual factors such as demographic, 
occupational, full- time / part-time, business sector and managerial style issues.  All 
require further ana lysis and debate. 
 
In understanding the patterns we observe, it may help to turn this round by asking 
about dissatisfaction in large organizations.  Idson (1990) for example, albeit studying 
size of workplace rather than size of firm, developed theoretical reasons why 
satisfaction declines with size.  Crucially, there are more rules and there is more 
rigidity in large workplaces, and higher capital intensity leads to pressures to utilize 
resources and thus to reduce workers’ ability to influence the pace of work.  He finds 
that rigidity is indeed high in large workplaces.  In relation to job satisfaction, 
apparent size effects on job satisfaction disappear or are attenuated once measures of 
rigidity are introduced.  Our own analysis of the WERS data has shown that formality 
increases with organizational size, and that measures of ‘employee need’ are inversely 
related to the level of formality (Storey et al., 2006).  Case studies in small firms, for 
example in restaurants, demonstrate a reasonably relaxed work pace and a lack of 
rationalization (Ram et al., 2001).  These studies do not have comparisons with outlets 
run by large organizations, but the intense rationalization of work practised by fast 
food chains is now very well established (Royle, 2000). 
 
In relation to the WERS data, Forth et al. (2006) show that small firms used formal 
devices such as performance appraisal less than did large ones.  It was also the case 
that in small organizations workers reported relatively good access to flexible working 
arrangements – which is one indicator of a lack of rigidity.  Another notable finding 
relates to the pattern of pay and satisfaction.  In large organizations, pay compression 
(that is a narrowing of the range of pay) reduced job satisfaction, but this was not the 
case in small firms – a result that Forth et al. (2006: 64) attribute to a lack of 
knowledge of other workers’ pay in small firms.  Thus, potential sources of 
dissatisfaction in large firms related to job grading and fairness seem attenuated in 
smaller organizations. 
 
Job satisfaction can thus be seen less as a timeless feature of small firms or a measure 
of ‘harmony’ and more as a characteristic that can be undermined by rationalization 
and management control.  Small- firm workers are not inherently happy, but aspects of 
their work situation make work less clearly dissatisfying than is the case in larger 
organizations.  Related to this point, qualitative studies (e.g. those in Marlow et al., 
2005) suggest distinct tensions in small firms between fairness and clear standards, on 
the one hand, and, on the other, the wish of owners to make personal decisions.  Firms 
may, for example, have pay standards which are then ignored when the owner wishes 
to award a bonus as he or she sees fit.  Such actions may not provoke discontent, 
either because workers do not know of them (secrecy in pay setting being a well-
known feature) or because the fall within some norms of fairness. But they underline 
that good employee relations are not pre-ordained.  They also illustrate some issues 
that surveys like WERS are not designed to investigate and that need to continue to be 
borne in mind. 
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These remarks suggest ways in which the effects of firm size can be addressed further.  
WERS has some measures that might be taken as proxies for rigidity and capital 
intensity such as the use of formal targets and various management techniques such as 
benchmarking.  We would expect these things to reduce worker satisfaction. 
Moreover, with Idson and a long line of writing on small firms, we might want to say 
that ‘size effects’ are in fact effects of the structure of work. The impact of 
organization size on satisfaction would then be attenuated or eliminated once 
measures of the structure of work were introduced. 
 
Of course, the above evidence is useful in presenting some baseline data on the 
employment relationships in micro firms.  However, some caution may be exercised 
when interpreting the results.  First, the number of micro firms in the analysis is 
smaller than those in the other size bands, although in terms of further data dis-
aggregation this is more of an issue in relation to the management rather than the 
employee questionnaire.  Second, there may have been some differential response 
rates in that disaffected workers in micro firms may have been less likely to be 
interviewed because of a higher turnover (the exit voice thesis), or self-exclusion or 
gatekeeper exclusion from taking part in the survey.  Third, we should not ignore the 
differences in the sector, demographic and occupational characteristics of those 
answering the questions.  Finally, there may be some size differences in the 
interpretation of questions and willingness of employees to be critical of management 
in answering the questions posed.  For example, in smaller firms the influence of the 
owner manager cannot be under estimated and this may generate a culture of 
‘collective spirit’ even within the boundaries of lower pay and conditions, if not 
acquiescence.  As expected, the smaller the smaller the workplace, the more likely the 
owner was involved full-time in the enterprise (82% in micro firms compared with 
48% in medium and 8% in large sized firms). 
 
Has WERS 2004 Innovated Enough? 
 
In moving to incorporate micro firms into WERS, a number of issues are raised from 
the previous section which merit consideration. These issues include: 
 
i. the multiple agendas of WERS, including the need for addressing traditional 
industrial relations issues as well as continuity, 
ii. the methodological approaches, and 
iii. issues of nomenclature, particularly the language used in the questions. 
 
Given the diversity of practices between small and large firms, it is fair to ask can the 
same research instruments be used in these differing work environments.  If so, how 
are we to improve the relevance of the questionnaires and their content to the small 
firms’ context?  Or should the emphasis be on seeking different questionnaires but 
with common core questions, to map more precisely into the practices known to 
operate in workplaces of different size.  Analysts have pointed out that the small firm 
is not a shrunken down version of a large firm, with the former having no or little 
division between ownership and management and a strong emphasis on non-
bureaucratic, informal managerial practices.  More sophisticated analyses have also 
related the greater exposure of the internal practices of the firms to the external 
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markets in which they operate.  This may render generic questionnaires problematic to 
administer and interpret. 
 
The corollary of this may be that it is difficult to reconcile the different agendas and 
approaches to investigating the employment relationship using the same or similar 
instruments.  Furthermore, is it fair to argue that the ‘agenda legacy’ of WIRS and 
WERS11, that is the need to maintain continuity over time in terms of definitions, 
agendas and target populations may have, in some respects, stifled innovations?   
These questions cannot be answered in this short paper but the evidence presented 
may help fuel the debates.  
 
4. Understanding the Relevance of WERS in the SME Workplace 
 
There are a number of ways of assessing the validity of WERS as a means of 
providing evidence on employment relations in small firms.  One way is to examine 
the ‘non-response/ no answer’ and ‘not applicable’ coding of answers to questions 
used in the research instruments.  Response rates include both overall response rates, 
that is the success rate of achieving a sample from the target population, as well as 
responses to particular questions within the surveys.  The reasons for non-response 
can be many but we may assume that they are indications of a lack of time, not 
understanding the question, a lack of interest, the absence of an appropriate pre-coded 
response or that the subject is perceived irrelevant.  Not- applicable codes to questions 
are useful indicators of the relevance of the question to the subject.  A high incidence 
of ‘not-applicable’ responses may suggest that the agenda behind the questions asked 
do not relate world of the interviewee.  Although this may not necessarily be 
interpreted negatively, it is important that surveys do seek to maximise the time used 
in the interview to glean information on the subject under investigation.  In short, as in 
most surveys, it is desirable to achieve as high a response rate as possible.   
 
It was a reasonable assumption of the WERS small establishment’s team that the 
WERS surveys may incur particular response rate challenges from smaller units.12  An 
examination of the response rates in WERS may be used to illustrate the particular 
size-related challenges of undertaking surveys in smaller units.  There are a number of 
issues that require exploration here including differences in response rates across the 
whole sample by unit size, response rates to particular questions and differences 
between workplaces and enterprises of the same size on specific questions. 
 
A preliminary examination of the data from the WERS2004 surveys show that there 
are indeed, particular size-related response-rate issues.  These issues may be shown by 
examining the response rates to a) the sampling frame (the top line survey response 
rates) as a whole b) the management cross-section survey (MQ) and to a lesser extent 
the employee questionnaire (EQ).  These will now be discussed in turn. 
 
                                                                 
11 Cully and Marginson (1995) also raised the problem of continuity on a variety issues. 
12 WERS has a number of definitions and conventions.  By Unit we are including both enterprises (i.e. 
the over all size of the business to which any workplace is a part) and establishments (i.e. the 
workplace).  In this paper firm and enterprise are used interchangeably.  Workplace and establishment 
are also used interchangeably. 
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Top Line Survey Response Rates 
 
WERS involved a series of surveys but a main gate for the project is engaging with 
managers in workplaces drawn from a sampling frame derived from the Inter-
Departmental Business Register (IDBR).  The ONS points out the coverage of this 
source: 
 
It covers all parts of the economy, but misses some very small businesses 
(self employed and those without employees and low turnover) and some 
non-profit making organisations. There are around 4.3 million businesses 
in the UK of which 2.1 million are on the IDBR. The IDBR provides 
nearly 99% coverage of economic activity.  
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/idbr/idbr.asp 
 
The IDBR holds records of 2.1m businesses and is updated using VAT, PAYE, 
National Statistics Surveys and Companies House.  From this database, the so called 
‘yield’ of establishments from the initial sampling of 4293 units selected was 53.5% 
(Table 7).  However, for the micro establishments (1-9 employees) this was only 
35.9% compared with 56.8% in the 10+ establishments.  Whilst this may not be 
considered a significant problem, because the yield is not referring to refusals, it does 
imply that the sample of firms in WERS 2005 is operating within the limitations of 
the IDBR.  The latter is the most comprehensive sampling frame of organisations 
from government, but it does however have some limitations.   
 
Most pertinent here is its tendency to avoid coverage of new firms because of its 
reliance on records related to registrations across various government departments for 
various official purposes.13 
 
      Table 7 
Yield from WERS 2004 Sample Management Respondents  
(Size of establishment) 
 5 – 9 10+ 
Ineligible/Out of Scope (%) 38.2 12.2 
Non-productive addresses (%) 25.9 30.9 
Interviews achieved (%) 35.9 56.8 
Sample 694 3,599 
Source: Chaplin et al. (2005), p.37. 
Note: The differences between the two size groups found to be statistically 
significant.  
            
Although the precise effects the IDBR sampling frame has on bias in the results of 
WERS 2004 are difficult to estimate, it may be that this leads to bias in the 
representation of micro firms since it is these that tend to be newer and shorter lived.  
The implication is that the sample probably collects data on older small firms than the 
                                                                 
13 For example, the ‘Beta model‘ database suggests that the IDBR covers2.1 enterprises in comparison 
to its own of 2.4 which is drawn from other datasets including Thomsons and Yellow Pages.  See 
http://www.betamodel.com/  
  133   
true population at any point in time.  New firms may also have very different 
employment relations practices.  Clearly this is a methodological issue that requires 
further debate. 
 
Table 8 
Response by size of establishment (IDBR) 
 Number of employees (IDBR) 
 Total 5 – 9 10 – 24 25 - 49 50-99 
Out of scope (%) 16.4 38.2 19.4 18.0 8.8 
Unproductive (%) 30.1 25.9 31.3 28.9 33.1 
Productive (%) 53.5 35.9 49.3 53.1 58.2 
Response rate (%) 64.0 58.0 61.1 64.7 63.8 
Sample 4,293 694 686 612 514 
Source: Chaplin et al. (2005) p.37 
Note: The response rate is equal to [productive/(productive + unproductive)]*100.  Differences in the 
response rate across firms’ size are found to be statistically significant between “5-9” and “25-49” and 
between “5-9” and “50-99”. 
 
Second, is the issue of the actual response rates of establishments approached for 
participation in the surveys.  Again the results from Chaplin et al. (2005) reveal some 
interesting size-effects.  Table 8 shows the response rates by size of establishment. 
Most notable is first the relatively high percentage of micro establishments that are 
out of scope (38.2% compared with 16.4% for the whole sample).  There also appears 
to be a sharp drop off in non-response amongst the medium sized establishments (50-
99) and this remains at between 8-10% for all 50+ sized establishments.  Collectively 
these suggest that micro and small establishments will be more subject to non-
response bias.  Again this is an issue that is worth further investigation if the 
comparisons with micro, small and larger units are to be robust.14 
 
Table 9 
Length of Management Interviews by Establishment Size  
Establishment Size: Mean  duration (mins) Median duration (mins) Sample 
5-9 96 90 229 
10-24 103 95 407 
25-49 115 110 322 
50-99 118 110 298 
100-199 123 120 277 
200-499 131 120 287 
500-999 134 120 154 
1,000-1,999 137 125 94 
2,000+ 138 130 141 
Total 118 115 2,209 
                             Source: Chaplin et al. (2005), p.42. 
 
Third, once inside the establishment, it appears that the actual length of the 
management interview is positively related to size. Table 9 provides both the mean 
and the median duration of management interview by establishment size suggesting 
                                                                 
14 The reasons for refusals are given in the Chaplin et al. (2005:p40) although these are not broken 
down by unit size. 
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distributions skewed to the right.  Interestingly, the interviews in micro establishments 
were 96 minutes (mean) compared with for example 131 respectively in 
establishments employing 200-499 employees.  
 
The reasons for these differences may be numerous.  In large establishments there 
may be a need for management in large firms to ascertain information possibly across 
a number of departments whilst in smaller establishments this may be to hand.  
However, a more crucial argument may be that the differences may be a result of the 
irrelevance of so many questions in the smaller establishments.  Owner-managers may 
be less able to answer questions that are designed for personal specialists and on 
topics that are alien to their day-to-day world of work.  Hence, the shorter duration in 
micro firms may not be solely to a more efficient interview.  Clearly, answers to these 
suggestions cannot be easily gleaned from the data provided so far but the reasons for 
the wide variation in the duration of interviews requires further consideration. 
 
Analyses of Non-Response and Not Applicable in the Management Questionnaire 
(MQ) and Employee Questionnaire (EQ)  
 
Given the variety of objectives of WERS and the relative new inclusion of the smaller 
sideband categories, and hence small enterprises, it is important that an examination 
of the appropriateness of questions is undertaken.  The small establishment’s teams 
initial glean of drafts the MQ suggested that some of the terminology used may not sit 
comfortably in small firms.  One of the principal themes in the accumulation of 
knowledge and theorisation of small firms is the absence of formality and associated 
bureaucracy (eg. Gibb, 2000). However, the cross-sectional management 
questionnaire WERS 2004 often focused on formal policies and practices.  Simply 
put, the term ‘formal’ or ‘formally’ appeared 36 times in the MQ cross-section 
questionnaire.  This language is likely to be alien to small business owners and elicit 
responses that are difficult to interpret.  An example is the question: 
 
Is this workplace covered by a formal strategic plan which sets out objectives 
and how they will be achieved? (BSTRATEGIC) 
 
Non-response to this question was minimal.  However, what is more revealing is the 
subsequent probe regarding the issues covered in the plan.  An examination of the 
non-response and not applicable to the question ‘which of the following issues are 
covered in the plan?’ reveals that SMEs were much more likely to have been filtered 
out by the previous question than the sample as a whole, or in large firms (Table 10). 
 
Hence, the subsequent question in asking ‘were you or anyone else responsible for 
employment relation matters involved in the preparation of the plan?’ (BPREPARE) 
also resulted in different levels of not applicable by size of enterprise: for example, 
69% of micros had been filtered out compared with only 10% of large firms. 
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Table 10 
Non-Response and Not Applicable by Enterprise Size (BMANAGE1):  
Which of the following issues were covered in the plan (e.g. satisfaction, 
development)?  
(Unweighted estimates, %) 
Micro 
5-9 
Small 
10-49 
Medium 
50-249 
Large 
250+ 
All 
69.05 56.82 31.00 10.07 24.34 
(84) (308) (229) (1,072) (1,693) 
Source: WERS 2004.  N values are in parentheses. 
Notes: Establishments classified according to their enterprise size bands. We test the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of non-response and not applicable is the same between micro, small, medium and 
large firms. The Wald test suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis, F(3, 1692)=127.04. 
 
In relation to the management of employees, the management questionnaire asked a 
question which may be considered difficult for respondents, particularly in SMEs: 
 
‘I now want to ask some questions about the involvement of other employees in 
employment matters.  Approximately what proportion of non-managerial 
employees have job duties that involve supervising other employees?  Please 
include line managers and foremen’ (BINVANG*) 
 
The difficulty for SMEs to answer the question is highlighted in the follow-up 
question (BAUTHOR1 – BAUTHOR3).  Table 11 shows that ‘non-response’ and ‘not 
applicable’ were negatively related to size of enterprise: those in micro-firms were 
more than three times as likely to record non-response or not applicable than medium 
or large enterprises. 
 
Table 11 
Non-Response and Not Applicable by Enterprise Size (BAUTHOR1-3): 
Do employees with supervisory responsibilities have the authority to make final 
decisions on … 
(Unweighted estimates, %) 
 Micro 
5-9 
Small 
10-49 
Medium 
50-249 
Large 
250+ 
All 
BAUTH1: Taking on people who work 
for them 
35.71 
(84) 
21.75 
(308) 
10.04 
(229) 
10.45 
(1,072) 
13.70 
(1,693) 
BAUTH2: Deciding on pay rises for 
people who work for them 
35.71 
(84) 
21.75 
(308) 
10.04 
(229) 
10.45 
(1,072) 
13.70 
(1,693) 
BAUTH3: Dismissing workers for 
unsatisfactory performance 
35.71 
(84) 
21.75 
(308) 
10.04 
(229) 
10.45 
(1,072) 
13.70 
(1,693) 
Source: WERS 2004.  N values are in parentheses. 
Notes: Establishments classified according to their enterprise size bands. We test the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of non-response and not applicable is the same across different size bands. The 
Wald test suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis: F(3, 1692)=13.71 for the three cases.  However, 
the test does not reject the null hypothesis that the proportion is the same between medium and large 
enterprises. 
 
This monotonic size-relationship was also found in a preliminary exploration of ‘not 
applicable’ on a series of other variables, illustrating a key point that the management 
questionnaire instrument was not relevant to SME respondents or not fitting in with 
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their employment relations modus operandi.  Non-response was less of an issue: 
indeed non-responses to questions were not as high as anticipated.   
 
Section C of the MQ focused on recruitment, training and organisation of work.  The 
sections on training tended to focus on formal, off- the-job activities and produced 
some corroborative evidence that SMEs tended to be less engaged in such activities.  
Unfortunately, informal training or on-the-job learning was not investigated even 
though this has found to be a key form of employee development in SMEs (Kitching 
and Blackburn, 2002; 2003).  The nature, character and scale of employee 
development in SMEs differs radically from that in larger firms and there is no 
surprise that the findings recorded high ‘not applicables’ across a range of questions.  
The results therefore need careful interpretation as false underlying assumption may 
be conveyed that formality is the normative model for training. 
 
A section of the MQ examined the use of teams as a means of organising the 
workforce (TEAMS).  Here the opening question was: 
 
‘What proportion if any, of [NAME OF LARGEST OCCUPATIONAL 
GROUP- LOG] at this workplace work in formally designated team?’ 
 
The non-response to this question was almost zero, and 55% of SME workplaces 
reported working in teams compared with 64% in large firms. However, the 
subsequent probing questions presented in Table 12 suggest a relatively high level of 
not applicable (rather than non-response) amongst micro and smaller firms.  Over a 
half of those in micro enterprises recorded ‘non-response’ or ‘not applicable’, 
compared with around 14% in large enterprises. The relatively large proportion of 
not-applicable in this probe question is undoubtedly linked to the absence of formally 
designated teams and a filtering out of almost half of all micro firms.  It is also likely 
that the term ‘formal’ would be difficult to interpret in SMEs because of the relative 
absence of formality and even where team-working is taking place this is unlikely to 
be picked up by the opening question (TEAMS).  The face-validity of this question 
may, therefore, decline with size of firm since, although team-working takes places, 
this may not be picked up using these questions (see for example Cooney, 2005). 
 
Section D of the management cross-section questionna ire addressed consultation and 
communication in the workplace.  Earlier feedback from the small establishment’s 
team, to drafts of the MQ, had expressed concern regarding the relevance of some of 
the questions to the SME context.15  The section focusing on the methods used to 
communicate and consult with employees asked a series of questions relating to 
meetings, their lengths and context.  An opening question on communication between 
managers and workers asked: 
 
‘Do you have meetings between line managers or supervisors and all the 
workers for whom they are responsible?’ (DBRIEF) 
 
The majority of managers (60% weighted) reported ‘yes’ to this question but 
significantly 40% said ‘no’.  In the subsequent probing questions over four out of 10 
                                                                 
15 Indeed, initial feedback, from the small establishment’s team, suggested that only around a half of 
the questions would be appropriate to the SME, and particularly micro and small firm contexts.  
Amendments were subsequently made to the section for the final questionnaire used in the survey. 
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micro and small firms has been filtered out (Table 13).  Similarly, over six out of 10 
micro and four out of 10 small firms were not asked about the frequency of meetings 
and, which issues are discussed in the meetings.  In contrast, only 15% of larger firms 
were filtered out of this question.   
 
Table 12 
Non-Response and Not Applicable by Enterprise Size (CTEAMHOA-HOE): 
Which, if any, of the following statements apply to the way that team working 
operates among…. at this workplace? 
(Unweighted estimates, %) 
 Micro 
5-9 
Small 
10-49 
Medium 
50-249 
Large 
250+ 
All 
HOA: 
Depends on 
each other’s 
work 
55.95 
(84) 
35.39 
(308) 
20.09 
(229) 
13.62 
(1,072) 
20.52 
(1,693) 
HOB : Aim to 
appoint their 
own leaders  
55.95 
(84) 
35.06 
(308) 
20.52 
(229) 
13.99 
(1,072) 
20.79 
(1,693) 
HOC: Jointly 
decide how the 
work is to be 
done 
55.95 
(84) 
35.06 
(308) 
20.52 
(229) 
13.71 
(1,072) 
20.61 
(1,693) 
HOD : Giver 
responsibility 
for products 
and services 
55.95 
(84) 
35.06 
(308) 
20.96 
(229) 
13.62 
(1,072) 
20.61 
(1,693) 
HOE: Tasks or 
roles rotate 
among the 
members 
55.95 
(84) 
35.06 
(308) 
21.4 
(229) 
13.9 
(1,072) 
21.09 
(1,693) 
Source: WERS 2004.  N values are in parentheses. 
Notes:  Establishments classified according to their enterprise size bands. We test the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of non-response and not applicable is the same across different size bands. The 
Wald test suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis: F(3, 1692)=35.73; F(3, 1692)=34.28; F(3, 
1692)=35.10;    F(3, 1692)=35.48 and F(3, 1692)=33.66, respectively.  
 
Similar results are found when examining the questions in relation to joint-
consultative committees and worker representatives.  Whilst these questions show 
advanced thinking by researchers for allowing the collection of valuable data in 
establishments owned by large organisations, the trade-off is a loss of potential data 
from firms at the smaller end of the spectrum.  Clearly, many of these questions did 
not appear to map onto the operations within SMEs.  The term ‘joint-consultative 
committee’ we would argue, would simply not be in the language used by small 
firms’ owner-managers. 
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Table 13 
Non-Response and Not Applicable by Enterprise Size: 
Arrangements for Communication: Meetings between line managers  
or supervisors and workers. 
(Unweighted estimates, percentage) 
 Micro 
5-9 
Small 
10-49 
Medium 
50-249 
Large 
250+ 
All 
DBRIEFN: How frequent are 
these meetings?  
67.86 
(84) 
40.91 
(308) 
20.5 
(229) 
15.0 
(1,072) 
23.5 
(1,693) 
DBWHICO1: Which issues are 
discussed at the meetings  
66.67 
(84) 
40.58 
(308) 
19.65 
(229) 
14.74 
(1,072) 
22.68 
(1,693) 
Source: WERS 2004.  N values are in parentheses. 
Notes: Establishments classified according to their enterprise size bands. We test the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of non-response and not applicable is the same across different size bands. The 
Wald test suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis: F(3, 1692)=53.22 and F(3, 1692)=52.96, 
respectively.   
 
One of the key areas for study in the field of industrial relations is employee 
representation and trade unions.  However, given the very low levels of trade union 
numbers and density in smaller enterprises Section E of the WERS2004 MQ 
highlights the difficulties using the same questionnaire for large and small firms.  The 
survey corroborated the low presence of unions in smaller firms and this rendered the 
bulk of questions on this subject as ‘not applicable’.  To some extent this is 
understandable and the need to collect data on trade union activities and 
representation at the workplace makes a significant contribution to mapping out the 
landscape contemporary industrial relations.  But what of those workplaces without 
the presence of trade unions?  WERS 2004 sought to collect information on non-union 
employee representatives (e.g. EELECT) but, the levels of non-response and not 
applicable in micro and small firms was over 90%. 
 
The system of payments and pay determination provided some useful information on 
depicting the predominant regime in small firms (see Forth et al., 2006: Ch6).  
Although there appears an absence of collective bargaining in SMEs (with some 
sector differences) lower levels of pay in SMEs and seemingly unilateral pay 
determination by management at the workplace, levels of satisfaction with pay 
appears to be higher the smaller the firms.  These apparent contradictions may have 
answers outside the data set such as different wage expectations by employees but 
higher perceived levels of job autonomy and recognition. 
 
However, the section on pay setting is not without the by now familiar challenges of 
non-response bias: again on almost all the questions not applicable, was highest 
amongst micro firms.  The reasons for this may be explained by the inappropriateness 
of some of the opening questions.  For example, FJOBEVA1 asked: 
 
‘Are there any formal job evaluation schemes here?  These are schemes for 
comparing systematically the relative value of different jobs in order to settle 
their relative rates of pay?’ 
 
Clearly, this would be difficult to apply to a SME, and particularly micro-context.  
Hence, only 7% of SMEs reported having a formal job evaluation scheme, compared 
with 24% in large firms.   
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Although the tenor of this paper is critical in focusing on what did not appear to work 
there were some passages in the MQ that were relevant.  The series of questions 
relating to the frequency of pay reviews and the factors influencing pay changes for 
the largest occupational group (FREVIEW) appeared to have elicited responses from 
SMEs to provide useful comparisons with larger firms and between sectors.  Response 
rates were high and broadly equal across all firm sizes in the passage of questions 
relating to pay levels and their changes.  However, when asked in relation to pay 
determination for each occupational group at the workplace, the rates of not 
applicable rise to 22.4% (FSOC1) and 92% (FSOC6).  The section on pay and pay 
determination, therefore, reveals some interesting results regarding micro firms but 
the ability to map pay determination is only partial compared with that of large firms. 
  
The Employee Questionnaire (EQ) produced some interesting findings regarding the 
experiences, views and attitudes of employees when compared with size unit.  The 
questionnaire was relatively short and administered by self-completion methods.  
Managers appeared to be positive in relation to their willingness to allow workers to 
complete these questionnaires, and it is notable that those in smaller units were more 
likely to say ‘yes’.   There are some issues worthy of exploration within the EQ in 
relation to the differences found in the results.  Whilst small firm workers appeared to 
be happier, more satisfied with the conditions of work and trust managers more than 
in large enterprises, issues of non-response bias must be explored.  Forth el al. (2006) 
investigated the concept of ‘exit voice’ as being one potential for low levels of 
discontent amongst small firm workers.  However, it appears that voluntary 
resignations were no higher than in larger firms.  One alternative explanation is that in 
the small firms’ context staff who are not committed to the organisation are much less 
likely to say so whilst those in large organisations have a culture of airing discontent, 
given for example the presence of trade union support, and internal structures.  This 
cannot of course be verified within the WERS data.  However, the evidence from 
Chaplin on the number of questionnaires received back is lower as a proportion in 
smaller firms than in larger firms.   This difference between the number of 
questionnaires left for completion and the proportion returned may be worthy of 
further investigation. 
 
Generally, an examination of the non-response patterns in the EQ show that this tends 
to be higher the smaller enterprise with few exceptions.16  The highest non-response 
across the board is in relation to QD3.  If this is unpacked further, there also appears 
to be a size relationship in the non-response.  The analysis shows that 71% of small 
firm employees and 66% of micro employees provided a ‘don’t know’ or ‘no answer’ 
(Table 14). 
 
In section D of the EQ, employees were asked a series of questions about trade unions 
and trade union membership.  It is clear from the non-response that this question is 
much less relevant in smaller firms (Table 15).  Over two-thirds of those in micro 
enterprises who had trade unions replied ‘don’t know’ or no answer – almost double 
those in all other enterprise size bands.  This is not surprising given the low density of 
unions in smaller firms. 
 
                                                                 
16 The analysis here is of non-response (ie ‘no answer’ or ‘don’t know’) because all employees are 
asked the questions. 
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Table 14 
Non-Response by Enterprise Size (D3): 
How would you describe management’s general attitude towards trade 
union membership among employees here? 
(Unweighted estimates, percentage) 
Micro Small Medium Large All 
65.98 
(241) 
70.46 
(2,197) 
61.92 
(2,245) 
50.78 
(10,578) 
55.49 
(15,261) 
Source: WERS 2004-Employee Survey.  N values are in parentheses . 
 Notes: Establishments classified according to their enterprise size bands. We test the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of non-response and not applicable is the same across different size bands. The 
Wald tesst suggests a rejection of the null hypothesis: F(3, 15,260)=126.68. However, the test does not 
reject the null hypothesis that the proportion is the same between micro and small enterprises. 
 
 
Table 15 
Non-Response (D6A-C)*: 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement about unions or staff 
associations at this workplace? 
(Unweighted estimates, percentage)  
 Micro Small Medium Large All 
D6A: Take notice of members 
problems 
36.36 
(11) 
16.03 
(131) 
15.40 
(396) 
15.82 
(5,139) 
15.84 
(5,677) 
D6B: ..are taken seriously by 
management 
36.36 
(11) 
15.27 
(131) 
18.18 
(396) 
16.37 
(5,139) 
16.51 
(5,677) 
D6C: ..make a difference to what it 
is likely to work here 
36.36 
(11) 
16.03 
(131) 
17.68 
(396) 
16.38 
(5,139) 
16.51 
(5,677) 
Source: WERS 2004-Employee Survey.  N values are in parentheses. 
Notes: Establishments classified according to their enterprise size bands.  We test the null hypothesis 
that the proportion of non-response and not applicable is the same across different size bands. The 
Wald tesst suggests that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected in all cases: F(3, 15,260)=0.63; 
F(3,15,260)=0.44 and F(3,15,260)=0.54, respectively.  
*The question was asked only to those who work in workplace where there is a trade union. 
 
On the majority of other questions in the EQ, low levels of non-response were found.  
This suggests that on the whole the EQ questionnaire worked well within firms of all 
sizes although the above exceptions need to be taken on board for future refinements 
in WERS. 
 
5. Discussion and the Way Forward 
 
This paper has sought to present a critique of the innovations in WERS in relation to 
the move to embrace smaller establishments in WERS 2004.  Small firms can no 
longer be ignored in this major programme of investigation.  As a result, WERS 2004 
has made significant breakthroughs in relation to the generation of facts on 
employment relations in smaller and especially micro workplaces.  The stratification 
of workplaces according to the size of the enterprise which they are a part has 
provided a significant breakthrough for those seeking size-based comparisons.  The 
argument and resources used for including micro firms in WERS has been fully 
vindicated since they show major differences from large firms.  Analyses to date have 
shown that there are significant size differences in employment relations practices.  
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Even within SMEs there is heterogeneity.  The analysis presented here has focused on 
micro enterprises differences between size bands.  However, this has thrown up many 
more questions than answers.  Further analysis is needed to relate these observed size 
differences according, for example, to contextual (industry sector, competition levels), 
worker profile (full-time/ part-time, age, gender, occupational class) and employer 
factors.  We would also seek to examine differences between enterprises and 
establishments in baseline employment relations. 
 
Yet, the analysis of non-response across various elements of the research programme 
and particularly not applicable in passages of questionnaires, has demonstrated that 
some bias against SMEs has been inherent.  Three layers of bias may be seen to exist 
against SMEs and particularly micro firms: at the level of the agenda; at the level of 
the sampling frame; and at the level of the research instruments used in the field.  As a 
result, whilst our knowledge base on SMEs has been enhanced as a result of WERS 
2004, it remains relatively partial when compared with that of larger organisations.  
We would, therefore, describe the innovation on small establishments in WERS 2004 
to be incremental rather than radical.  The analysis of non-response to particular 
questions and passages of text presented in the paper is illustrative rather than 
exhaustive.  More detailed explorations may focus for example on differences 
between size of employer/ workplace; multi/single plant organisations; and use more 
sophisticated techniques to control other variables such as occupational and sector 
variables which will intervene in size-comparisons. 
 
A key issue is the multiple agenda of WERS.   We accept that all surveys involve 
compromises particularly when they seek to record both cross sectional and time-
series changes.  WERS 2004 is no exception.  Hence, it is accepted that the survey 
instruments used in WERS have to strike a balance between being innovative, and by 
implication introduce changes, whilst at the same time maintain some continuity to 
allow time-series comparisons.  However, many of the questions within WERS 2004 
refer to formal practices and policies.  Such concepts are simply anathema to small 
business owner-managers.  There is clear, long standing, unequivocal evidence that 
employment relations in small firms, inter alia, tend to be devoid of ‘formal’ 
practices, trade union representation and industrial relations or personnel specialists 
(see for example, Curran, 1991; Marlow et al., 2005; Ram and Edwards, 2003).  Yet, 
these phenomena are amongst the pillars of ‘conventional’ employment relations’ 
literatures and to some extent continue to be reflected in the data collected for WERS.  
Spanning the world of employment relations in small and large organisations will 
always prove difficult using the same survey instruments and series.  It is clear debate 
is needed on the way forward and ideas shared on how to best satisfy the needs of 
various interested parties.   
 
In looking to the future of WERS, more change is needed.  WERS has to develop 
research instruments that have questions that demonstrate both construct and face 
validity fit for the small workplace.  Unfortunately, WERS 2004 has too many large 
firm ‘measuring rods’ and large firm norms underlying the questions on employment 
relations matters.  This leads to questions that have relatively high reported levels of 
‘non-response’ or ‘not applicable’.  In taking WERS forward, we also noted above the 
brevity of interviews in small firms.  Whilst not eschewing the need for data on 
formal practices and policies within the workplace, one solution could be to have 
these as probe questions rather than as part of an opening sequence.  Another would 
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be to include questions with a small firm emphasis, just as there are now details 
relevant only to large firms.  For example, the informality of arrangements in small 
firms over such issues as pay determination, training, and employee communication is 
widely noted. It would be possible to devise questions which try to explore this 
informality, for example just how decisions on pay are reached or how training takes 
place.  Some of these inferred large firm-small firm tensions may be less of a problem 
than first thought.  For example, more questions on informality may also reveal 
interesting results from larger organisations.   
 
Finally, a more basic improvement is suggested. Our early unpacking of the data sets 
revealed that the ability to identify micro enterprises easily was hampered.  This was 
because the variable recording the number of people in the enterprise as a whole 
(AUKTOT) was categorical and did not separate micro from small firms.  In order to 
reach our classifications numerous iterations had to take place and we were able to 
identify 84 micro enterprises with confidence.  In this process a number of 
establishments were not able to be distinguished between small and micro firms and 
were therefore excluded.  Hence, we recommend that a continuous (rather than 
categorical) variable is used when recording the total number of people in the 
organization to which the establishments are a part.  
 
These issues aside, WERS cannot be regarded as a definitive method for 
understanding the employment relationship in SMEs.  There is a strong argument that 
quantitative surveys with closed questions are more difficult to apply within smaller 
firms (Blackburn, 2005) and more nuanced accounts of the employment relationship 
in SMEs have been developed recently (e.g. Marlow, 2005).  Hence, it is a 
commonplace in the small firm’s literature that the context is critical: a small clothing 
company is very different from a web design firm or a professional service firm with 
the same number of employees (eg. Ram, 1999).  Context is of course also important 
in large firms. But, first, there are many more small firms than large ones so that the 
range of variation is greater.  Second, small firms are less formally structured and are 
more likely to reflect idiosyncrasy.  They may also be less exposed than are large ones 
to standardizing processes such as engagement in networks of human resource 
professionals. In other words, there may be fewer pressures to isomorphism. 
 
As a broad survey, WERS is not designed to look in detail at context.  Much research 
on small firms, by contrast, uses very small numbers, and WERS has great benefits of 
generalisability.  But one should not be blinded by numbers alone. Although WERS 
embraces 621 SME workplaces, the number in any one sector will be low.  Now, it is 
true that WERS is still likely to contain a large number of observations, particularly 
on employees.  But these will be a collection of responses from some very diverse 
contexts.  Carefully chosen detailed studies within particular contexts may have 
smaller total numbers, but they will be able to say things about those contexts and 
thus to identify distinct patterns and causal mechanisms underlying those patterns. 
Such targeted research is needed to complement what WERS can accomplish. 
  
A particular strength of WERS relates to what we would term pure size effects. That 
is, because of its breadth it can in principle compare firms of different sizes confident 
that they represent the relevant population.  The issue of course is whether such 
effects really exist.  We are increasingly of the view that they do, and that they turn on 
the nature of face-to-face relationships (Tsai et al., 2006).  This argument is in some 
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ways a reaction to the well-established position that size is correlated with other 
factors and that seeking simple size effects, as was the tendency in early research (see 
Curran and Stanworth, 1981a; 1981b), is erroneous.  We of course accept that one 
cannot generalise about all small firms because of their size alone.  But there has been 
some tendency to assume that size is not important at all.  There was an importantly 
similar tendency in relation to technology, with early technological determinism being 
rightly rejected but with technology then being ignored; only recently has a fuller 
appreciation been developed (Edwards, 1988; Bélanger, 2006).  In the same way, size 
determinism can be rejected, but size effects are still significant.  Plainly, one needs a 
theory to say what they are and how they work, but WERS provides important means 
for people armed with such theories to develop relevant empirical tests.  Hence, even 
within the limitations of quantitative surveys, there is room for improvement in 
WERS when SMEs are considered as a means of informing other analyses and 
approaches. 
 
These points are for future innovations in WERS.  We should not, however, lose sight 
of the positive developments in WERS and the incorporation of smaller units.  
Altogether, the innovations in small establishments in WERS 2004 represent an 
important shift in raising the knowledge base.  It should provide the basis for 
significant secondary analysis, complementary research projects and further agendas.  
However, WERS has benefited in the past from the challenging of various sacred 
cows.  This is one tradition to which we subscribe.  
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Well-Being in the Workplace Employee Relations Survey 2004 
 
Stephen Wood1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A measure of emotional well-being has been included in the Workplace Employee 
Relations Survey series (WERS) for the first time in 2004.  This is becoming known 
as the well-being measure.  It is based on the measure of anxiety developed by Warr 
(1990).  As such it measures one dimension of well-being.  Warr (2002) 
conceptualises job-related well-being in terms of three dimensions: an anxiety-
contentment axis; a depression-enthusiasm axis; a job dissatisfaction-satisfaction axis. 
The first two are related to arousal but in different ways: anxiety is associated with 
high arousal, contentment with low arousal, while enthus iasm is related to high 
arousal, depression with low arousal.  Job satisfaction is concerned with the extent of 
pleasure a person gains from their job.   Measures of job satisfaction were included in 
WERS when the employee survey was created in 1998.  
 
When discussing well-being in the work domain emphasis is often placed on 
psychological strain or stress, and job strain is often taken to be a combination of 
anxiety and depression.  Layard (2005: 21), a pioneer of the new economics of 
happiness, conceived of happiness in similar terms, since he defines it as involving 
Warr’s two main dimensions of well-being: contentment and joy (equivalent to 
Warr’s enthusiasm).  Yet happiness may also include in addition to well-being, 
overall mental health and feelings of self-esteem or worth.  
 
We can distinguish between general and domain-specific well-being.  Warr (1990) 
developed his measure of anxiety to serve as a domain-specific measure in the work 
context. However, there is no necessary reason why the items can not be used in other 
contexts or even for general well-being.  Indeed Warr drew on general psychological 
literature on emotional mood (e.g. Watson, Clark and Tellegen, 1988) when 
developing his underlying constructs and he has applied them to the non-work 
context. But Warr’s team suggest the General Health Questionnaire is probably more 
appropriate for general well-being (Mullarkey, 1999: 33-4, 57).  
 
The anxiety-contentment and depression-enthusiasm axes are measured by asking 
respondents, “Thinking of the past few weeks, how much of the time has your job 
made you feel” each of twelve emotional states. Three positive states – calm, 
contented, relaxed – and three negative ones – tense, uneasy, and worried are used to 
measure the anxiety-contentment dimension.  Similarly three positive items – 
cheerful, enthusiastic and optimistic – and three negative ones – depressed, gloomy, 
miserable – measure depression-enthusiasm.  In its original applications,  respondents 
were given a six-point response scale running from ‘never’ to ‘all the time’, and the 
negative scales were reverse coded so the higher values of the two scales represented 
greater contentment and greater enthusiasm, respectively.   
 
The respondent’s interpretation of the format of the items is  assumed to be bipolar, so 
answers to the positive items are negatively but highly correlated to those for the 
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negative item and the mid-point(s) on all items correspond to each other. Thus, for 
example if the mid-point of a five-point scale for the contentment items is some of the 
time, we would expect that some times on the tense item is equivalent to the similar 
answer on the calm item.  If these items were weakly negatively correlated this would 
mean that the responses to the two items did not overlap so that the two closest 
responses are “not at all” tense and “not at all” calm.  This is the contrasting unipolar 
format. 
 
In the initial application of the instrument Warr (1990: 200) showed through principal 
component analysis that, with the negative items reverse coded, the twelve items 
separated into two discrete factors that corresponded to the two theoretical concepts.  
A two-factor solution for each of the pairs of six items (contentment and enthusiasm) 
revealed that the negative and positive items formed separate components.   
Subsequent applications have sometimes used either a reduced, five-point scale or a 
reduced number of items by limiting them to the negative items only. 
 
The distinction between the two dimensions of psychological distress is important, 
even though they are related concepts.  As they differ in their relationship to arousal - 
the anxious person has high levels of arousal and the depressed person low levels - 
they might predict and be determined by different phenomenon.  For example of the 
potential predictors of well-being, high job demands may be more strongly related to 
anxiety than to depression, whereas the lack of personal control is more strongly 
associated with depression than with anxiety.  Similarly for example of the possible 
consequences of well-being, absence may be associated with depression and not 
anxiety, as the lack of energy and arousal that characterises depression often leads to a 
reduction in activities, which may include work attendance. In contrast anxiety at 
work or ill-contentment in a job may lead people to seek alternative employment.   
 
2. Well-being in the Workplace Employee Relations Survey of 2004  
 
The employee survey of the Workplace Employee Relations Survey of 2004 
(WERS2004) only includes the anxiety-contentment items and adopted the five-point 
scale, thus: “all of the time”, “most of the time” “some of the time”, “occasionally”, 
“never”.   Eight job satisfaction facets are covered in WERS2004: the amount of 
influence the person has over their job, the amount of pay they received, the sense of 
achievement they get from their work, their involvement in decision making, the 
scope for using initiative, the training the person received, their job security, and the 
work itself.  Of the two dimensions, contentment and enthusiasm, we might expect 
that the depression-enthusiasm one to most correlate with the job satisfaction items, 
and these might be treated as substitutes for it.  A person who is depressed about 
aspects of their job is likely to be highly dissatisfied, while one who is enthusiastic is 
likely to be satisfied.   
 
The employee survey within WERS 2004 produced a sample of 22,451 employees, 
which represented a response rate of 61 per cent.  The data were collected via an 
eight-page, self-completion questionnaire distributed within workplaces where WERS 
surveyors had conducted the management interview.  The aim was to get up to 25 
employees in each workplace, who were selected on a random basis to complete the 
questionnaire. Employee questionnaires were distributed in 86 per cent of the 
workplaces where the WERS surveyors had conducted the management interview. A 
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further 12 percent of workplaces did not return any questionnaires, and in those with 
10 or more employees these were treated for purposes of calculating the 61 per cent 
response rate as the same as those who had initially declined to distribute 
questionnaires.  The median number of employees per workplace completing the 
questionnaire was 13, with the most frequent (in 100 workplaces) being 16 
employees.  The number of employees in no cases exceeded the 25 employees 
requested by the surveyors.   
 
3. The behaviour of the contentment measure in WERS2004 
 
A principal component analysis on the six contentment items (with the positive items 
recoded so that the scale would be from the negative state of anxiety to the positive 
one of contentment) revealed that they form two discrete factors, as the negative items 
load on one factor and the positive items on another.  The correlations between the 
items ranged from 0.37 for a pair of negative and positive items, relaxed and not 
uneasy, to 0.79 for a pair of positive items, relaxed and calm.  
 
Several explanations have been given for the separation of negative and positive items 
into two factors.  For example following Bradburn (1969) one could infer that 
negative and positive feelings are independent of each other, and hence we ought not 
to expect bipolar responses to combinations of questions that are phrased in negative 
and positive terms.  Or we might argue that the separation reflects measurement error 
(Green, et al, 1993). A more recent argument is that there may be a relationship 
between positive and negative items, but that it is non- linear.  The respondent’s 
response format may be ambiguous and, while the response categories for each item 
may overlap they may not follow the tidy bipolar format (Segura and González-Romá, 
2003).  Saying, for example, one is not calm does not mean that one is terribly tense.  
In such circumstances, a model that allows for non- linearity such as the Mokken 
model is appropriate, rather than the linear factor model.  When conducted on the 
contentment items (using STATA9), the Mokken test achieved a good fit, which 
means they form a one-dimensional scale (Table 1).  Scalability is evaluated by the 
Loevinger H coefficient (Loevinger, 1948). The overall coefficient in the model of 
contentment is 0.55, which indicates that the items are scalable on a bipolar 
dimension, since when it is over 0.5 the scale is deemed strong (González-Romá, et 
al., 2006: 170).  
 
Table 1 
Results of Mokken Scale test Contentment 
Item Observations Loevinger H 
coefficient 
Significance 
Level 
Uneasy 21796 0.5231 0.0020 
Worried 21796 0.5243 0.0020 
Tense 21796 0.5770 0.0021 
Content 21796 0.4856 0.0023 
Calm 21796 0.5712 0.0033 
Relaxed 21796 0.5762 0.0026 
 
The anxiety-contentment scale has a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. This figure is 
consistent with those achieved in some of the earlier studies using the identical 
measure of well-being as reported in Mullarkey et al. (1999: 63), as the range across 
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the studies, predominantly in manufacturing companies, is 0.71 to 0.88 with a mean of 
0.79. 
 
Principal component analysis of the job satisfaction items suggested that they form 
one factor, with the model explaining 50% of the variance.  The factor loadings 
ranged from .82 to .51 and the three extrinsic items – satisfaction with training (.63), 
pay (0.51) and security (.56) have considerably lower loadings than the other intrinsic 
ones.  A measure based on the eight items has a reliability statistic, measured by the 
Cronbach’s alpha, of 0.85. This figure is again consistent with those achieved in the 
29 studies of job satisfaction overviewed by Mullarkey et al. (1999: 63), where the 
range across the studies is 0.85 to 0.93 with a mean of 0.88, although it used a 
different set of items to that used in WERS2004. 
 
The correlation between the two measures, contentment and job satisfaction, in the 
WERS2004 sample is the moderately high, 0.47 (significantly different from zero at 
the 0.01 level).  The correlation between the two sets of individual items making up 
the scales varied from 0.10 (not worried and satisfaction with initiative) to 0.51 
(feeling content and satisfaction with work itself); those between the satisfaction items 
and the negative contentment items are consistently lower than those involving the 
positive ones. 
 
4. Contentment amongst British Employees 
 
The average level on the anxiety-contentment scale in the sample is 3.2 (s.d. 0.8), and 
the data is distributed normally.  This mean is identical to the average of the means in 
the studies overviewed by Mullarkey et al. (1999: 63).  On the basis of the response 
codes for the contentment items, we would conclude that on average the British 
workforce is moderately content and anxious some of the time.  
 
The mean level of contentment varies significantly between occupations (F = 85.21 in 
ANOVA tests, significant at the 1% level).  Table 2 displays these and comparisons of 
mean scores across other groupings.  Caring, Leisure and other personal services are 
relatively high (see Figure 1).  Only skilled trades and routine unskilled workers have 
a level of contentment on a par with this group. Most significantly the contentment of 
managers is lower than all occupations with the exception of professionals. The 
variation is all within the range that we might classify as moderate levels of 
contentment, with all groups having some periods of time when they are anxious, the 
implication being that the amount of these is greater for managers, but not so high as 
to be, on average, most of the time.  
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Table 2 
Contentment means  across groupings of employees  
Well-being measure 
Grouping 
Contentment 
 
Well-being measure 
Grouping 
Contentment 
 
Occupation Group  Gender  
Managers and Senior 
Officials 3.03 Male 3.18 
Professional 3.01 Female 3.23 
Associate Tech & 
Professional 3.10   
Admin and secretarial 3.22 Contract   
Skilled trades 3.31 Permanent 3.19 
Caring, Leisure & personal 
services 3.36 Temporary 3.41 
Sales & Customer Service 3.29 Fixed 3.28 
Process, plant & machine 
operatives 3.26   
Routine unskilled 3.42 Education  
  Degree 3.04 
Age group   No Degree 3.27 
16-17 years old 3.38   
18-19 years old 3.38 Tenure   
20-21 3.31 Less than 1 year 3.31 
22-29 3.11 1-2 years 3.23 
30-39 3.17 2-5 years 3.20 
40-49 3.16 5-10 years 3.19 
50-59 3.24 10+ years 3.14 
60-64 3.57   
65+ 3.96   
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Figure 1   Mean Contentment by occupational group 
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Most age groups are less content in their jobs than 16-17 year olds (Figure 2), but the 
over 60s have the highest levels of contentment.  Generally, as tenure increases 
contentment steadily falls (Figure 3).    
 
Figure 2   Mean Contentment by age band 
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Figure 3  Mean Contentment by tenure  
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5. Predicting Contentment  
 
Perhaps the most popular theory of well-being is Karasek’s (1979) theory which is 
centred on the demands and discretion associated with jobs. In this, psychological 
strain results from the effects of the demands of a work situation and the range of 
decision-making freedom available to the worker facing those demands.  The model 
thus identifies job characteristics as the principal source of distress in the workplace 
as it proposes that psychological strain is caused by the combination of high job 
demands and low job control (and for this reason it is also called the demands-control 
model).  The underlying rationale of the model is that workers experience distress 
when this combination of circumstances exists because they are prevented from 
formulating effective responses to deal with the challenges of the job.  Other 
researchers (Payne, 1979; Johnson & Hall, 1988) have extended the model to include 
a lack of social support as a third potential source of job strain; this has become 
known as the demand-control-support (DCS) model.   
 
The job strain model has been formulated in two ways: an additive and an interactive 
form.  The additive form of the DCS model predicts that high demands and low 
control and low social support each cause psychological strain.  The interactive form 
of the DCS model predicts that control and social support buffer the negative impact 
of high demands on well-being (i.e., they interact with demands to reduce its negative 
impact).  Both forms predict that psychological strain will be greatest given the 
combination of high demands with low control and low social support (in the DCS 
model).  Karasek (1989) argued that whether one or other of the additive or 
multiplicative models fits reality better than the other is not the main issue as the 
practical implications for job design are the same.  The key test of the model is then, 
as (de Lange et al, 2003: 284) interpret it, that job demands and job controls 
independently predict strain and/or that there is a multiplicative relationship between 
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them, since the theory is that employees who work in jobs with high demands and low 
control experience the highest level of strain. 
 
The theory is typically tested by using measures of demands, control and supportive 
management based on individual’s perceptions of these job and environmental 
characteristics. We can use WERS to test it in this way.   
 
First, we can measure job demands by two workload measures: (a) a two- item scale 
based on asking respondents whether they agreed, using a five-point scale from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree, with three statements: “my job requires that I 
work very hard”, “I never seem to have enough time to get my work done”. 
Cronbach’s a  for the scale equals 0.60. (b) the amount of hours per week, including 
overtime or extra hours, that the person usually works.  There is another candidate for 
inclusion in a measure of demands – “I worry a lot about my work outside working 
hours”, but for the purpose of predicting well-being, its inclusion would mean that the 
outcome is embedded in the predictor.  This item is corrrelated highly with the 
negatively worded contentment items, the highest correlation coefficient being 0.54 
between it and being worried. 
 
Second, we can measure job control by a five- item measure (Cronbach’s a = 0.81) 
based on asking respondents to rate on a four-point scale – “A lot”, “Some”, “A little” 
and “None” – how much influence that they have over five areas of work: “the tasks 
they do in their job”, “the pace at which they work”, “how they do their work”, “the 
order in which they carry out their tasks”, and “the time they start or finish their 
work”.  
 
Third, managerial support can be measured by a six- item scale (Cronbach’s a = 0.93) 
based on a question that asked about the extent to which the managers at the 
workplaces had the following characteristics: “can be relied upon to keep to their 
promises”, “are sincere in attempting to understand employees’ views”, “deal with 
employees honestly”, “understand about employees having to meet responsibilities 
outside work”, “encourage people to develop their skills”, and “treat employees 
fairly”.  
 
Weighted regression analysis reveals that both measures of demands and the control 
and support scales are significantly related to contentment.   The results for a model 
with relevant controls and significant main effects and interactions are reported in 
Table 3.  Job demands and hours worked are both independently negatively associated 
with contentment; while job control and support are positively related to it.   
 
Analysis of the interactions between the various predictors shows that the negative 
association between demands and contentment weakens as job control increases.  
Giving employees control over their work buffers the impact of workload demands on 
contentment to some extent, as Karasek (1989) predicted when stressing that it is the 
constraints on people fulfilling their demands that is crucial.  However, job control 
does not have similar buffering effect on the negative link between hours worked and 
contentment.  The association between supportive management and contentment 
tapers off as control increases. The interaction between hours and demands is negative 
so the impact of longer hours intensifies as demands increase.   
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High hours have a greater negative impact on contentment when the wage of the 
employee is low, defined as not more than £220 per week.  In contrast, for this group 
of employees the impact of supportive management on their contentment is not as 
strong as for those earning above this amount.  
 
The regression analysis (Table 3) shows that contentment increases steadily with age, 
while only those with service of over ten years have significantly lower levels of 
contentment than those who have low levels of service. 
 
There is a significant difference between men and women, as men have higher levels 
of contentment than women.   Moreover the negative effect of long hours on 
contentment is stronger for women and than it is for men and the positive association 
between supportive management and contentment is stronger for women than for 
men. Finally managers and university educated personnel have significantly lower 
levels of contentment than others.  
 
Further analysis including measures of employee voice revealed that where 
management are perceived to be consulting with the work force or their 
representatives contentment is higher.  But employees who are members of a union do 
not report higher levels of contentment, suggesting than a union voice does not make 
any difference, at least over and beyond other consultative approaches.   
 
Multi- level analysis that has extended the above analysis to include characteristics of 
the workplace has shown that these explain some of the variance in contentment but 
by far the greater part of this is explained by the individual- level variables associated 
with the Karasek model.  The existence of a recognised trade union in the workplace 
is positively associated with contentment, but both the extent of high involvement 
management and family-friendly management are negatively associated with 
contentment (Wood, et al, 2006). 
 
The pattern of relationships is similar for job satisfaction, the distribution of which is 
again normal with a mean of 3.48 (s.d. 0.70).   Control and supportive management 
are significant positive predictors, and control buffers the impact of job demands so 
its negative impact is disproportionately concentrated in jobs with low control.  The 
impact of supportive management weakens as control increases.   
 
But, in contrast to contentment, the number of hours worked weekly is positively 
related to job satisfaction, and there is no interaction effect between hours and job 
demands, as there is in the case of contentment.  The interaction between wages and 
hours is again negatively associated with job satisfaction, so the positive effect of high 
hours is reduced for those on a low weekly wage.  There is though no relationship 
between low wages and job satisfaction. 
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Table 3 
Weighted Regression analysis of anxiety-contentment 
Main Effects plus Significant interaction terms  
   Beta Coef.  T 
Temporary -0.04 -1.56 Contract  
(Ref: Permanent) Fixed -0.02 -0.54 
     
 Manager -0.17*** -8.92 
 University Educated -0.11*** -8.60 
 Male 0.05*** 3.52 
    
Age group 
(Ref: 16-17 year olds) 18-19 years old 
0.09 1.48 
 20-21 0.14** 2.30 
 22-29 0.12** 2,24 
 30-39 0.20*** 4.00 
 40-49 0.20*** 4.03 
 50-59 0. 28*** 5.39 
 60-64 0.47*** 8.06 
 65+ 0.58*** 7.86 
Tenure  
(Ref: < 1 year) 1-2 years -0.01 -0.64 
 2-5 years -0.01. -0.57 
 5-10 years -0.00 -0.20 
 10+ years -0.05** -2.00 
     
 Low wage 0.13*** 6.17 
     
Main Predictors  Weekly Hours -0.00*** -2.99 
  Demands  -0.28*** -41.50 
  Control  0.10*** 14.54 
  Supportive Management  0.25*** 23.23 
  Demands x  Control  0.02*** 2.74 
  Supportive Management x 
Control  
-0.01** -2.16 
  Hours x Demands -0.03*** -3.74 
  Hours x Low wage -0.04** -2.09 
  Supportive Management x Low 
Wage 0.03* 1.67 
  Hours x Male 0.03** 2.30 
  Supportive Management x 
Male -0.05*** -3.69 
  Constant 3.07 56.26 
F  ( 29,19674) = 242.56 *** 
R-squared  0.33 
*** Statistically significant at p < 0.01 level, ** p < 0.05 and * p < 0.10 level.  All continuous 
predictors were standardised.  
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In contrast to contentment, men are less satisfied than are women, and the interaction 
effects involving gender for job satisfaction differs from those found for contentment.  
The impact of control on job satisfaction is stronger for both men and managers and 
the positive association between supportive management and job satisfaction is 
greater for men (when it was stronger for women in the case of contentment).   
 
The basic multiplicative Karasek model holds for both contentment and job 
satisfaction as job demands and control are related to them and control buffers the 
impact of demands on both measures. Supportive management is also important. 
However, hours, one measure of workload, is negatively related to contentment, as the 
model predicts but positively related to job satisfaction.  
   
6. Aggregating scores to the workplace level 
 
There are no measures of performance or withdrawal behaviours in WERS at the 
individual level.  Analysis linking contentment to such outcomes has then to be 
conducted at the organizational level where such outcomes are measured.  We can 
thus assess whether workplaces with workforces that are content have higher levels of 
productivity or quality and lower rates of labour turnover and absenteeism than do 
those where the workforce are anxious.  
 
However, when aggregating the individual scores on a variable to the workplace level 
we need first to assess the level of agreement between the individuals.  On a five-
point scale an average score of 3 could be achieved in a number of ways, for example 
by all respondents scoring 3; or by a third of the respondents scoring 2, a further third, 
3 and the final third 4; or by half scoring 1 and half 5.  Attributing a score of three for 
the average score on that variable for the last of the three cases would be a highly 
misleading summary measure.  
 
An index of agreement as developed for assessing inter-rater reliability can we used 
for assessing the representativeness of summary measures.  The Index of Agreement 
for multi- item scales proposed by James, Demaree and Wolf, (James et al., 1984) 
agreement index measures inter-rater agreement for categorical variables.  The index 
compares the observed within group variances to an expected variance from ‘random 
responding’.  For scale variables, the null distribution, used to represent ‘no 
agreement’ between respondents, is the uniform distribution where the expected 
proportion of cases within each of A categories is 1/A.  For example on a 5-point 
scale, random responding would result in 20% responding to each of the 5 categories.  
The variance for this null uniform distribution with A categories is calculated as 
( )
12
122 -=
A
nulls  .  For a 5-point scale variable this null variance is always 2.  The 
calculation of the sample variance for comparison with the null is calculated as 
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The index can take values between -1 and 1 with the general practice being to classify 
those groups with values above 0.7 as sufficiently homogenous for within group 
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aggregation.  Negative values occur when the sample variance is larger than expected 
from random response and are generally replaced by 0. 
 
Often there are groups of questions that are related and we may wish to calculate one 
measure of agreement for a set of questions rather than individually.  If this is the 
case, the following formula is applied for J related variables:  
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related questions.   
  
The spread of the results for the Index of Agreement for contentment for each 
workplace is shown in the Figure 4.  The mean index of agreement is 0.8 suggesting 
that for a lot of workplaces, using a summary measure would be considered a good 
representation of the views of individual employees.  Nonetheless, 72 workplaces 
score 0, or less.  
 
When a high proportion of workplaces are below the acceptable level of agreement of 
0.70 we can either exclude these workplaces from analysis and limit ourselves to a 
considerably reduced sample or conclude that the summary statistic is too 
unrepresentative of workplaces to be meaningful.  In the case of the measure of 
contentment, the proportion is 88%, and we might use the whole sample and simply 
Figure 4 Distribution of index of agreement scores for anxiety-contentment 
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report that some workplaces have an index of agreement below 0.7 as a certain 
number of such workplaces below this figure is to be expected.   
 
However, there is also an issue that there are a number of workplaces, representing 
5% of those which participated in the employee survey, which have only 1 or 2 
respondents and we may wish to consider excluding these from the sample, regardless 
of the size of the workplace, under the assumption that there is a greater chance that a 
summary variable for a workplace with only one or two respondents will be 
unrepresentative of it.  When these workplaces are excluded from the sample the 
proportion of workplaces with an index of agreement on the contentment measure 
increases to 91% compared with 88% in the whole sample.  Moreover the standard 
deviation of this index decreases by approximately 30% after the removal of these 
workplaces.  
 
When doing analysis that involves several aggregate measures of workplace variables 
e.g  the job demands and control used in the analysis above, we might want to average 
the index of agreement scores for all the measures, by workplace and exclude those 
workplaces whose average is below the 0.7 level rather than exclude workplaces 
where the index of agreement scores for individual scales falls below this level.  This 
would result in the exclusion of workplaces where there was general disagreement 
between views of employees rather than just disagreement on one measure.  For some 
scales there are generally lower levels of agreement between employees.  In 
particular, only 48% of workplaces have an index of agreement score of at least 0.7 
for the control scale, suggesting that control is more related to job than workplace.  In 
this situation it may be preferable not to use an aggregated mean score for control and 
exclude this score and, if possible, find a better measure of workplace control. 
 
Analysis using the aggregate measure of contentment showed that a contented 
workforce is not related to any of the performance variables available in the 
management survey: labour productivity, financial performance, quality, absenteeism 
and labour turnover.  Job satisfaction is however strongly positively related to labour 
productivity, financial performance, quality and negatively related to absenteeism and 
labour turnover. (Wood, et al, 2006).   
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Coverage of Job Satisfaction 
 
Michael Rose1 
 
1. Objectives in extending coverage of employee job satisfaction in WERS 5 
 
Introduction of an employee questionnaire was the major innovation in the WERS 4 
of 1998 (Cully & Woodland 1998). One strong motivation for this innovation was the  
overreliance in the precursor WIRS (Workplace Industrial Relations Survey) series 
upon management or worker representative reports of employee response to control 
structures and regimes. Now there was employee material directly corresponding to 
the workplace data gained from these other organisational participants. But as far as 
job satisfaction went, the new opportunities to explore the effect of workplace regime 
on worker attitudes was somewhat limited in WERS 4. Just four questions on aspects 
of job satisfaction were asked in 1998. They were judged to have  broadly succeeded 
in showing a number of key features of workplace attitudes by the 1998 Survey’s 
designers (Cully et al. 1999:18-2), and this conclusion was to be echoed in other 
studies. Reviewing the employee attitudes methodology of the 1998 survey, the  
present writer (Rose 2000) argued that four job facet questions might be a rather too 
narrow selection on which to make well grounded judgments about levels of overall 
job satisfaction, especially as the questions actually fielded represented intrinsic 
(quality of work life) aspects of jobs (job facets) better than the extrinsic (contractual 
and material) aspects. None the less, comparative analysis in this writer’s study 
showed that the response distribution for satisfaction with the crucial pay facet 
seemed reasonably close to that in other large surveys of British employees. It was not 
possible even to offer an opinion, let alone reach a clear verdict, about the success of 
other facet questions in the absence of directly comparable questions in other surveys.  
 
There were other grounds internal to the data set (such as details of workplace 
context) for believing the four 1998 questions had in fact worked quite well. Most 
tellingly in terms of technical quality, given their estimated internal consistency 
reliability2, the questions could be considered to form a single scale. Comparison of 
the performance of such a WERS 4 summary measure with those produced by far 
better calibrated overall job satisfaction measures in other employee surveys3 were 
reassuring. To the crucial question about the WERS 4 job satisfaction material – how 
far can you trust it? – it was possible to answer: A lot further than might have been 
expected. 
 
The revision of the employee questionnaire for WERS 5 built upon such evaluations 
of the WERS 4 experience and resulted in some changes. These changes are 
summarised in Table 1. Four main objectives were pursued: a) some continuity with 
WERS 4; b) an increase in the number of job facets covered; and c) a selection better 
grounded in theory of a representative set of job aspects; d) production of an adequate 
                                                                 
1 University of Bath 
2 As measured by Cronbach Alpha (0.74) it rose safely above the normally accepted threshold of 0.74, 
especially if allowance is made for some ‘normal’ attenuation (see Section 4). 
3 The Work Histories and Attitudes questionnaire of the ESRC’s Social Change and Economic Life 
(SCELI) Initiative; The Employment in Britain (EiB) survey; and the Employment Module of the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). 
 
  163 
summary measure for overall job satisfaction (Mullarky et al. 1999). These aims are 
considered in turn below, after noting some general measurement problems. First, job 
satisfaction as a concept and contract has given rise to considerable debate over 
meaning and measurement; but it is agreed that it makes sense to talk about such a 
construct, and to see it as having a unitary domain of application, albeit a somewhat 
complex one. In this sense it is comparable to such constructs as social mobility, 
human intelligence, or utility. To measure job satisfaction presents similar problems 
to those arising in selecting ‘items’ (appropriate problems, or relevant questions) to 
include in any ‘test’ (measurement operation). To survey job satisfaction successfully 
requires adequate domain sampling of the items (questions about job facets). In theory 
such sampling should take the form of random selection from a very large universe of 
items. In practice, items have at some point first been composed, while it would be 
impossible to create a list of all items ever composed and used. (Job satisfaction is  
possibly the most frequently studied topic in the social sciences of work and  
employment.) However, Nunnally & Berstein (1994: 217) note that simply pursuing 
variety, though imperfect, has a broadly similar effect in practice. Moreover, variety 
can be improved by applying knowledge about the internal structure of job 
satisfaction. Just as human intelligence comprises dimensions (or factors) such as 
mathematical ability, verbal ability, and spatial judgment, job satisfaction has several 
distinct though interdependent dimensions. It is desirable to represent each one as 
fully as possible. 
 
Achieving the foregoing might de done simply by increasing the number of items in 
the test, at least if the aim is to produce a good measure of overall job satisfaction.  
Answers to enquiries about satisfaction level with any two job-facets will correlate to 
some extent with each other in any fair sized sample of employees, though some 
facets will correlate more closely – or much more closely – than others. For example, 
people having higher satisfaction with their pay will tend to have higher satisfaction 
with their sense of achievement. (For many individuals, of course, there may be sharp 
divergence.) 
 
Adding four further facet questions to a set of four will always produce a more 
accurate profile, whether of individuals or for large occupations, irrespective of 
exactly which job facets have been covered already in the initial four, and irrespective 
of exactly which additional four job-facets are covered. In a word, more nearly always 
means better in the sense of a gain in understanding. However, and rather obviously, 
some samples of facets will produce more additional understanding than others. 
Ideally, observers should sample aspects of a domain in a fully representative way; 
but there are always practical limits on how many separate questions, however 
relevant and otherwise productive, can be asked in a given survey. Such limits result 
from competition for space on a questionnaire, or limits to the patience of people 
responding to the questionnaire. In the WERS selfcomplete questionnaire, these limits 
are necessarily tight. 
 
 
  164 
 
Table 1 
 Continuity and Change in WERS Job Satisfaction Questions  
Question wording  
 
WERS 
4 
WERS 
5 
Why included in/excluded from 
WERS 5 
The amount of respect you are 
shown v × 
·  Dropped because purpose 
unclear and possibly 
unreliable 
The amount of PAY you receive 
v v 
·  Continuity with WERS 4. 
·  Most frequently examined 
job-facet in job satisfaction 
surveys. Clear relevance to 
assessing extrinsic 
(‘material’ or ‘economistic’) job 
satisfaction 
The sense of ACHIEVEMENT 
you get from your work  v v 
·  Continuity with WERS 4. 
·  Clear relevance to assessing 
intrinsic job satisfaction 
The amount of INFLUENCE 
you have over your job v v 
·  Continuity with WERS 4 
The scope for using your own 
INITIATIVE × v 
·  Standard question in one-off 
large employee surveys, 
and in BHPS [WAVES 1-6 
ONLY] 
Your JOB SECURITY 
× v 
·  Rated among the three most 
desirable job facets by 
BHPS employees. 
·  Standard question in one-off 
large surveys. 
·  Salience of debate on 
‘flexicurity’ in UK. 
The TRAINING you receive 
× v 
·  Standard question in one-off 
large employee surveys 
·  High relevance to HRM and 
flexicurity debates and policy 
The WORK ITSELF 
× v 
·  Standard question in one-off 
large employee surveys, 
and in BHPS 
·  Known to correlate highly 
with single-item questions for 
overall job satisfaction 
Amount of INVOLVEMENT in 
decision-making × v 
·  Relevance to issues of 
employee representation and 
HRM strategy/design 
 
Fortunately, a theoretical guide of how to ensure representative coverage is available. 
The Maslovian tradition in psychology, and a lesser known sociological approach 
originating with Kalleberg (1974, 1977), emphasises an essential division between 
extrinsic and intrinsic job rewards. Further subdivision is justified by factor analysis 
of actor preferences, with up to six types of reward recognised. Most employees seek 
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rewards of all types, and evaluate them but factor analysis shows that some are of 
greater importance (salience) than others to most workers; studies of job-facet 
preference rankings confirm this. The extrinsic (contractual and material) and intrinsic 
(quality of work life) dimensions are the most important. Coverage can be improved 
simply by ensuring that more questions be asked about them, and that there is a more 
or less equal number of questions in each case. A very crude analogy with the process 
of measuring intelligence can be made. A longer test is almost always better than a 
very short test, whatever the questions asked. Yet there is a risk of selecting questions 
which mostly test verbal (or mathematical, or spatial) ability. Results of a longer test 
will be still better if the additional questions also tap mathematical ability and spatial 
ability. 
 
Continuity 
 
Two of the four job-facets covered in WERS 4 (the influence you have over your job, 
the respect you receive) are essentially social and relational in nature. It seems 
essential for a survey of WERS’ type, concerned closely with internal workplace life 
as it is, to deal adequately with the relational aspects of job satisfaction. However, it  
was argued that the question referring to ‘respect’ might be interpreted in more than 
one way and that it was hardest of all four to relate to other employee relations 
research. (Question forms referring to relations with an immediate supervisor or boss 
are closest.4)  
 
It was therefore eventually replaced by a question on satisfaction with involvement  in 
decisions. Besides being clear in meaning this new enquiry relates immediately to a 
huge amount of other research on employees and central debates in policy and 
academic circles. The two other job facet questions from WERS 4 were retained: pay 
is such a central job-facet for all employees, and so central to evaluation of 
satisfaction with the extrinsic rewards of employment as a whole, that it would be 
almost unthinkable not to include an appropriate enquiry. Degree of satisfaction with 
a sense of achievement is not often covered in large employee surveys, despite its 
manifest relevance for accurate assessment of the intrinsic reward of jobs, while being 
likely to correlate highly with data from other questions concerned with tapping the 
intrinsic dimension. Retaining it provided direct continuity with WERS 4. 
 
Increased spread of job facets covered 
 
Space on the self-administered employee questionnaire in WERS is very scarce, but it 
was agreed that a limited number of additional questions could be added to the main 
job satisfaction question battery. (The enquiry about satisfaction with involvement in 
decisions was to be asked later, alone and free-standing, immediately after questions 
about what kind and level of involvement took place in the workplace.) A large 
number of possible questions could be listed, but it seemed best to select job facet 
questions with known properties regularly featuring in other employee surveys. This 
drive for comparability reduced the list considerably. A further aim was to balance the 
new questions between extrinsic and intrinsic job facets. This meant that questions 
about satisfaction with hours worked, for example, which relates to a convenience 
dimension (Kalleberg 1977), had to be excluded. BHPS continues to include such a 
                                                                 
4 Such questions were asked in SCELI and EiB. 
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question, but it produces somewhat enigmatic results: for example, it is known that 
many women working part-time wish to work full-time and complain that their hours 
are shorter than they wish, while many men, and an increasing number of those 
women who work full- time, are dissatisfied with their hours because they want to 
work fewer hours. Obviously, too, some employees may misinterpret a question about 
satisfaction with hours worked as an enquiry about satisfaction with their daily or 
weekly working time schedules. 
 
Factor analysis of data for a large set (above 10) of job facet items shows that an 
extrinsic factor and an intrinsic factor have the two clearest patterns of item loading;  
these two ‘strong’ factors are by far the easiest to interpret on immediate inspection.  
Data on the job facets that would be preferred or priorit ised in job switches or in job 
search also show that these are indeed, for practical purposes, what most concern most 
employees (Rose 2005a). Two additional intrinsic reward items were agreed without  
much difficulty, to go with sense of achievement: satisfaction with opportunities to 
use initiative and satisfaction with the work itself. Both enquiries figure in other 
important surveys (see next section). Some question may arise over how the work 
itself may be interpreted. It is intended to apply strictly to the work that is done in the 
current job. In many occupations very similar work would be done in other jobs 
bearing the same job title. 
 
Does this affect how respondents answer the question? In particular, do many people  
answer, at least in important part, in terms of the generic work of their occupations? 
Will they be more inclined to do this if they are dissatisfied with the pattern of 
specific tasks and responsibilities that the current job requires? This is part of a wider 
problem of the field of reference for most intrinsic reward job-facets which urgently 
requires research.  
 
Choice of two extrinsic reward job-facets required lengthier consideration. Apart from 
pay, the contending job-facets were: promotion opportunities, training received, job 
security, and fringe benefits. Of these, promotion was the easiest to eliminate, on the 
grounds that such opportunities are excluded or somewhat conjectural, thanks to the 
job held, for about one in every twelve employees. This complicates the creation of 
composite measures of overall job satisfaction (see below) where data on satisfaction 
with promotion opportunities are available. Other recent data from the Working in 
Britain survey (White et al. 2003) showed that 83% of employees considered job 
security ‘important’ or ‘essential’ when appraising a job opportunity; training 
provision was given such importance by 73%; and promotion opportunities by only 
52%. No data were available about the prioritisation of fringe benefits5. 
 
A key element in the debate about flexibility is the HRM claim that while job security 
can no longer be guaranteed nor promised with sincerity, employers can provide 
workers with training to enable them to find other work more readily if severance 
becomes inevitable, as well as improving the ir performance in the current post. A 
question about satisfaction with training received in the current post rarely figured in 
employee surveys until the 1990s, but Gallie and White (1998) included one in their  
Employment in Britain (EiB) survey of 1992. (However, this data set has only recently 
been released into the public domain.) Irrespective of the risk of severance, training 
                                                                 
5 Working in Britain (WiB) data: see White et al. 2003. 
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may increase chances of promotion. Thus a case for including it in WERS, with its 
focus on the interaction of workplace structures and employee attitudes, was a strong 
one and finally agreed.  
 
It might seem that the claim for job security is equally strong, especially at a time of 
widely perceived insecurity in the labour market. (That such insecurity may 
sometimes be overstated is beside the point.) However, the case for including fringe 
benefits instead was also quite strong, given the topicality of the crisis of employer 
funded pension schemes and the wider set of issues regarding pension provision. 
Finally, however, job security was chosen on the grounds of wider comparability. 
 
2. Comparability with other survey data on job satisfaction. 
 
Two difficulties in the comparability in job satisfaction data between surveys must be 
distinguished. The first relates to facet coverage; that is, the extent of overlap in those 
aspects of a job actually covered in two or more surveys. The second, comparability 
of measurement, creates more troublesome problems. First, scales of  satisfaction/  
dissatisfaction offered to the respondent vary greatly: see below. Many British 
dedicated employee surveys are undertaken using a personal interview; some such as 
the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD) annual survey, use 
phone interviews; but WERS uses a self-complete schedule. (BHPS offers an overall 
job satisfaction question in both an interviewer administered and a self-complete 
form.) Lack of similar scales, differing methods of administering the questions, and 
slight variations  in question form make it very difficult to compare results from one 
survey to another in any but a very indirect way. However, as will be shown, some 
comparison can usually be made for a given job facet appearing in two or more 
surveys, provided there are no major changes of wording in the question phrasing or 
the response anchors: apparently trivial changes can wreak havoc (Rose 2005b). 
Comparisons of overall job satisfaction based on composite measures (see below) are 
perhaps less exposed to such risks. 
 
Table 2 summarises the coverage of job satisfaction in eight well-known employee 
data sets. With 8 facets covered, WERS 5 has an intermediate position between 
WERS 4, and BHPS Wave 7 onwards, with only four facets covered in each case on 
the one hand; and, on the other hand, EiB and WiB with 15 in each case. Two of the  
extrinsic reward facets (pay, job security), and two of the intrinsic reward facets (work 
itself, opportunities to show initiative), have in each case been the best covered facets 
of their type in other surveys. It has been less common to ask about training provision 
(3 out of 7 other surveys), and much less common to ask about sense of achievement 
(only in WERS 4). WERS 5’s relational dimension questions about influence on 
decisions, and sense of involvement, have also been asked in each case only in one 
previous survey, one of these being WERS 4, the other EiB – where the specific 
wording in fact referred to ‘communications’, though the facet denoted seems to be 
very similar. 
 
  168 
 
 
Table 2 
Coverage of Job Satisfaction Facets in Large Employee Surveys 
Dimension of job 
  Specific job facet 
W
iB
 
EiB
 
SC
E
L
I  
W
E
R
S 5 
A
W
IR
S 
B
H
PS 
em
ploym
e
nt 
m
odule 
W
ave 1-6 
B
H
PS 
em
ploym
e
nt 
m
odule 
W
ave 7 
W
E
R
S 4 
Tim
es 
facet 
exam
ined 
Extinsic          
  Pay × × × ×  × × × 7 
  Security × × × ×  × ×  6 
  Promotion × × ×  × ×   5 
  Training provision × ×  × ×    4 
  Fringe Benefits × ×       2 
  Work Effort × ×       2 
Intrinsic          
  Work performed × × × ×  × ×  6 
  Initiative required × × × ×  ×   5 
  Variety of tasks × ×       2 
  Acheivement    ×    × 2 
  Abilities used × ×       2 
Rational          
  Supervisor/ 
manager × × ×  × ×  × 6 
  Management 
quality × × ×      3 
  Influence    ×    × 2 
  Coworkers × ×       2 
  Involvement or    
Communications 
 ×  ×     2 
Convenience          
  Hours of work × × ×   × ×  5 
  Journey to work ×        1 
Other          
  Various     ×    1 
Number of job  
related facets 15 15 8 8 7 7 4 4  
Correlation Alpha 
value                  
0.87   0.8   0.77   0.85  0.70       0.77             0.68    0.74 
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Comparability on any shared job-facet is sharply reduced by variation in the  number 
of points on the scales used to gauge satisfaction. SCELI used an 11-point (0-10) 
agree/unsure/disagree scale; EiB, WiB, and both modes of BHPS, used a seven-point  
scale; both WERS have five points; AWIRS – already id iosyncratic in the selection of 
job facets it offered to employees – took a resolutely minimalist approach, simply 
offering the 3 options ‘agree’, ‘unsure’, ‘disagree’. Creation of standardised scores is 
only a very incomplete fix for the problem. This makes it impossible to compare 
directly the proportion of positive response (percent of sample expressing some 
degree of satisfaction) or the mean scores obtained – quite apart from the more 
delicate question of whether how far it is justifiable to compute mean scores from 
ordinal level data in any case.6 An additional complication is that the WERS and 
AWIRS data were collected by means of a self-complete schedule, while all the other 
data were collected by an interviewer. 
 
3. Measuring Overall Job Satisfaction.  
 
During the course of revising the draft questionnaire for WERS 5, the question arose 
of whether to include a further question about overall job satisfaction, e.g. ‘All in all, 
how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with your job?’. Most surveys that ask about 
satisfaction with job-facets conclude with such a summary question. It is always asked 
only after all facet questions have been asked.7 In theory, the list of job-facet queries 
acts as a focusing aide-mémoire and results in a relatively reliable summary 
judgement. It was agreed not to include such a question, partly on the grounds of 
space and partly because of methodological worries about single- item measures of 
complex attitudes. The omission of such a question may seem inconvenient  to some 
users of the data set; thus the methodological grounds for excluding such a measure 
will be spelled out.  
 
There are increasing grounds for suspecting that a single- item measure (SIM) of job 
satisfaction provides data that is insufficiently reliable for many sorts of analysis. Two 
of these grounds will be discussed here. The first is job facet bias. Response to job 
satisfaction SIMs appear to be more closely related to ratings of intrinsic sources of 
job satisfaction (variety, opportunities for initiative, the task performed, etc.) than to 
extrinsic sources (pay, job security, opportunities for promotion, fringe benefits). This 
link did not become apparent until, relatively recently, when large data sets for 
national random samples of employees with appropriate variables began to appear. 
(Applied psychologists have usually drawn samples within organisations, or at most 
from several related organisations.) Examination of three of these data sets for the UK 
clearly establishes the closer association between ratings for a job satisfaction SIM 
and those for intrinsic job satisfaction; in terms of joint variance explained (r2), the 
average is around 30% for intrinsic facet data and around 20% for extrinsic facet 
ratings. One association in particular stands out, that between scores for a SIM and 
                                                                 
6 It should be noted, however, that psychological measurement experts are more supportive of this 
practice than others: see Nunnally & Bernstein chapter 1 (page 16 esp.). 
7 Where there is a lengthy list of job facets to be covered in an interview, it is usual to rotate them, 
typically by moving down the list; the first respondent starts at the first on the lis t as printed on a hard-
copy questionnaire and ends with the last; the next respondent starts on question two, completes the 
list, then returns to question 1. With CAPI (computer assisted interviewing) the rotation is achieved 
automatically, or can even be fully randomised. Such rotation is not possible in self-administered 
questionnaires, thus increasing the risk that a respondent will end by simply repeating a given category 
(response-bias). 
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scores for the work itself, where joint variance explained rises to at least 40%. 
Researchers who choose to use, or are obliged to use, a SIM should attempt to correct 
for this inbuilt bias. How this might be done is at present not clear. 
 
The most troubling evidence against SIMs concerns internal consistency reliability. A 
rubber tape measure is useless as the units registered are likely to vary from the ‘real’  
units which it purports to measure on each occasion it is used. It will not just be 
inaccurate but unpredictably so. Measures in the social sciences can never measure 
whatever they set out to measure so accurately and so predictably as a steel tape 
measure can register millimetres or inches. However, it is possible to make relatively 
good estimates of how well the inevitably imperfect measures used by social scientists 
should operate from one ‘trial’ to another. The internal consistency of overall 
measures created from several facet variables can be measured by the Cronbach’s 
Alpha (a ) statistic. Alpha measures the degree of correlation between, on the one 
hand, an additive score of facet ratings for each case and, on the other, the theoretical 
true score which would be created with a perfect measuring instrument. An Alpha 
value of 0.70, signalling that around 50% of joint variance between it and the notional 
perfect measure is explained, is considered the threshold necessary for building a 
minimally trustworthy composite score (COM) variable (for overall job satisfaction in 
this case). More rigorous researchers look to achieve an Alpha value of at least 0.80, 
or desirably 0.90. (A low Alpha value may often be increased simply by adding extra 
items to the test or enquiries to the question battery,  since a minimum of five or six 
facet questions are normally required to reach 0.70, however good the data.) 
 
There is no direct way of providing an Alpha value for a SIM. However, an indirect 
method was suggested some years ago by Wanous et al. (DATE). In a meta analysis, 
the Wanous team showed that, whenever a viable COM can be computed from the 
data set concerned, and the data set also supplies a SIM, the degree of correlation 
between them provides a route towards an estimate for an Alpha equivalent value for 
the SIM.8 The Wanous meta analysis of over 30 US data sets produced a mean 
estimate value for Alpha Equivalent of 0.64. Research by the present author on 3 large 
British data sets, following the Wanous procedure, yields a value slightly higher, 
0.66.9 These results are disheartening for anyone who must rely on SIMs. However, 
Wanous suggest that, because all survey data is subject to other kinds of unreliability 
it is unreasonable ever to expect a maximum value for Alpha much over 0.90, and 
never a value of 1.00. Thus, might it not be acceptable to increase an Alpha value of 
0.64 by 11%, bringing it above 0.70? The present writer feels somewhat uneasy about 
such an adjustment, and cannot see how the value of the suggested correction has 
been estimated; but its logic seems impeccable. However, that still leaves such 
questions with far too feeble an Alpha value for comfort. In any case, the latter value 
is much less than those of genuine Alpha estimates for COMs when several 
appropriate job facet measures are available – as they are in the WERS 5 employee 
data. 
                                                                 
8 See Wanous et al. 1997. The route towards a grounded minimum estimate for an Alpha equivalent 
value lies through the correlation value for a SIM and a COM in the same data set. If each alternate was 
a perfect measure of the construct, they would correlated perfectly with a value of +1.00. In practice 
they rarely corre late better than around 0.70. This failure must reflect unreliability in each of them. As 
an exact estimate for the reliability of the COM can be made, the proportion of total error in the 
correlation attributable to the SIM can easily be computed. 
9 The data sets are SCELI, EiB, and WiB. 
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For the eight job satisfaction variables in WERS 5, internal consistency reliability is 
high (a  =0.84), with joint variance explained of around 70%. A job satisfaction score 
can easily be computed either by simply summing the eight scores, by Factor analysis, 
or by Optimal Scaling. Correlation between these measures is extremely high (well 
over 0.90), and for many purposes they are virtually interchangeable. For some kinds 
of description and exposition, the simple sum of scores version is preferable, as (e.g.) 
mean scores are easier to relate to a meaningful scale in terms of simple units. Factor 
scores are perhaps preferable for statistically more intricate analysis. 
 
4. Performance of WERS 5 job satisfaction questions  
  
Two types of test of the quality of the job satisfaction data in WERS 5 can be applied. 
The first is purely internal. Table 3 shows percentages satisfied or very satisfied with 
the job-facet concerned. The proportion varies enormously; there was a high degree of 
satisfaction with all three intrinsic facets; job security, influence, and training all show 
a lesser degree of approval, though one with substantial majorities of satisfied 
employees; while involvement in decision-making and pay both show broad 
disapproval; pay was especially so with 40.8% registering that they were either 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied. This pattern is one that the present writer would judge 
entirely typical in a British employee sample. For whatever reason, intrinsic job-facets 
always receive a relatively high rating. An optimistic, but almost certainly incorrect, 
view would be that this shows the high level of skill of British managers in delivering 
job quality. An alternative view is that, with regard to these job-facets, expectations 
are set lower, and that less rigorous or less exigent tests of acceptability are then 
applied to them. Some evidence supports the latter view, though less clearly than 
might be wished. Research into the reasons for the pattern, which recurs in survey 
after survey, would be useful. 
 
Table 3 
Performance of WERS 5 job satisfaction questions  
 ‘Satisfied’/ 
‘very satisfied’* 
Nonresponse** 
Job-facet Percentages 
The scope for using your own initiative  71.9 1.4 
The work itself  72.0 1.3 
The sense of achievement you get from your 
work  
70.5 1.0 
Your job security  63.0 2.9 
The amount of influence you have over your job  57.6 1.9 
The training you receive  50.6 2.0 
Amount of involvement you have in decision-
making at this workplace? 
38.4 
 
0.8 
The amount of pay you receive  35.6 1.35 
Mean  57.45 1.6 
Notes: Unweighted data, *Not answered or ‘Don’t know’,**Percent base=valid response. 
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A second internal test relates to inability to decide one’s level of satisfaction 10(“Don’t 
know” selected as response) or avoidance of any response at all; this may be viewed 
as analogous to a refusal to provide an answer in a face-to-face interview. Given the 
extensive pre-testing and piloting of the WERS surveys, poorly understood questions  
are quickly removed or improved before the survey goes into the field ‘for real’. The  
proportion of non-response, averaging just 1.6%, shows that no general problem 
arose. The actual differences in non-response to questions is none the less worth 
noting. The highest level of non-response was for job-security, just under 3%. Most of 
this is accounted for by “Don’t know” responses. It seems reasonable to suppose that 
information on which to reach a definite verdict was indeed lacking in many of these 
cases. In view of the cultivation by some employers of uncertainty about job security, 
the figure might even seem on the low side, with many having to make a guess about 
their degree of job security. Whatever the truth of the matter, there is no sign here of 
any failure of communication on the part of the surve y instrument. Finally, the very 
low (0.8%) non-response for involvement might well suggest that there was 
exceptionally high interest in the question in this sample.  
 
The second type of quality control test is comparison with results from other surveys. 
As noted earlier, undertaking such tests is not straightforward, owing to the varied 
length of scales offered for level of agreement or disagreement, changes of question 
wording, and contrasting methods of data collection (interviews versus selfcomplete 
questionnaire schedules). When results from questions with manifestly comparable 
intent produce similar patterns of response, confidence in reliability increases. It is 
always possible to examine how specific groups of people answered any question 
covering the same job-facet (such as pay) in each of two very different surveys by 
reference to demographic details such as age and sex, which are invariably recorded 
in any employee survey. But such demographics are relatively clumsy for this 
purpose. A better test is, however, available in the present case. The officially 
recognised occupational groups in the UK Standard Occupational Classification (SOC 
2000) are known to vary greatly in their modal levels of job satisfaction (Banovcova 
& Rose 2006; Rose, 2003). After taking mean scores (or percentages of satisfied 
response) for occupations within one data set, each occupation can be assigned a rank 
in a job satisfaction ‘league table’. The same operation is performed on the second 
data set. The rankings are then compared statistically. Table 4 shows the results of 
doing this, using as the comparator the sample of currently employed people in the 
British Household Panel Survey Wave 14, which was fielded in the autumn of 2004. 
 
Table 4 shows Spearman correlations for the rankings, in WERS 5 and BHPS 
respectively, for satisfaction with pay, the work itself, and for overall job satisfaction, 
of the eighty-one SOC 2000 Minor Occupational Groups. Mean values were used to 
create the rankings. It should be noted that the BHPS sample includes people working 
in establishments of all sizes, while the WERS 5 sample has a 5-person cut-off point; 
as job satisfaction is known to be boosted by working in very small workplaces, this 
may affect the results, hopefully in only a marginal way. Rather more important, the 
BHPS sample is smaller (7,340 unweighted cases), less than one-third that of the 
WERS 5 sample.  
 
                                                                 
10 This kind of response is qualitatively different from a ‘neither satisfied nor dissatisfied’ reply, which 
indicates ambivalence, neutrality, or indifference.  
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Table 4 
Performance of WERS 5 job satisfaction questions  
Rank Order Correlation of Minor Occupation Groups in WERS 5 & BHPS 
Wave 14 
 n=81 n=47 
(cases>=50) 
n=29 
(cases>=100) 
Satisfation with pay 0.47  
 
0.56 0.69 
Satisfation with 
work itself 
0.59  
 
0.71 0.76 
Overall job 
satisfaction* 
0.81  
 
0.87 0.88 
Notes: Unweighted data, *Single-item measure in BHPS, composite measure for W ERS 5 
 
Between one-quarter and one-third of the occupations small sub-sample size produces 
mean values subject to very large standard errors; this problem that affects only a 
handful of occupations in the WERS 5 sample. 
 
As the minimum number of cases required is increased (in order to reduce confidence 
intervals around the occupational means) first to 50 or more persons and then to at 
100 or more, the rank order correlations improve. The degree of agreement is  
somewhat better for the work itself than for pay, and best of all for overall job 
satisfaction. The WERS 5 measure of overall job satisfaction, as noted earlier, is a 
composite score created from scores for facet variables, and known to be better 
calibrated than the BHPS measure by virtue of its high Cronbach Alpha value. Use of 
interviewers on the one hand, and a self-complete questionnaire on the other, may be 
of some importance to the comparisons made here; just how much remains to be 
established by appropriate research. None the less, the rank correlation of 0.88 for the  
overall satisfaction rankings for the 29 largest occupations seems rather encouraging. 
 
(However, values for Kendall’s tau are slightly lower.) It may be data collection 
method, or establishment size, accounts for some of the remaining difference in 
rankings. However, in so far the difference results from less success of a measurement 
instrument  to operate predictably, in all probability the WERS 5 ranking is the more 
dependable. 
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